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Preface 
 
The present monograph has set the aim of providing the presentation and analysis of the 
development of Hungarian copyright law from the beginnings in the 19th c. to currently 
effective inland and Union regulations. In view of the growing importance of this field of law, 
its analysis in an independent monograph is justified by the fact that—although several 
commentaries and text books as well as studies focusing on certain specific fields have been 
published recently—a work giving a full-scope and overall presentation and analysis of the 
history of the development of Hungarian copyright law has not been issued up to now. 
In terms of its structure the work can be divided into two larger parts. The first part focuses on 
the history of the evolution and regulation of Hungarian copyright law from the age of the 
Enlightenment to the 20th century, against the backdrop of European development and 
regulation, and compares domestic and foreign lawmaking. In this part, special attention has 
been paid to Ferenc Toldy’s and Bertalan Szemere’s copyright law bills, and a separate 
chapter discusses the debate of the Hungarian Lawyers’ Society held in 1906, which affected 
the fundaments of the regulation of copyright law, and Elemér Balás P.’s reform proposals. 
The analysis of this scientific rather than codification history background is meant to present 
the reform proposals pointing forward in Hungarian copyright law and getting this field of 
law close to European standards and their relation to effective regulations of relevant periods.  
The second much lengthier part explores the history of the development of specific 
institutions of copyright law in the mirror of our laws, that is, Act XVI of 1884, Act LIV of 
1921, Act III of 1969 and Act LXXVI of 1999. As part of that, we shall discuss the basic 
dogmatical pillars of copyright law, delimitation of moral and economic rights and their 
increasingly clear separation in specific laws, limitations of copyright law and use contracts. 
After that, relevant genres regulated separately in specific laws will be addressed one by one, 
setting out from genres that traditionally fall within the scope of copyright law such as 
literary, dramatic and musical works, arriving at regulation of issues arising from 
technological development, such as software related copyright law issues. This part will cover 
the definition of infringement of copyright as set out in specific laws, regulation of their legal 
consequences and description of prevailing order of procedure related thereto. Finally, 
tendencies in the development of effective copyright law will be addressed, with special 
regard to recent and expected effects of Community law.1 
 
 
 
 
Tamás Nótári 
 
                                                 
1
 Mauscript finished on April 11, 2012. 
I. Introduction 
 
Copyright is the author’s or his legal successor’s exclusive right over some intellectual 
product that falls within the scope of literature or art. The long process of the evolution of 
copyright protection has been influenced by the joint impact of three factors. One of them was 
the invention of the technology of printing of books, which can be called the physical side, or 
technical or material circumstance, because the appearance of the possibility of reproduction 
emphasised—through saleability of intellectual properties—the necessity of protecting 
personal and intellectual interests.2 The other factor is a circumstance in the history of ideas: 
the appearance of individualism. Works of art of the Middle Ages were characterised by 
anonymity, however, from the Renaissance the subjective element revived, man became an 
intellectual individual and recognised himself as such. Artists strove for survival and 
recognition of their name—this change resulted in the subjective side. The third factor, a 
characteristic of the past two centuries, is the social need for men to become the owner of 
their intellectual products. This can be considered the consumer side. As demand for 
intellectual works grew, the necessity of property protection, in addition to intellectual 
appreciation, came to the front. It was no longer all the same if the profit arising from the 
work of art landed in the hands of the party entitled to it or an unauthorised person. 
One of the primary aims of the regulation of copyright is to encourage creation of intellectual 
works; it is in this spirit that it acknowledges moral and economic rights for the author’s 
benefit, and thereby advances appreciation, protection of values of national, European and 
universal culture. At the same time, regulation of copyright law shall create and maintain the 
critical balance of private and public interest. There is a need for balance between the interests 
of authors and other right owners as well as users and the general public. Copyright 
legislation must satisfy lawful needs of education, general education, scientific research and 
free access to information. Legal regulation must keep up with technological development and 
must arrange for institutional and procedural conditions of extensive, efficient enforcement of 
entitlements too. 
Copyright is a partial field of private law; it constitutes security for the legal protection of 
intellectual products. It provides protection for artistic activity—which creates literary, 
musical, fine arts, applied arts, applied graphical, photo art, dance art and so-called secondary 
works (adaptations, translations)—performing arts activities and activities akin to author’s 
creative work. Creators are entitled, on the one hand, to moral rights, which are related to 
making works public, integrity of the work, exclusivity of use of name and title, and, on the 
other hand, to economic rights, which apply primarily to author’s fee, distribution, 
reproduction, any form of use of the work. Author’s economic rights can be transferred; after 
the author’s death heirs will be entitled to moral rights related to the work for a defined 
period. Prejudicing any of the rights the author is entitled to constitutes infringement of 
copyright (usurpation) and involves civil and criminal law sanctions.  
Consequently, acknowledgement of intellectual and artistic performance was manifested in 
the initial obscure legal awareness of this development. The State included the exposition of 
this legal awareness in its tasks only in the Middle Ages, after printing of books had spread 
since the new form of disseminating thoughts was of general significance and brought along 
certain risks. The first protection and limitation of author’s rights began with princes’ 
privilege right, which, however, did not extend beyond granting the printing of author’s works 
and prohibition of reprints, and protected and restricted printing of books only. 
Acknowledgement of the author’s independent rights developed only after the fall of the legal 
system of privileges in England and the French Revolution terminated old feudal rights, 
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which was a great breakthrough in the field of author’s rights too. So, it is not by chance that 
acknowledgement of the author’s rights on the Continent took place in 1793 in France. In 
Sweden, the first ordinance on freedom of printing was adopted in 1766 
(Tryckfrihetsförordning), which, however, did not apply to works on religious subjects and 
writings endangering the security of the State, but with respect to other works it terminated 
censorship and made free political dialogue possible. It can be demonstrated that also in the 
rest of the States the author’s independent power evolved through disintegration of the feudal 
structure and freedom to communicate thoughts (freedom of the press) was acknowledged 
too. Copyright itself was part of various licences set out in the right of communicating 
thoughts.  
The first form of independent copyright evolved on the analogy of the right of ownership at 
the end of the 18th c.; this state in Europe lasted for almost one hundred years. Analogies 
drawn from right of ownership were certainly suitable for providing protection for author’s 
works in corporeal form for the benefit of the author. Prosecution of reprints of printed 
literary and musical works, compensation for damage caused by prejudicing rights, exclusion 
of others from use as well as legal succession through purchase and sale or inheritance could 
be implemented under this approach to law. Furthermore, it was possible to achieve, which is 
important in terms of freedom of the press, that the author’s power could at last get rid of old 
privilege and administrative burdens and as an acknowledged private right should be subject 
to the competence of courts. Yet, it was not suitable for enforcing the author’s personal 
licences or for securing the acknowledged right against immaterial infringements. 
In the right of ownership approach, however, copyright could not be protected against 
distortions at all or only insufficiently by violently bending application of law. Public 
speeches, theatre plays and musical works were mostly left without protection too. Works of 
the fine arts (statues, pictures, architectural drawings, applied arts decorations) were also 
heavily in need of protection, whereas invention of new technological procedures and 
photography made it easier to infringe (usurp) the author’s right. 
Both in jurisprudence and practical life it became more and more obvious that the approach to 
writer’s and artistic property rights was untenable along the general development of 
education, and that the objects of the licences that the author was entitled to in the new state 
of development included incorporeal goods that could not be protected on the analogy of 
ownership, whereas their protection was a universal social interest and not just the author’s 
personal legal interest. Rapidly increasing circulation of literary and artisitic works, invention 
of new forms of reproduction and publication—especially in picture-writing and music—
demanded safer regulation of universal social interest against the author. 
In time, the right of ownership approach in copyright law failed in jurisprudence and partly in 
legislation, allowing a new uniform law interpretation to appear, which defined the author’s 
various rights as separate units and (putting aside its old name) used the name copyright. 
France and England kept to the old approach.  
The first resolute step to this effect was made by the Prussian act of 1870, later by the German 
imperial Urheberrecht and the two other acts of 1876 attached to it. The Hungarian act of 
1884 on copyright and the Austrian Urheberrecht of 1895 were based on them too. 
Undoubtedly, by the beginning of the 19th c. the development of copyright had not been 
completed and the nature and scope of several licences had not been clarified yet through the 
general acknowledgement and exposition of this highly important legal principle in 
legislation. New licenses were formulated; likewise, the need for new types of protection 
arose, especially against usurpation committed by electronic and optical procedures.  
It can be also established that both jurisprudence and legislation strove to extend the author’s 
rights, to provide more effective protection for it and to create a closer international legal 
organisation. The new, independent and uniform copyright law was under the impact of vivid 
movement of development in the early 19th c. too; what is more, the reform movement in Italy 
tried to include all intellectual works in the scope of copyright protection. 
In the legal regulation of the given social conditions—as it was acknowledged in the general 
approach of the period too—the lawmaker has the option to engage certain arbitrariness. The 
lawmaker’s decision is based primarily on the analysis, evaluation of interests related to the 
given social conditions and efforts to ensure harmony of these interests. Various interests 
arise concerning intellectual works. The interest of the creators of works is fundamentally 
important: the need to create the conditions necessary for developing talent, to ensure 
personal/moral and proper financial/economic acknowledgement related to creation. The user 
has interests to be appreciated; in case of either artistic or technical works it is an essential 
interest that use should be unrestricted and secure, and protection should be provided for the 
disposal over a significant rate of benefit/profit obtained or obtainable through use. It is a 
lawful interest of society that intellectual works should be created at as high standards and in 
as great numbers as possible and should be used as extensively as possible. Easy access to 
works helps education, scientific research. Disposal over intellectual works provides 
competitive edge; therefore, in using works attention should be paid to competitors’ interests 
too. All these interests cannot be ignored by the law-maker in the regulation of intellectual 
works. In practice, however, conflicting interests rarely appear in a clear, polarised form; the 
webs of interests meant to be regulated are complex, coloured by overlapping interests. 
Theoretically, it is possible to construct a kind of hierarchy of interests; however, the 
lawmaker’s decisions are necessarily some kind of compromise. What is needed is conscious 
deliberation, comparison of interests; efforts to create harmony between interests must be 
based on economic and legal policy considerations providing that this requires ceaseless 
maintenance by the legislator. 
The Hungarian regulation of the law of intellectual products, fundamental codes go back to 
the 19th century. This was justified by the re-regulation of the relevant fields of law. The 
consequences of the Second World War, the evolution of the centrally controlled socialist 
economic/social system emphasised this requirement all the more. Obviously, however, the 
socialist legal system could be built only gradually; and clearly, the law-maker first focused 
on codification of overall, fundamental codes that affected complete branches of law. In civil 
law, this was carried out in 1959. Only after that was recodification of other important 
specific fields of civil law put on the agenda, including norms to regulate intellectual works. 
In recodification of intellectual works the first great steps were taken in 1969. 
Copyright protection is a legal relation of exclusive character, absolute structure. It follows 
from this that only the obligee of this legal relation—the author, co-author, author’s legal 
successor (right owner)—is a determined person; anybody apart from the author whose 
obligation has a negative content can be in the obligor’s position; he must respect the author’s 
legally protected interests, the relation to his work and must refrain from disturbing it. There 
is no need for any authority’s proceedings, registration for creating copyright protection. This 
is justified by the role of the subjective aspects of the work, the individual/original character 
as fundamental criterion, contrary, for example, to the objective character of technical works. 
Compared to it, copyright protection arises simultaneously with the creation of the work; in 
case of disputes the court can, as matter of fact, declare that the author of the given work is 
not the person who was thought to be or who declared himself as such but somebody else.  
The content of the author’s legal relation is made up by the rights the obligee (copyright 
owner) is entitled to and the obligations he is bound by. The author is entitled to moral rights 
and economic rights. It is disputed in theory whether these should be considered independent 
civic rights or partial rights of a uniform author’s civic right. In Hungarian jurisprudence the 
concept of uniform author’s civic right prevails; this is supported also by the inseparable 
relation of moral rights and economic interests, the appearance of the given titles as different 
aspects of the same title.  
The essence of copyright is that the user does not get the right of exclusive use of the work 
directly from the State; instead, he needs to obtain it under private law contract from the 
author, who is solely entitled to sell his work on the strength of the law. Because of that it was 
obvious to include the absolute rights on the work in the concept of property, which, on the 
one hand, made it possible to market them, and, on the other hand, ensured exclusivity of 
disposal over the work by virtue of traditionally accepted title. The concept of literary and 
artistic property, however, did not pay regard to the author’s personal interests in his work or 
his right to take action against distortions of the work or to claim authorship or plagiarism. 
And competing users were against the possibility of creating hereditary market monopoly on 
the work based on property, as earlier at the time of privileges. However, temporal restriction 
of intellectual property was in conflict with the essence of the private law property concept. 
This way, from the outset, ownership qualification of copyright was disputed in terms of both 
its content and form of exercise. 
Copyright is the author’s licence to his thought expressed externally, usually by punctuation 
marks, picture representation, words or music, which can be considered a work. The essence 
of this licence is that solely the author has the right to make public, publish, 
duplicate/reproduce, present, perform or cause to perform his work and to enjoy the benefits 
arising therefrom, and the author has the right to transfer his such exclusive right to other 
persons either in whole or in part. Exclusivity involves the right to translate the work into 
other languages and to adapt it to other genres. These licences are partly of personal property 
right nature and are to be protected alike. Furthermore, the author has the right to withdraw 
his published work, forbid other persons to publish it, even to exclude the State from the 
above. 
It follows from the author’s moral rights that he can determine the form of publishing his 
work, and whether he publishes his work under his own name, pseudonym or anonymously, 
and under what title. Anybody who does not take this right of the author into consideration 
and publishes his anonymous work, for example, under the author’s name or uses other names 
(publisher) prejudices the author’s moral rights to his work. Also, the author has moral rights 
to publish his work in the form determined by him, without any changes. The publisher or 
other legal successor who changes anything in or omits anything from the work without the 
author’s consent infringes the author’s moral rights. The law must efficiently protect not only 
the work but also the intellectual and artistic interests laid down in it and the author’s personal 
authority, conviction and reputation related to the work against other persons’ intrusion.  
The author’s economic rights cover the exclusive enjoyment of the benefits and advantages 
expected to arise from his work. Solely the author is entitled to benefit financially from his 
work. Therefore, the author disposes over economic benefits that can be obtained from it and 
can determine the form and scope of benefiting. The forms of economic benefits can be 
various: for written works the most frequent from is reproduction and distribution through 
printing, however, reproduction by handwriting also occurs; exhibition (projection) by optical 
means or publication through reproduction by phone, on records, for speeches publication in 
printing or other ways. For theatre plays and musical works, publication of the text of the 
play/work through printing or in other way, public performance of the work. Distribution, that 
is, selling or disseminating the published work to the public as independent act also belongs to 
the author’s economic rights. Quite expressively, Hungarian language sums up violation of all 
these rights set out in copyright in the word usurpation; furthermore, in all European laws it 
involves private law and criminal law consequences. 
In jurisprudence the subject of copyright was the topic of theoretical disputes in the 
beginnings. The approach, however, which setting out from ownership considered the 
external, physical body of the manifestation of the thought (manuscript or printed paper, 
painted canvas, carved object, sculptured material) the subject of law failed together with this 
theory. This approach, for that matter, did not cover public speeches and lectures.  
The approach that the subject of copyright is bodiless, i.e., immaterial can be considered 
general in the theory. According to Josef Kohler’s notion, which has not completely broken 
away from the physical approach to the subject of law, the subject of copyright is the 
imaginary picture, that is, its artificial creation (Gebilde) that the author has given to its work 
first in thought, then in external expression. That is what the law protects and not the content 
of the expressed thought. The content is often more important; yet, it is not this but the form 
of expression that copyright protects.3 According to another approach, the thought, that is, the 
content of the work is the subject of law. This is clearly seen especially in plagiarism when 
the infringer makes other persons’ expressed thought public in other treatment—where the 
distinctive feature of usurpation is the content itself, i.e., misappropriation of the thought. It 
was a recent approach that the subject of copyright is actually the shape, form in which the 
author’s thought became embodied, that is, turned into a protectable work. New legislations 
set out from that and judicial practice moved within this scope of idea.  
The further approach that the author’s work is actually a right that belongs to the author’s 
person and so the protection provided for it is ensured also to the author—i.e., it is a personal 
right in the strict sense—takes the personal aspects of the subject of law into account only and 
should be considered outdated. In accordance with the Hungarian Act LIV of 1921, the basis 
of copyright is constituted by the exclusive knowledge of the thought, the artistic shape in 
which the author recorded the thought or the technical procedure the author has invented to 
realise the thought. In general it can be established that the law protects thoughts appeared in 
a certain form only. However, the method itself (manier), form of writing (style), literary, 
picture-writing, sculptural, architectural, decorative and photographing taste itself cannot be 
the subject of protection unless owing to the thought implied by or the structure of the work. 
Yet, expression of the thought by a new method, in a new style or taste can be deemed 
usurpation all the less because there is perhaps no such thing at all in literature and art as a 
totally new thought. Our every new thought is rooted in the past and is the result of slow 
development, growth, although it certainly carries the mark of individuality; so, accordingly, 
neither form, nor thought itself can be the subject of copyright. The two together, however, as 
an original composition, i.e., work can be.  
Accordingly, the real subject of copyright is the planned composition in which the finished 
intellectual product, the work appears externally. Thus, basically, the subject of law is the 
intellectual fabric, i.e., plan of the work. This ”intelligent” fabric, plan, that is, 
structure/organisation is the real subject of copyright. To the question what should be 
considered a work in terms of copyright no certain answer is given by various legislations and 
theories. In general, an irregularly, unsystematically expressed thought cannot be considered a 
work in terms of copyright yet.  
Copyright is an exclusive but not unlimited right. Copyright can be exercised within 
restrictions set out in rule of law only, which restrictions mark the borders of the social 
function of copyright. All this is based on the social conditioning of author’s works. To create 
a valuable intellectual product, author’s work, first of all a creative person’s individual skills, 
artistic, literary, scientific vein, outstanding achievement over the average are required; 
however, the impact of social environment cannot be underestimated in conceiving the work. 
It is enough to think of education, efforts to attain proper cultural level, setting up and 
operation of institution network that advances, ensures use of the works, creation of 
legal/organisational/financial conditions that serve authors’ interests, development of a social 
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climate to encourage creative work, appreciation of cultural heritage. Consequently, legal 
regulation needs to make efforts to guarantee not only the author’s moral and economic 
interests but also to create opportunities for the possibly most extensive undisturbed social use 
of interesting works.  
In social life the author’s copyright powers are opposed to general cultural interests of 
significant weight. It is the author’s interest to have legal dominion over his work excluding 
everybody, and that he alone should determine the economic conditions of publication too. It 
is, however, the interest of the individual and society itself that intellectual goods should 
spread as fast and as easily as possible. Between these two opposing interests the statutory 
protection of the author’s rights arises from the consideration that a vivid intellectual product 
that meets the need of the public will be properly assured only in the event that the authors are 
also assured with respect to the expected economic benefits and personal advantages of their 
work. Accordingly, the practical question to be decided in science and lawmaking was as 
follows: in what aspects and to what extent can the author’s exclusive legal dominion be 
restricted.  
Legislative restrictions of copyright apply basically and primarily to economic rights the 
author is entitled to, which, of course, does not mean that moral rights are unrestricted. They 
are also governed by general legal principles and norms that set forth the obligation of 
exercise of rights according to rules and the prohibition of abuse of rights. Certain restraints 
of moral rights can be observed regarding service works, in the restriction of right of notice 
linked to revoking consent given to use; as a matter of fact, the author himself can use the 
means of self-limitation, for example under a contractual agreement. In the widest, at the 
same time simplifying sense, the term of protection can mean restriction of the author’s 
economic rights although it is more proper to consider them the limits of protection.  
In the state of development of the period, restrictions apply partly to the limits of copyright, 
partly to its duration. The former include especially liberation of works serving the benefits of 
education and general education, exclusion of charity performances in certain cases from the 
scope of the concept of usurpation and authorisation of quotations from alien authors’ works, 
inclusion of short extracts from poems in music. To determine all these is a secondary task, 
which sometimes involved quite a lot of practical difficulties—for example in adapting a 
work to another genre or using a work for decorative purposes (applied arts).  
Restrictions in time include term of limitation of right of action and even more the general 
limitation of copyright itself for the benefit of society, which could be perhaps called the 
extinction, amortisation of copyright. It is in it that the legal demand that society lays claim to 
the authors’ works is manifested the most definitely, which was not clearly expressed in the 
period of the theory of intellectual property. Legislations usually set the term of amortisation 
in thirty/fifty years from the author’s death, although the Berne Convention of 1886 tried to 
make it uniform. Certain statutes set shorter term of limitation, i.e., extinction on certain 
works (replicas of the fine arts, photos, plays, applied arts objects, etc.) as well as on 
translation of literary works—they made the latter subject to registration and terminated 
protection of translation of unregistered works in one or two years in order to boost 
circulation of thoughts and ensure greater legal security, which meant termination of the 
author’s exclusive translation rights.  
All these and restrictions similar to them belonged to the open questions of further 
development of copyright, just as eminent domain of the State regarding works considered 
prominently important in terms of general education—legislations preceding Act XVI of 1884 
dispensed with eminent domain in terms of the author’s moral rights.  
The oldest form of infringement of copyright is plagiarism (plagium), which was known by 
the Romans already, yet in a completely other sense.4 Originally, plagiarism meant the act of 
making alien ideas appear one’s own, so it fell within the scope of forgery and not theft. 
However, even new development in law has not made plagiarism a prosecutable infringement 
of rights, and as declaration of plagiarism could not be a task of copyright law, plagiarism in a 
stricter sense was not determined in the cases of infringement of copyright anywhere.5 
According to the standpoint of the jurisprudence and legislation of the period infringement of 
all moral and economic rights provided for the author of the work was called usurpation, so 
the work itself, or its plan, i.e., structure, to be considered in this sense, was the subject of 
legal protection, and the author or his legal successor was the protected person (the latter only 
with respect to the rights devolved to them).  
The cases of usurpation in author’s, musical, theatre, fine arts and photographic works—
presuming lack of the author’s consent—could be the following infringements of rights: 
− unauthorised publication of any copyrighted work not made public yet 
− unauthorised reproduction of works made public already but not reproduced yet 
(public recitation, piece of music, exhibited picture, statue, photo) 
− unauthorised publication of a work lawfully reproduced already but not made public 
yet, in spite of the author’s will 
− all cases of unauthorised distribution 
− unauthorised public performance of plays and musical compositions 
− unauthorised public exhibition or remaking of works of fine arts and photography 
− unauthorised translation of author’s work into another language 
− unauthorised adaptation of a work in the same or to another genre 
− unauthorised use of works of fine arts or photography for the purposes of applied arts 
or industrial manufacturing 
− unauthorised use of author’s works as words of music 
− unauthorised changes, omissions, additions or corrections in/from/to the title or text of 
the work 
− unauthorised use of the author’s name on an alien work, or distortion of the author’s 
name on the author’s work, use of his real name instead of pseudonym or use of pseudonym 
instead of his real name, or use of another name instead of his name. 
All these infringements of rights are partly of a personal nature, and sometimes of a mixed, 
moral and economic nature according to the author’s right. It is beyond dispute that the 
author’s moral rights will devolve on his legal successor (publisher) only in the event that he 
has expressly transferred them; however, neither in jurisprudence nor in legislation has a 
uniform view evolved as to what extent moral rights (use of name, correction of the work, 
right to make changes, etc.) devolve due to the author’s death on his heirs, or to what extent 
on the person to whom the author transferred the economic utilisation of his work in his life 
(publisher).  
According to the position held in the period, the legal consequence of usurpation was 
compensation for damage payable to the author; usually, the infringer’s bad faith or 
negligence brought along complete compensation for damage (damnum emergens and lucrum 
cessans); in case of the infringer’s excusable error or good faith refunding of unlawfully 
acquired benefit, i.e., enrichment was stipulated. In general, fine was acknowledged as 
penalty of usurpation, however, in copyright lawsuits the issue of penalty was more and more 
separated from the issue of compensation for damage, the latter was referred from the 
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jurisdiction of private law courts to the jurisdiction of criminal courts, as it was set forth by 
Austrian statutes in 1895 and German statutes in 1901 and 1907. 
Publishing right is actually a partial transfer of rights, which the publisher obtains from the 
author for reproduction, publication, distribution of the work for certain consideration 
(honorarium), and as such it belongs in the strict sense to the scope of private law, and it 
contained all the rules of law that regulated the legal relation in the absence of any contract 
between the author and the publisher or in case such contract was incomplete. As a matter of 
fact, within the scope of the rights transferred to it, the publisher was entitled to take action 
against third parties, so if for example the publisher acquired the right to publish the work for 
a single edition, the publisher was entitled to copyright against not only a third party offender 
but against the author himself, except for the author’s untransferred or untransferable rights. 
On the contrary, if the publisher acquired all of the author’s rights on his work, then as the 
author’s legal successor the publisher would exercise all of the author’s rights, again except 
for those which can constitute solely the subject of negotia inter vivos. 
Copyright regulation regulates economic and personal relations; today it still belongs to civil 
law in the broad sense. Nevertheless, as a consequence of its peculiarities and special 
function, in time it has turned into an independent, separated field of law both internationally 
and in our national legal system. Copyright protection is a legal relation that stipulates an 
obligation with absolute structure, negative content, which is in its character similar to 
ownership relations. Its subject, however, is the intellectual product that requires 
acknowledgement and protection of the author’s moral rights too. 
Author’s economic rights are also granted the constitutional protection that in accordance 
with the Constitutional Court ruling No. 17/1992. (III. 30.) arises from the provisions of the 
Constitution on protection of ownership. This was declared already by Part III of the 
Constitutional Court ruling No. 1338/B/1992 with regard to inventor’s rights; there is no 
reason at all to exclude author’s economic rights from the constitutional protection already 
acknowledged for inventor’s rights, where protection of such economic rights is the duty of 
the State. 
On the other hand, the presumption seems to be well founded that on the grounds of 
paragraph (1) of Article 54 of the Constitution protection of the author’s moral rights 
constitutes part of general personal rights and appears as a peculiar aspect of protection of 
human dignity. To support the above, it is possible to refer to the structural solution used in 
the Civil Code: the regulation of personal and intellectual property rights jointly in one 
chapter. 
It also points towards fundamental rights classification of author’s rights, or at least of the 
claim for copyright protection, that Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted by the United Nations (promulgated by Law-
decree 9 of 1976) demands signatory countries to acknowledge the right everybody is entitled 
to that his/her moral and financial interest shall be protected with respect to any and all 
scientific, literary or artistic works s/he is the author of. 
 
II. Turning points in the international history of the legal protection of 
intellectual property 
 
II. 1. Copyright law in the national codification of the modern age 
 
Although as early as in Roman law there were contracts that were entered into between the 
author and booksellers on multiplication of literary works and under which publisher’s rights 
were protected by trader’s business habits, these transactions were not provided with legal 
protection because legal sources do not mention the right of multiplying author’s works and 
there were no action-at-law by which a possible claim could have been enforced.6 The 
privileges provided by rulers or other superior authorities for merely certain individuals 
appeared as the first legal sources, which ”were granted to the author or the publisher, and in 
earlier times exclusively and usually to the publisher only”.7 As we can see action could be 
taken against reprints, impressions through privileges granted solely in individual cases: the 
point of these privileges was that the publisher—for example, subject to the prince’s right of 
supervision—obtained right to printing and publishing of books under ”monopoly”. For lack 
of rule of law, it was determined in charters what works the privilege applied to, what the 
content of the legal relation between the publisher and the author was, and what its limitations 
in time were. Two great types of patents can be distinguished. One of them ensured printing 
of books in general for the person obtaining charter, and simultaneously barred everybody 
else from this activity; whereas the other type made it possible to print particular books, while 
excluding everybody else. In this respect, Hungary was not lagging behind considerably since, 
for example, in 1584 the College of Nagyszombat obtained the exclusive right of publishing 
Corpus Iuris Hungarici, being aware of the clause set out in the charter that impression and 
unauthorised sale by other persons shall be punished by ten golden marks.8 In the Middle 
Ages, guild rules provided some collective protection with respect to product markings on the 
grounds of charters; from the 15th c. more and more privileges were issued, primarily in 
England, Switzerland and city-states of North Italy. This regulation aimed at the legal 
protection of the user, i.e., printer-publisher rather than that of the author, although privileges 
granted to the author can be also found in records.  
Privileges were replaced by regulation at the level of law effective for the entire country 
rather slowly in Western Europe too. First, such a statute was adopted in England in 1709; the 
real wave of enacting laws started from the end of the 18th century only. Laws were usually 
determined by aspects of prevailing state and economy policy and definitely showed the 
traces of the system of privileges. After several Austrian decrees and Hungarian attempts at 
making laws in the late 18th c., the Hungarian national assembly passed a law on this subject 
in 1884 only. 
The 1709 statute of Ann Stuart (1702–1714) and the judicial practice that evolved from it can 
be considered a scheme that broke through the feudal model and arrived at the concept of 
copyright law in the modern sense.9 It can be established that codification with regard to 
intellectual properties reached consistent solutions that suited the capitalist economic system 
in countries where social/political transformation was also radical; so, in France and the 
United States of America, which can be considered the model of consistent bourgeois 
revolution. 
During the 19th c. in Europe, codification of copyright and patent law in the modern sense 
evolved, consistently enforcing civil law approach and development of exclusive rights to 
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intellectual property. The capitalist legal system consistently acknowledged the authors’ 
rights, protection of works; this protection, however, as a result of the principle of formal 
equality before the law, continued to leave authors economically exposed to users in stronger 
economic position. In copyright law, guarantee rules protecting the weaker contracting party, 
i.e., the author, had developed only by the 60’s and 70’s in the 20th c. 
The ancestor of every copyright law is the Copyright Act of 1709 of the Protestant Ann Stuart 
(Statute of Ann), which ended the monopoly of the Stationers Company and provided for 
exercise of censorship. It set forth that on the copies of a work published for the first time 
subject to entering it into proper register exclusive right would be created in favour of the 
author or the person to whom he transferred this right. After fourteen years had elapsed, the 
transferred right reverted to the author, who could transfer it to another person for fourteen 
years again. After a total of twenty-eight years had passed, the copyright terminated. When 
Bertalan Szemere started to prepare his bill, as we shall see, a regulation adopted in England 
in 1842 extended this protection merely to expiry of seven years following the author’s death 
and to forty-two years (i.e., three times fourteen years) from the date the book was published. 
The twice fourteen-year term of protection included in the pan-federal copyright law passed in 
1790 in the United States of America following Ann Stuart’s lead was raised in 1831 to twice 
twenty-eight years from the first edition, making renewal for the second period subject to 
compliance with determined scope of persons and new registration.10 In the United States, as 
early as in the beginning of the 19th c. under pain of forfeiture of right, it was required that 
each reproduced copy should contain a ”copyright” mark showing the year of the first 
edition; this made it possible to calculate the duration of the term of protection everybody was 
expected to meet and substituted publication in the official Gazette read by only a few people. 
It was not long ago that this generally known requirement terminated, more specifically after 
the accession of the US to the Berne Union in 1989. 
In France, revolutionary decrees on theatre performances adopted in 1791 and on ownership 
rights of authors, composers, painters and draughtsmen in 1793 provided for the exclusive and 
transferable ”most sacred author’s ownership” for five and ten years following the author’s 
death respectively, and it was the users and not the authors of relevant works who benefited 
from it. In 1810 the term of protection was extended to twenty years from the author’s death. 
On German territories, in the shadow of recipiated Roman law, authors’ and publishers’ rights 
were interpreted theoretically. In 1734, Böhmer asserted that by purchasing the manuscript its 
ownership would devolve to the publisher ”cum omni iure”—including the right of 
publishing. In 1785, Kant stated that the author was entitled to inalienable and most personal 
right (ius personalissimum) on his work, and he could be addressed even in the form of 
publishing only with his permit.11 In 1793, Fichte distinguished between the thoughts 
communicated in the work, casting these thoughts into an expounded work and the book 
embodying the work: the thoughts constitute public domain, the work is the author’s 
inalienable property, and the publisher is entitled to rights on reproduced copies. The 
ownership concept was reinforced at the beginning of the 19th c. by Schopenhauer and Hegel. 
In his lectures published in 1820 Schopenhauer expounded that actual property is that can be 
taken away from a person only unlawfully, and the property that he can protect ultimately can 
be what he had worked on. Hegel made it clear that the person who obtains a copy of a work 
will be its unrestricted owner, however, the author of the writing will remain the owner of the 
right to reproduce the intellectual property.  
Against the backdrop of such theoretical arguments and on the basis of increasingly prevailing 
natural law, the makers of the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794 deemed it unnecessary 
to establish copyright; instead; they set out publisher’s right in section 996 of the code, 
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stipulating that as a general rule a bookseller shall obtain publishing rights only on the 
grounds of written contract entered into with the author. Given this concept, the issue of 
protection did not even emerge. In Prussia, copyright law was created only on 11 June 1837: 
it was at that time when with the assistance of Savigny they made law on the protection of 
rights on scientific works and works of art against reprints and remaking. This law provided 
for protection of author’s property for thirty years from the author’s death. 
In the same year, the Deutscher Bund quite modestly resolved that member states should 
acknowledge the author’s right, at least for ten years, that a work published by a publisher 
indicated in it should not be reprinted without their permit. What we have here is mostly a 
rule of protecting publishers. In 1830, Russian legislation stipulated that the term of protection 
was twenty-five years. It is worth adding that when Szemere’s proposal was completed, in 
1844, Bavaria, for example, did not have a copyright law yet; it was made in 1865 only. 
However, at that time no copyright law was in force in Switzerland either where the Contract 
Law Act regulated publisher’s transactions in 1881 only; a pan federal copyright law was 
made first in 1883. Even in Austria, the copyright patent entered into force only on 19 
October 1846; since 1775, an imperial decree against reprints had been in force merely for the 
eternal provinces. So, the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1811 regulated 
copyright only filius ante patrem. 
The third step was constituted by international agreements and treaties, once it had been 
realised that necessity of protection crosses borders. The signatories of such bilateral or 
multilateral international agreements developed their internal regulations so that they should 
comply with the content of the agreement as much as possible. Hungary entered into such an 
agreement first with the Austrians, in 1887, which provided for mutual protection of author’s 
rights in literary and artistic works. Furthermore, in the 19th century, similar state agreements 
were entered into with Italy (1890), Great Britain (1893) and Germany (1899). From among 
multilateral international agreements the Berne Union Convention should be highlighted, 
which was entered into in 1886; however, Hungary became its member only in 1922—for that 
matter, this fact also contributed to making Act LIV of 1921, that is, the second copyright 
law. 
Looking at these three forms, it should be seen that they move from the individual to the 
general. Privileges were issued by rulers, yet to single persons only, to print—usually one—
book, simultaneously barring everybody else from this activity.12 Subsequently, this could 
provide opportunity to enforce claims only against those who belonged to the jurisdiction of 
cities (city-states). Later on, laws focused on authors, and as part of that provided every 
author with protection of rights, and threatened everybody else, who committed abuse on the 
territory of the country, with penalty. International agreements determined frameworks of 
copyright protection in the most general terms, under which foreign works were also 
protected, however, actual substantive and procedural rules were contained always in national 
legislations. With respect to the subject of copyright protection, i.e., protected works, it can be 
stated that, albeit, in the beginning they prohibited reprints of writer’s works, as technology 
developed protection of performances and works of art followed it at an increasingly fast 
speed. 
 
 
II. 2. International copyright treaties 
 
As international copyright laws applied to the territory of the issuing country only, they did 
not provide protection for foreign authors. Fundamental principles of mutuality between 
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countries were set out first by the Berne Convention in 1886. Contrary to that, Emil Szalai 
writes that mutuality is not contained even at the level of reference in the text of the 
Convention.13 The document clarified basic principles of copyright, and summed up the 
principles of settlement of disputed international issues; however, it left specification of 
details to the laws of the countries of the Union.14 This basic document inspired several 
international requirements, agreements made later. Three types of these international 
agreements can be distinguished: universal, regional and bilateral agreements. 
The highest level acknowledgement of copyright is set forth in Section 27 (2) of the United 
Nations General Assembly Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, which determines 
copyright as ”a fundamental right”. This taciturn statement, however, is sufficient for this 
entitlement to be respected by practically all the states of the world. Universal agreements are 
more practical than that, and determine basic institutions of copyright usually as a framework 
rule. Agreements are mostly aimed at ensuring that the author should get at least basic level 
protection in each country from which specific ratifying countries can deviate maximum 
within the frameworks determined by the agreement. One of these basic rules is, for example, 
term of protection, which was determined as fifty years from the death of the right owner. 
The first copyright meeting held a session in 1858 in Brussels; international regulation of 
copyright was discussed here for the first time. Chaired by Victor Hugo the Association 
Littéraire Internationale was founded in 1878 already, which provided framework for 
consultations of writers, artists and publishers in every second year until the First World War. 
From among them, the Rome meeting in 1882 is an outstanding event where on the proposal 
of Paul Schmidt (secretary general of Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler) an 
international meeting was convened to Berne to set up a copyright law union, and the Federal 
Council of Switzerland was requested to provide administration of the process. The meeting 
was held in September 1883; in the following year, the subject was discussed already at a 
diplomatic conference where Hungary represented itself officially—for the first and last time. 
After the 1885 conference, the year 1886 saw the founding of the Union: nine countries—
England, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Tunis and Haiti—signed 
the first Union document together with the supplementary article and final protocol of Berne, 
all of which entered into force on 5 December 1887. The Convention provided for further 
meetings too, of which it is necessary to mention the 1896 meeting in Paris (“additional 
document of Paris” and its supplementary statement) and the 1906 Berlin meeting, where 
codification of the right of the Union was formulated as a goal. As a result of that, “the 
modified Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works” was created—
this is the corpus iuris of the Union, together with the 20 March 1914 supplement. Hungary 
(together with fourteen countries) acceded both of them without reservations. Member states 
of the Union in 192215 were as follows: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark (including the Faroe Islands), France (Algeria and colonies),16 Greece, Haiti, Japan, 
Poland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Morocco (except for the Spanish zone), Monaco, 
Great Britain (including its colonies and several protectorates), the Netherlands (including 
Dutch India, Dutch Antillas/Curacao and Suriname), Germany (including its protectorates), 
Norway, Italy, Spain (with its colonies), Portugal (with its colonies), Switzerland, Sweden and 
Tunis.17 
Although the text of the Convention adopted in Berlin is authoritative, contrary to the 
principle of lex posterior derogat legi priori, member states may proceed against each other, 
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against countries outside the Union and newly accessing countries against the rest of the 
countries on the grounds of earlier provisions. It should be added that acceding countries are 
obliged to accept the Berlin modifications, while specifying parts of earlier documents 
intended to be applied.18 Deviation from the Berlin Convention is allowed with respect to 
term of protection, protection of works of applied arts, etc.; consequently, the Union did not 
have a uniform legal source.  
The Convention is divided into three parts: the organisation of the Union; substantive law of 
the Union (relation of the members of the Union to each other and cogent copyright rules 
within the frameworks of the Union); the administration of the Union. Its coercive force and 
system of sanctions, mutuality are not even mentioned in it. Based on that we can declare that 
the Convention is lex imperfecta, its application is based on solidarity, that is, each member 
state presumes that in the event that it complies with the provisions of the Convention, then 
the rest of the countries will also do so.  
Hungary was obliged by Section 222 of Act XXXIII of 1922 (on ratifying the Trianon Peace 
Treaty) to accede to the Berne Union within twelve months, which had been de facto in 
progress since 1913. The relevant bill was made, but the outbreak of the First World War 
prevented the law from being enacted, what is more, the chaotic inland and international 
conditions after the world war made it definitely impossible to submit the bill to legislature. 
Eventually, the bill was submitted to the legislature in 1921, and was approved by the 
National Assembly on 23 December 1921, and it was sanctioned on 25 February 1922 (after 
Hungary acceded to the Union). Hungary announced accession to the government of the 
Swiss Confederation on 14 February 1922. In our country, the law providing for the above 
was published in the 4 February 1922 issue of the National Statute Book under the title Act 
XIII of 1922 ”on Accession of Hungary to the International Berne Union Founded for 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works”. 
The Berne Convention of 9 September 1886 for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
set forth some fundamental principles (minimum standards of protection) that efficiently help 
universal protection of author’s works.19 These fundamental principles are as follows: a) 
principle of national treatment under which a country extends the same protection to 
foreigners that it accords to its own authors; b) principle of automatic protection without any 
required formalities; c) principle of independent protection (a foreign artist will be provided 
with protection complying with domestic rules of law even if his work is not under protection 
in the country of origin). It sets forth the concept of work; definition of the copyright owner; 
the author’s minimum moral and economic rights. The Convention was originally signed by 
ten countries, today more than one hundred and fifty countries have adopted it. It has been 
revised on seven occasions: in Paris (1896), Berlin (1908), Berne (1914), Rome (1928), 
Brussels (1948), Stockholm (1967) and Paris (1971). Hungary acceded to the Berne 
Convention in 1922. Hungarian legislature included the text of the Convention revised on 24 
July 1971 in Paris into Hungarian legal order by the law-decree 4 of 1975. 
The Universal Copyright Convention signed on 6 September 1952 was made under the 
auspices of the UN; its necessity was justified by political reasons. Its essence is protection of 
copyright without any required formalities for foreigners. Promulgation of its text revised on 
24 July 1971 in Paris in our country was provided by law-decree 3 of 1975.  
The 1961 Rome Convention is for the protection of performers, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasting organisations. In Hungary it was implemented by Act XLIV of 1998. The 
Geneva Convention made on 29 October 1971—for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorised Duplication of Their Phonograms—was promulgated in 
Hungary by law-decree 18 of 1975. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
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Property Rights (TRIPS), constituting Annex “I. C” of the Marrakech Treaty, which set up the 
World Trade Organisation, promulgated by Act IX of 1998, provided for enforcement of 
rights based on reciprocity of form and the greatest allowance and for settlement of disputes 
between states. 
They are differentiated from universal treaties by the number and geographical location of 
ratifying countries. The most important ones for Hungarian legislature are the Treaty of Rome 
founding the European Economic Community, and the directives affecting copyright adopted 
by the European Union recently. Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer 
programs by copyright determines the concept of software, the right owners, their economic 
rights and special limitations of rights. Directive 92/100/EEC on rental right and lending right 
and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property creates a “rental 
and lending right” as part of copyright protection, and sets out minimum standards of 
protection for the related rights of performers, phonogram, and film producers and 
broadcasting organisations. Directive 93/98/EEC harmonising the term of protection of 
copyright and certain related rights ensures that there is a single duration for copyright and 
related rights across the entire European Union, increases the duration of protection and 
provides for protection of works from the death of the author. Directive 96/9/EC on the legal 
protection of databases and their special limitations.  
As part the European Union integration process, one of the tasks of Hungarian legislation is to 
develop proper legal environment for the Union law, paying special regard to Union 
directives. Based on that it can be declared that these directives are present as a quasi norm in 
Hungarian law, although they do not have direct effect; therefore, they bind the lawmaker but 
do not bind law enforcers. 
In Article 65 of the Europe Agreement promulgated by Act I of 1994, Hungary assumes 
obligation to provide protection of an extent similar to the protection that prevails in the 
Community, within five years from signing the Agreement, which Hungary has completed, 
among others, by making the new copyright law. Regarding the European Union, it needs to 
be added that drafts, proposals and other preparatory documents, which constitute parts of the 
Union lawmaking process but have no binding force, represent important guidance for 
Hungarian legislation. They include, for example, the White Paper, whose annex deals with 
copyright protection; or the Green Paper published by the European Commission in June 1995 
entitled ”Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society”. The most recent directive 
is the EU directive on copyright adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 2001.  
Although universal and regional agreements profoundly regulate copyright, the framework 
regulation is to be filled and specific procedural issues are to be regulated mostly by the 
legislature of specific states. So, bilateral agreements do not play a significant part, they have 
political or diplomatic significance; see, for example, the international agreement 26/1993 
(Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of the 
United States of America on intellectual property). In harmony with its title, Article II of the 
Agreement extensively deals with protection of copyright and related rights, however, the 
greatest emphasis is given to protection of phonograms and computer programs, which 
obliges Hungary to implement legal harmonisation.  
Operation, harmonisation and organisation frameworks of international conventions on 
copyright are provided primarily by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) of 
the UN from 1970, in co-operation with the UNESCO. Its task is, in addition to 
administration, to advance creative intellectual activity and further transfer of technologies to 
underdeveloped countries. The World Trade Organisation as the entity to manage the TRIPS 
Agreements co-operates with WIPO in certain implementation issues. 
  
III. Attempts at creating and reforming legal protection of intellectual 
property in Hungarian jurisprudence 
 
Given the peculiarities of historical development, modern codification efforts evolved with a 
delay in the Age of Reforms in the eighteen-thirties; with respect to copyright the Bills related 
to Bertalan Szemere are worth mentioning. After suppression of the War of Independence 
(1849) and the Compromise (1867), basically Austrian laws were applied.  
In the Central-Eastern European countries after the Second World War, intellectual property 
rights bore certain traces of central economic administration, foreign exchange management, 
income regulation and censorship. To different extent and for different reasons from country 
to country, this branch of law nevertheless preserved its main traditional features owing to, at 
last but not least, several decades’ long membership in international agreements. The legal 
field of intellectual property shows continuous progress, without injuring essential principles. 
Just as in the phase of its evolution, in the appearance of modern development tendencies, 
economic circumstances and technological conditions constitute the key driving forces. 
General features of historical development are reflected by the progress made in this legal 
field in Hungary too. 
Centuries long traditions of Hungarian copyright law, experience of domestic legal 
development cannot be ignored in working out the new regulation. Enforcement of 
international legal unification and European legal harmonisation requirements do not exclude 
respecting domestic copyright law traditions at all—they make it definitely necessary to 
integrate regulation harmonised with international conventions and European Community 
directives into Hungarian legal system and legal development organically; therefore, we must 
not put aside the assets of our copyright law in order to fulfil our legal harmonisation 
obligations. What Hungarian copyright law needs is reforms: renewal that maintains 
continuity of domestic regulation by exceeding former regulation while preserving the values 
achieved so far.  
The history of Hungarian copyright law is characterised both by successful and unsuccessful 
attempts at codification, although aborted bills failed due to changes in historical 
circumstances rather than the standard of proposals.  
The Bill submitted by Bertalan Szemere to the National Assembly in 1844 was not enacted 
for lack of royal sanctioning. Following the age of imperial patents and decrees, after the 
Compromise (1867) the Society of Hungarian Writers and Artists put forth—again an 
unsuccessful—motion for regulation; however, the Commercial Code, Act XXXVII of 1875 
devoted a separate chapter to regulation of publishing transactions. 
The first Hungarian copyright law, Act XVI of 1884, was made following László Arany’s 
initiative, upon István Apáthy’s motion. The Act implemented modern codification adjusted 
to bourgeois conditions, setting out from theoretical bases of intellectual property not 
superseded ever since.  
Later re-codification of Hungarian copyright law was required by the need to create internal 
legal conditions of the accession to the Berne Union Convention. Act LIV of 1921 
harmonised our copyright law with the current text of the Convention, and adjusted our 
regulation to the results of technological development.20 
The last attempt at modernising bourgeois copyright law can be linked with the name of 
Elemér Balás P.; his Bill drafted in 1934 was published in 1947, however, due to political 
changes this Bill could not become an act. 
The development of copyright law of the bourgeois epoch was dominated by the concept of 
intellectual property, qualifying copyright as proprietary (economic) right similar to property, 
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which was in line with the requirements and needs of market economy and trade. Gradual 
acknowledgement of authors’ moral rights also began; however, protection of these rights did 
not become the central element of copyright law approach either in theory or in practice. 
Paradoxically, as a special impact produced by the current ideology, this happened only 
during the period of plan economy and one-party system.  
Our Copyright Act III of 1969—which is the third one following Act XVI of 1884 and Act 
LIV of 1921—was and has remained a noteworthy codification achievement in spite of the 
fact that it bore the traits of the age when it was made. Due to the economic policy trend 
prevailing in that period, there was no need to break away from fundamental principles and 
traditions of copyright; regulation did not distanced copyright eventually from its social and 
economic function. (Fortunately, it was only theory rather than regulation that was imbued 
with the dogmatic approach arising also from ideological deliberations that worked against 
enforcement of the authors’ proprietary (economic) interests by overemphasising the elements 
of copyright related to personality (moral rights).) Perhaps, it was owing to this that Act III of 
1969, albeit with several amendments, could for a long while keep up with international legal 
development and new achievements of technological progress just as with fundamentally 
changing political and economic circumstances.  
Hungarian copyright law in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s was in the vanguard of world-
wide and European legal development: as one of the first legal systems, our copyright law 
acknowledged protection of copyright to computer programs, provided for royalty to be paid 
on empty cassettes, settled copyright issues related to so-called cable television operations. 
Regulation of right to follow (subsequent right) and paying public domain was huge progress 
too.  
After coming to a sudden standstill temporarily in the second half of the 1980’s, new 
significant changes were brought by the period between 1993 and 1998. In terms of actions 
taken against violation of law, amendment to the Criminal Code in 1993 was of great 
significance, which qualified infringement of copyright and related rights a crime (see Section 
329/A of the Criminal Code (Btk.) set forth by Section 72 of Act XVII of 1993). Act VII of 
1994 on the Amendments to Certain Laws of Industrial Property and Copyright, in 
accordance with international and legal harmonisation requirements, provided for overall re-
regulation of the protection of related rights of copyright—i.e. rights that performers, 
producers of phonograms and radio and television organisations were entitled to. 
Furthermore, the Act extended the duration of the protection of author’s economic rights from 
fifty years to seventy years from the author’s death, and the duration of protection of related 
rights from twenty to fifty years. In addition to that, the Act withdrew the rental and lending 
of computer programs, copies of motion picture works and phonogram works from the scope 
of free use; and, it required, in addition to the author’s consent, the approval of the producer 
of phonograms and performers for rental and lending of marketed copies of phonograms. It 
was also an important progress that the 1994 Amendment to the Copyright Act terminated the 
statutory licence granted to radio and television for broadcasting works already made public 
in unchanged form and broadcasting public performances, and thereby modernised rules on 
broadcasting contracts. Act LXXII of 1994 implemented partial modification of the Act.  
Following Constitutional Court resolution 14/1994. (II. 10.) AB, instead of a decree in a 
statute, it regulated the legal institutions of ”right to follow” (droit de suite) and ”paying 
public domain” (domaine public payant) important in terms of fine arts and applied arts. Act I 
of 1996 on Radio and Television Broadcasting also modified the Copyright Act; furthermore, 
it contains provisions important in terms of copyright. Govt. Decree Number 146/1996. (IX. 
19.) as amended on collective copyright and related rights management provided for overall 
and modern regulation of collective management of copyright and related rights that cannot 
be exercised individually, and determined the transitory provisions related to termination and 
legal succession of the Copyright Protection Office as central budgetary agency, aimed at 
maintaining continuity of law enforcement. Decree Number 5/1997. (II. 12.) MKM on rules 
of register of societies that perform collective copyright and related rights management was 
made to implement the Govt. Decree. Decree Number A 19/1996. (XII. 26.) MKM raised the 
maximum duration of publisher contracts to eight years. The amendments implemented by 
Act XI of 1997 on Protecting Trademarks and Geographical Product Markings and entered 
into force on 1 July 1997 affected legal consequences that may be applied due to infringement 
of copyright and measures that may be applied in lawsuits brought due to such violations of 
law. And, on the grounds of the authorisation granted in the new Trademark Act, Govt. 
Decree Number 128/1997. (VII. 24.) on measures that may be applied in customs 
administration proceedings against infringement of intellectual property rights was adopted. 
Accelerated legal development in recent years could become complete through overall re-
regulation of copyright and related rights.  
Act LXXVI of 1999 satisfies these demands, while it builds on recently achieved results. The 
Act is based on several years’ preparatory work. The Minister of Justice set up an expert team 
in 1994 to work out the concept of the new regulation; furthermore, the Minister of Justice 
invited the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) of the UN to assist in preparing 
the new copyright act; also, on several occasions it was possible to have consultations with 
the experts of the European Commission. Taking the proposals of the expert team into 
account, by June 1997 the concept of the overall revision of our copyright law had been 
completed, which was approved by the Government by Govt. Resolution Number 1100/1997. 
(IX. 30.). In accordance with Section 4 of this Government Resolution, the Minister of Justice 
set up a codification committee to develop the new copyright regulation from the 
representatives of ministries and bodies with national powers concerned, courts, joint law 
administration organisations as well as interest representation organisations of right owners, 
users and other copyright experts. The draft Bill has been discussed by the Committee both in 
details and on the whole on several occasions; the content of the proposal reflects the 
consensus reached in the Committee in every respect. 
 
 
III. 1. Ferenc Toldy and copyright 
 
In the Age of Reforms members of Hungarian society met with several fields that had not 
been legally regulated until then. That is how placement of intellectual works in the legal 
system must have arisen as a fundamental problem because until the beginning of the Age of 
Reforms the “profession” of writers had not developed, there had been no periodicals, 
newspapers, and dramatic art and play-writing could not develop as an independent genre.  
Two articles of Ferenc Toldy calls the attention to filling this gap in the law and reveal 
extraordinary expertise and rhetorical competence. His first article written on the topic was 
published in the columns of Athenaeum in 1838 entitled ”A few words on writer’s property 
and petition to publishers of periodicals”,21 the other one in the Budapesti Szemle in 1840 
under the title ”On writer’s property”.22 
First, he defines the concept of property clearly as follows: ”Everything that we acquire by 
either our own internal talents or external tools without harm to alien rights is our 
unalienable true property, mortmain.” The definition contains every important element 
concerning the criteria of property. After that he translates the term of property to intellectual 
works and proves that once having obtained a form through printing it becomes property and 
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unalienable property at that.23 Furthermore he defines the term of reprint/impression/: 
”misappropriation committed on true property”.24 
Once he has clarified fundamental terms, he expounds them in details: first of all, everybody 
can freely dispose over his property (ius disponendi). He can do it in the following forms 
according to Toldy: ”He may transfer his original right to other persons at his discretion, … 
he may disclaim the property … until he does not do that clearly or, knowing that, does not 
abandon it or does not let it lapse, nobody shall encroach upon his rights to this natural 
property”.25 Toldy expounds the process how a writer’s thought becomes a thing. If he 
disposes of it by gift or sale, he always does it conditionally. He does not sell the work of 
intellect; instead, he lets some unique thing, copy, instrument on moral lease. By his work the 
author conveys ideas, information to the buyer, and the buyer processes them and integrates 
them in his store of knowledge. ”The author has not attached, cleverly could not have 
attached, has not put up for sale any other right to any copy of his work on sale: the buyer 
has not bought, could not have bought anything else so he does not have anything more than 
such intellectual utilisation”.26 This is a consensual contract that—in the absence of any 
stipulations to the contrary—cannot be attacked or doubted either morally or legally.  
Toldy’s reasons contain statements valid even today. Regulation of writer’s property in an act 
is an indispensable task of the State because the writer and his intellectual work is public 
domain, which shapes the edification, intellectual and ethical moral of society. Society’s task 
is to appreciate the writer and to ensure that the writer could spend all his time and power on 
creation, development of his own intellect: thereby he will produce works that serve the 
edification, progress of the whole country. If a writer does not see the reward of his talent and 
efforts or not even recovery of his financial expenses certified, he will leave this career, which 
makes society, science poorer. In his opinion it is a fundamental condition that each state 
should protect its own intellectual products and based on reciprocity should not authorise 
reprinting or sale of foreign literary works. (Several countries authorised or did not forbid 
reprinting of foreign works or sale of reprints:27 France, Belgium, the United States of 
America, the states of the Deutscher Bund and Austria too—the latter was a hotbed of 
unrestricted reprinting both of foreign and the greatest German literary works: these printing 
houses were protected by the state too.) Toldy asserts that the really blissful situation would 
be if states did not authorise reprinting and they purchased original works from each other, 
and the rate of imports/exports would depend merely on ”which country provides its citizens 
with more instruments, support, which is indispensable and necessary in the world of 
science”.28 
Toldy claims that only one reason can be raised as an excuse, which somewhat explains 
advocacy for reprints: ”and that is expensiveness of original editions”.29 As a matter of fact, 
he does not accept this reason either, as he knows that these books are more expensive 
because publishers can cover their costs from sold copies only. In his opinion publishers could 
sell their books cheaper if they should not be afraid of reprinters, since more copies could be 
printed and sold with greater safety: the less a reprint costs and the more certain buyers win, 
the more lawful owners, publishers and writers lose. The writer because the publisher cannot 
pay for his efforts according to his merits and the publisher because its profit from the 
enterprise is dubious. Yet, it is not only the individual but also the state that incurs loss 
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because thereby in the long run scientific life, scientific development will be endangered and 
society will lag behind in development. Writer’s work cannot be distinguished from other 
breadwinner activities, so it should be paid for. However, the issue of paying a fee is a rather 
complicated task. Toldy raises several possibilities.  
On the one hand, it would be possible that the state should give salary to writers. This would 
not be a path to be followed because it could not be financed from the country’s budget and it 
is problematic also because a standard to measure writers should be determined and only 
those who comply with this measure would be given salary. To avoid this, a reward of equal 
rate could be set, which is not a suitable method because there are huge differences between 
writers: ”And intellect cannot be measured by a man’s arm.”30 He raises the possibility that 
the state should make writer’s property free ”by giving the right to writers to claim dividend 
from publishers on each printed or already sold copy. … But who will set this dividend? Who 
will check the number and sale of copies?”31 Questions, questions, questions, to which Toldy 
claims there is only one answer: when the state acknowledges writers’ property right on their 
works, or to put it in other words, forbids reprinting. ”The public—vox populi—will reward 
its writers this way.”32 
The solution could be only to make law. He considers the German act promulgated on 9 
November 1835 an example to be followed in this subject, which obliged each province of the 
German Federation individually and mutually to acknowledge and protect both scientific and 
artistic property at least for ten years against reprinters as well as prohibited sale of reprints 
brought in from abroad and threatened with penalty. Penalty determined by the laws of 
provinces were imposed on reprinters and sellers of reprints, each copy and the instruments 
used for preparatory works were confiscated from them, and they were obliged to give full 
redress and compensation to the writer and the publisher. The Prussian government made an 
even stricter law covering all aspects, to consist of thirty-eight sections, which now regulated 
the issue of reciprocity and ”retaliation” concerning foreign states.  
Until then the issue of writer’s property had not been put on the agenda of legislation in 
Hungary ”because there was no reason for worrying about it” and ”if it has been injured, the 
injury has been overlooked or has not become subject of any complaint”.33  
Toldy, however, looks into the future with hope: he mentions Kazinczy’s language reform 
efforts, publication of count István Széchenyi’s book entitled Credit, foundation of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and thereby the foundation of a new layer in civil society: 
the layer of writers. Literature came to life because now it had permanent audience, especially 
through the work of the press, and this participation, no matter how low its rate was compared 
to the five million population, did not give cause for dissatisfaction. Editors of periodicals 
were considered pioneers such as Károly Kisfaludy who paid honorarium on larger studies 
published in the columns of Aurora edited by him. József Bajza was the first who paid for all 
the studies published in his almanac, and in a predetermined system at that. Thereby 
intellectual work began to become goods and the idea of ownership involved in goods became 
reality.  
 
 
III. 2. Early stages of statutory protection of author’s works in Hungary 
 
Regulation of copyright in Hungary was strongly linked to the Austrians. Its starting point 
was the exclamation by Ádám Takács addressed to lawmakers, in which the protestant 
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minister from Göny called the attention of the Governor’s Council to the fact that having 
defiled the work of printer Paczkó in Pest who published his funeral orations, printer 
Landerer reprinted the whole volume, … due to the loss caused by it Paczkó withdrew from 
publishing the second volume being afraid of Landerer stealing it again.34 To prevent 
continuation of this foul play, the minister turned to the Governor’s Council as a result of 
which on 3 November 1793 the royal decree number 12157 was issued, which was the revised 
version of the decree dated 11 February 1775 in Austria. It sanctioned inland reprint by 
penalty and confiscation as well as compensation to be paid to the author. All this, however, 
did not apply to books published abroad and already reprinted inland by others, they could be 
freely published by anybody. It extended legal protection to the writer’s legal successor 
(cessionarius) and formulated the institution of limitation well-known from later periods, 
which stated that after a certain period elapsed after the author’s death the work became 
public domain and could be published freely by anybody but it did not set its detailed rules 
yet. In 1794 by another royal decree (no. 1812) it added reciprocity to it: it was prohibited in 
Hungary to reprint works printed in Austria, and the same protection was provided for works 
published on Hungarian territories against Austrian reprints. This rule was in force until the 
above mentioned Hungarian-Austrian international agreement (Act IX of 1887) was entered 
into.35 Protection, however, proved to be underdeveloped because only the “preliminary path” 
formulating censorship existed instead of the judicial path. The scope of protected works was 
further widened by the court decree no. 4232 dated 22 April 1831, which extended protection 
to ”drawings and copper engravings”. 
In the middle of the 19th century, however, literary, scientific and political life in our country 
flourished, strongly helped by reproduction. Simultaneously with progress, claims were 
received on abuses of copyright. The first highly significant writings on the topic can be 
linked to Ferencz Toldy, as it has been described above already. 
The Kisfaludy Society seemed to be a committed adherent of lawmaking for a long time. 
They made their first attempt in 1844 when the board worked out a draft. This bill was 
forwarded to Bertalan Szemere to make it more accurate, who made the final version heavily 
under the influence of the 1837 Prussian copyright act and the 1843 Hungarian criminal law 
concept. On the one hand, he extended the scope of protection (in addition to author’s works, 
theatre plays, musical works, drawings and paintings were defined); on the other hand, he 
defined the term of protection as a period of fifty years different from the average because 
thereby both the author and his legal successor could feel safer. Fine to be paid to the National 
Museum dominated (which could be converted to captivity in case of insolvency), however, 
reimbursement of the loss of the injured party was also carried out by obliging the injuring 
party to pay ”compensation”, considered private law sanction. It was his innovative and 
significant merit that he provided procedural law regulation too. The bill was progressive 
because contrary to the right of inheritance practice governing at the time the surviving 
spouse should obtain ownership rather than right of enjoyment on the work. In section 47 of 
his bill he set forth that ”at the same time the protection under this act shall be extended to 
insuring the rights of writers and artists of Transylvania until union with Transylvania is 
accomplished”. In other words, foreseeing the union formulated (set) as a political aim he 
strove to extend copyright protection to eastern territories. He urged that all acts, customs and 
privileges contrary to the act in the making should be repealed, and he set the aim of 
regulating copyright in an act instead of unwritten law. 
The ruler, however, threw back the bill giving the reasons that ”the principles set in the bill … 
should be modified for greater clarity and to fill certain gaps.”36 Yet, the national assembly 
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dissolved in the meantime did not have the opportunity to analyse the returned bill again. The 
ruler’s real reason could be searched for in the fact that, given the intention to enact the 
Austrian copyright law vigorously being made, he did not want to break up the unity attained. 
The Austrian patent was published in 1846 and at the same time the king redebated Szemere’s 
bill in order to create harmony with the patent. The next step was the Hungarian Royal Book 
Reviewer Office, which submitted its report to the king on 27 July 1847. Paying regard to all 
that Pál Jászay made his bill, which, however, was not debated due to accelerating political 
events, so the above mentioned decrees continued to be in force in our country. 
During the revolution two significant statutes were made that highly affected the subject area, 
however, none of them was a direct copyright act. First, Act XVIII of 1848 should be 
mentioned, which covered the freedom of the press and as part of that abolished censorship. It 
stipulated that setting up a printing house was conditional upon compliance with Act XVI of 
1840 on traders and depositing the mandatory four thousand forint security. Bookseller 
activity could be performed without any permits. Act XXX of 1848 provided for setting up 
theatres and ensured that theatre plays could be performed freely. The above mentioned 1846 
patent, entitled ”Act to protect literary and artistic property against unauthorised publication, 
reprint and remaking” was entered into force by the open order of 29 November 1852 in our 
country effective as from 1 May 1853.  
These statutory provisions were in force in our country until 1861 (in Transylvania until 
1884) when the National Judge’s Conference implemented the program of gathering valid 
rules of civil law (that is how the collection of Temporary Judicial Rules was made), which 
served as source for all proceedings until governing statutory provisions were developed. 
According to these rules, intellectual works enjoyed the same legal protection as any other 
property, now not only books were protected but ”creatures of the mind” too, that is, literary, 
artistic and musical works as well as translations. All this included the right of public 
performance and reproduction. At the same time, they declared that copyright was rooted in 
civil law and that the content of copyright would not extend beyond the author’s death; at the 
same time, printing of books and reprint was no longer made subject to authority’s licence.37 
Real practice, however, did not develop because these provisions were rather uncertain.  
The year 1867 saw two new significant events in our country. First of all, owing to the 
international agreement entered into between Austria and France it was included in our act 
that performance of translation was attached to author’s reservation of rights, and with respect 
to articles and communications published in periodicals both in regard to translation and 
reprint author’s reservation of rights was a condition. Effective rules now included right of 
public performance, which was already regulated by the 1846 patent but—as it was referred to 
above—it was in force from 1853 to 1861. It must have been an outstandingly important tool 
of legal protection that as a new condition published and reproduced works were registered. 
In the same year the Kisfaludy Society made its second bill, which was not debated even in 
1869. It actually failed because the Hungarian criminal law concept was not completed yet, so 
there was nothing to compare the issue of penalties and procedure to. And the part on artists 
reworked by the Hungarian Society of the Fine Arts did not get any further than the desk of 
the Minister of Justice. 
The Society of Hungarian Writers and Artists headed by Gyula Kováts, making use of the 
1870 German imperial statute, made a new draft in 1874, which was submitted to the 
parliament as a bill—however, even if it paid regard to Hungarian needs, especially due to 
making the commercial code, it was not approved. 
The Kisfaludy Society made a third attempt in 1876, this time in co-operation with the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences: it entrusted László Arany to work out the draft. The draft 
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was first submitted to the Academy, then it was forwarded to the Minister of Justice, who 
convened a vocational conference to study it. The bill was submitted to the House of 
Representatives on 20 November 1882, which referred it to its judicial committee. The 
committee’s report was made by 9 February 1883 already, yet the final text was attested by 
the House of Representatives only a year later, on 12 March 1884, and was approved by the 
Upper House in unchanged from. Finally, the ruler promulgated Act XVI on 7 May 1884.  
 
 
III. 3. Bertalan Szemere’s role in inland regulation of copyright—the 1844 
Copyright Bill 
 
Bertalan Szemere noticed the necessity of protection of property in copyright law. Owing to 
the technological revolution, works of authors and artists became unprotected, so it was 
reasonable to make a duly worked out act. 
Szemere’s modern approach to ownership superseded the approach prevailing in the age both 
on international and national level, which made legal regulation simpler in several respects. 
The legal scientist combined the jurist’s thoughts on theory and practice in his works, which 
is expressed the best in one of his most significant works, his report and bill on providing 
literary and artistic rights drafted in 1844. 38 
He presented his bill on 23 September 1844, it was adopted with a few modifications. The bill 
was approved by the session of the members of the Upper House on 9 November 1844, 
however, the ruler did not sanction it as the court was already working on a copyright patent 
governing the whole empire, which entered into force also with respect to Hungary by the 
imperial decree dated 29 November 1852.39 In determining the core of copyright Szemere 
surmounted the concept of ownership prevailing both home and abroad, which simplified 
legal regulation in several respects.40 
It was the 1865 Bavarian act that used the term copyright (Urheberrecht) for the first time on 
German territories; five years later it was followed by the German federal copyright act. On 
French territories for the first time in 1886 the Belgian legislation used the phrase  ”droit d’ 
auteur” instead of the term propriété. In Hungary Act XVI of 1884 reflected Szemere’s 
approach already, with Gyula Kováts’s significant contribution, who successfully proposed 
the concept of ”copyright” as a general technical term.41  
Szemere interpreted the author’s rights on his works as the author’s moral rights, which is 
clearly reflected by his sections proposed for asserting and exercising rights. According to his 
approach, rights regarding the work were regulated by law in a form inseparable from the 
author and the author could transfer uniform copyright only with respect to its exercise. This 
clearly shows how much his approach to copyright was ahead of his age for in Austria it was 
the 1895 Act that started to follow this interpretation.42 
Protection of the author’s right enjoys priority since the author retains his right even if he has 
transferred exercise of such right to the authorised publisher and he can assert it by lawsuit if 
the empowered publisher fails to do so.43 
By harmonising the action of the author as original copyright owner and the exclusively 
authorised user of the work before court against a third party and by laying the legal grounds 
of author’s contracts, he formulated thoughts again ahead of his age. An example for the latter 
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is section 44 in Chapter VII entitled ”General provisions”, which states that ”as the number 
of editions is not determined in the contract, […] only one edition shall be considered before 
the law. And as the number of copies is not determined, each edition is calculated to contain 
1000 copies.”44 It is important that the author does not transfer his own right, instead gives 
licence to publish, that is, such rights possessor may exercise the author’s right only with 
respect to publishing and therefore it seems to be authorisation rather than transfer of property 
rights. 45  
Besides author’s rights, Szemere separately discussed theatre plays, musical works as well as 
drawing and painting works, and regulated them in summary in an act. Following foreign 
example, he called editions without licence, referred to as pirated edition, fake edition, and 
would have imposed punitive sanctions. In the comparative analysis he finds that a fine is 
used for fake editions abroad too, which is converted to captivity in case of failure to make 
payment. 46 
Szemere’s reasons also emphasises the importance of protection of author’s rights stating that 
in Western Europe, more specifically France, being an author is a rank just as being a 
nobleman, a priest, a merchant. Szemere set legal regulation and social prestige of French 
literary life as an example to Hungarian legislation. He stressed that ”civilised nations” 
already had laws to regulate copyright at the level of an act.  
 
 
III. 3. 1. Copyright property in Szemere’s bill 
The question to be decided was whether ”the group of writer’s, artistic rights is a property 
just as any other property?” According to traditional approach maintained until then, legal 
relation of ownership has an absolute structure, the owner is entitled to means of legal 
protection against everybody. It is an important feature of the content of the right of 
ownership that its term is endless in theory, its subject can be alienated by the owner, and 
after his death it will devolve in accordance with rules of inheritance. Difficulty in the 
analysis of the content of author’s rights is that its term is by no means endless; this 
righteously raises the importance of the dogmatic analysis of author’s property rights. Some 
claim that it is a kind of sui generis property right, which ”has all the attributes of property, 
except for infinity of hereditariness”.47 
For a long time they maintained the approach that writer’s and artistic property is basically 
identical with property in the general sense. So, in its first section the 1846 Austrian act stated 
that products of literature and works of art constitute property of their author. Writer’s and 
artistic property (literarisches und artistisches Eigentum) was accepted for a long time in our 
country too. In Hungary, only in the bourgeois age did the judicial committee of the House of 
Representatives state the definition ”intellectual property” replacing it by the term 
”copyright”.48 
One of the most important issues of the subject area was the term of protection, which was 
determined as fifty years from the death of the author by Bertalan Szemere. It is clear that 
compared to the rest of countries of Europe this is a relatively long period. The draft of the 
Kisfaludy Society wanted to fix sixty years as the maximum of the term of protection, 
however, Szemere did not consider it expedient to set a period longer than fifty years, and 
deemed any period shorter than that definitely disadvantageous. His reasons can be summed 
in three points. Quite easily, given a short term, aliens outside the author’s lawful descendants 
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enjoy the benefits arising from a work appreciated by posterity only. It is well-known, he 
says, that it is just the most precious works that need the greatest ”investment” in time and 
energy, what is more, such masterpieces are produced quite often at the end of their writer’s 
life only. So, if the term of legal protection is short, this will urge authors to write works that 
can be written quickly rather than works developed over a long period of time. Obviously, 
there is a weightier interest to support the former works. Also, it is a living possibility that the 
work of an author is not published during his lifetime or it is not appreciated properly, 
however, subsequently it is appreciated. Szemere considered it important that writers and 
artists should be reassured that for a term of fifty years only their family, descendants could 
enjoy the fruits of their ancestor’s work.49 
In succession of author’s rights, general rules of law of inheritance/succession and contract 
law prevail; so, the writer can transfer the rights he is entitled to (that is, publishing) under 
either free or onerous transactions. During the fifty-year term the legal successor can also 
exercise rights, however, only with respect to publishing, that is, he is not entitled to the right 
of change. Szemere’s bill raises the issue of the right of surviving spouse upon the author’s 
death. If the writer has not made a last will and testament, then author’s rights will devolve to 
the lawful inheritors.50 
The surviving spouse was entitled to rights provided under widow’s right (ius viduale), of 
which inheritance in real assets was considered exceptional, and was basically restricted to 
certain movables. According to the main rule, the surviving spouse was given usufruct on the 
goods only. A special version of legal succession is also discussed where term of protection 
was provided for those who—not being a relative or testamentary inheritor—got into the 
possession of the manuscript after the author’s death and published it. 
And if the manuscript is found after fifty years from the author’s death only, the lawful 
possessor will be entitled to the right to publish for thirty years from the first edition of the 
work. So, Szemere set fifty years as the maximum term of legal protection. He promised 
much shorter, thirty years protection to authors who made Hungarian literary remains of the 
language, historical sources, charters and collections of folk legends, tales, sagas, songs and 
proverbs public domain.51  
When the work was first published, a reservation of rights statement had to be made with 
regard to translation into foreign languages; this is one of the significant elements of 
copyright. If such statement was not made, then the right of translation became public 
domain; just as when the author did not publish his work in some language ”living in the 
country” in three years from publication. So, the right of translation into German, Romanian, 
Slovakian etc. was available to the author for three years only; if he did not exercise it during 
this period, he definitely lost the opportunity to exercise it. 
In publishing periodicals and volumes of studies, the publisher was entitled to writer’s rights, 
however, a contract to the contrary could be entered into with the publisher; furthermore, the 
author could have his articles published in an independent collection after two years from 
publication. In this case it was the author’s rights that were primarily protected. Rights related 
to works produced as a result of co-operation of several authors were provided for the 
authors’ groups; calculation of the deadline started from the last volume for dictionaries and 
from publication of each volume for collections and yearbooks; according to the comments 
the term of protection was thirty years too.52 
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Double fee was not unusual since authors were entitled to general writer’s rights in addition to 
stage rights.53 This might be in the background of the regulation of musical works too.54 
Composers and their legal successors were given all the rights to publish and use their works 
that were granted to writers, and compositions that were performed in theatres and in concerts 
enjoyed rights on theatre plays too.55 
”Drawing and painting works” were also regulated in the act. However, it was difficult to 
determine their concept; Szemere listed the most frequent versions as examples; ”all works 
that can be produced permanently by lines and colours” enjoyed legal protection. Artists of 
the fine arts (and their legal successors) had rights set out in the first chapter. Assignment of 
the right to reproduce, as a matter of fact, did not mean that the original work was no longer 
owned by the artist, he could waive that solely by express statement.56 
 
 
III. 3. 2. The concept and sanctioning of violation of writer’s rights in Szemere’s 
approach 
Szemere discussed violation of rights related to author’s rights and their legal remedy in 
details. He carried out in-depth analysis regarding fake editions too. As a matter of fact, not 
only the publisher but also the author might have commited violation of rights, for that matter, 
against the publisher if he had his work published by another publisher too before expiry of 
the period set out in the contract they had entered into on that work. On the other hand, the 
publisher acted contrary to law if he printed and published more copies than set out in the 
contract. This latter version most probably occurred only when printed works produced in 
extra numbers were not sold or were bought by buyers but the publisher did not share the 
profit from sale over the stipulated number of copies with the author. Furthermore, it was 
considered fake edition when works printed abroad were marketed inland if the author was a 
resident in the country.57 
Without the copyright owner’s being aware and having given his consent thereto it was 
forbidden to make and publish any kind of extract, abridged edition or revision/adaptation that 
basically contained the content of the original. This bill, furthermore, considered it fake 
edition when introductions, explanations, notes were written to a work already in public 
ownership without the author’s or his legal successors’ permit. If it was possible, the author’s 
(legal successor’s) consent had to be obtained. Addresses, lectures held by teachers on pulpits 
could be published with the lecturer’s permit only. Szemere cared for writings published in 
periodicals and newspapers; any writing concerning them could be published solely with the 
source specified. His bill claimed that it was fake edition when an author, in order to deceive 
his readers, gave a title to his work that belonged to another work already in circulation.58 He 
dwelt on quasi fake editions too. These conducts were similar to those described above; yet, 
they were not considered fake editions. Accordingly, anybody was allowed to publish rules of 
law: no pecuniary loss was suffered thereby by anybody, on the contrary, it was in 
everybody’s interest to make rules of law extensively known. With similar freedom it was 
possible to publish speeches delivered at public sessions of the parliament, municipalities and 
any association, with the essential restriction that the collected edition of the speeches of one 
person enjoyed legal protection. Also, it was possible to quote from anything freely but only 
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word for word. Also, it was possible to adopt papers, essays, poems and oral works with full 
liberty in works serving educational purposes.59 
Sanction took the form of compensation of pecuniary loss. The party causing damage was 
obliged to pay fine up to six hundred forints to the National Museum, however, as appropriate 
he had to compensate for the total damage the injured party had suffered. Instigators and 
abettors were responsible for their acts in proportion to liability. Parties privy to the act had 
joint and several liability. At that time the six hundred forint fine seemed to be moderate since 
in France, for example, penalty was two thousand (for habitual offenders four thousand) 
Francs and up to one-year imprisonment, while in England one hundred pounds and double 
the amount of the price of all the printed copies had to be reimbursed.60 
When it was possible to determine the number of sold copies of the fake edition, the price of 
the original copy had to be paid to the lawful possessor for each copy, and when it was not 
possible to determine the number of printed or sold copies, or misdemeanour was committed 
to the injury of a work not even published yet, on the first occasion at least half of the number 
of original copies, on the second occasion the ”usual price” of similar works served as 
measure for assessing the damage in court. The author had the right to decide whether he took 
over or destructed the fake copies confiscated and the metal and stone slabs and wood boards 
etc. necessary for producing them. In the former case the amount up to the rate of his 
enrichment was deducted from the amount of compensation. In the case of authors of theatre 
plays and musical works, whenever the play, musical piece in question was performed 
unlawfully, the total proceeds were every time confiscated (without deductions!), irrespective 
whether the work was performed individually or together with other pieces. If it was not 
possible to determine the proceeds subsequently, the closest proceeds at the time governed in 
determining the amount of compensation.  
Habitual offence was severely sanctioned; basic penalty was maximum six hundred forints, 
and could be up to the double of the aggregate amount of compensation. The perpetrator, if he 
was unable to pay, could discharge penalty in the form of imprisonment. One day captivity 
was equal to five forints. However, it was not at the offender’s discretion; penalty could be 
commuted to imprisonment only in the event that a) the offender had not reached legal age 
(men younger than twenty-four) and not having any property his parents did not intend to 
discharge, b) attachment on the property of the condemned had been promulgated due to 
bankruptcy or dissipation of funds, c) if the fine had not been produced from the obligor’s 
property.61 
 
 
III. 3. 4. Procedural rules of copyright disputes in Szemere’s bill 
In chapter six Szemere writes in details on procedural rules of disputes. Szemere anticipated 
that Hungarian judicature would face a quite new phenomenon of substantive law, whose 
procedural rules could not be integrated without difficulties into the pattern of any of the 
former action types.62 That is the reason for the detailed an extended regulation, which 
skilfully avoids dangers of casuistry. “Punitive claim” could be submitted by the injured 
party only. The name ’claim’ is misleading because the issue here is not that violation of 
author’s rights was considered criminal law delictum; even the special part of the penal code 
bill debated in the 1843/44 national assembly did not contain such state of facts, so the 
attribute ”punitive” should be interpreted quite generally. Here, the injured party means not 
only the author or his legal successor but the publisher too. So, it was primarily the publisher 
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that was entitled to the right to bring action against violation of rights in connection with a 
work published, except when the author’s rights were impaired by the publisher printing and 
publishing a number of copies higher than agreed upon in the contract entered into with the 
author. If, however, the publisher failed to do so during thirty days from the written notice 
made by the author or his legal successor, the right to submit the statement of claim would 
devolve to the author (legal successor). If the act violated rights related to unpublished 
manuscripts, the action could be instituted solely by the author.63 
During the proceedings the parties could make an arrangement as well, however, such 
arrangement could cover compensation only and not the fine to be awarded for the benefit of 
the state (more specifically the National Museum). So, impairment of the author’s rights must 
have injured both private interest and public interest.64  
Furthermore, the bill orders that one bound copy of the published work ”shall be placed and 
registered” in the proper office of the ”Hungarian academy”, and the author should get a 
receipt thereon, whose attested copy should be attached to the statement of claim. For theatre 
plays and musical works in manuscript, it was sufficient to register the title and the name of 
the author or the rights possessor and the date and place of the first performance. The 
copyright owner could exercise his right to institute action during two years from committing 
the injury.65 Term of preclusion was two years from occurrence of the objective fact of the 
injury. The action could be brought without paying regard to feudal legal status. The action 
could be brought before the authority of the place of injury, i.e., before the deputy sheriff in 
the county and before the captain in privileged districts and free royal cities. Summons were 
issued within eight days from receipt of the statement of claim, appearance could not be 
shorter than fifteen days and longer than forty-five days depending on the distance of the 
domicile of the sued party.66 
The lawsuit was conducted in writing and both parties could make two oral pleadings, the 
plaintiff’s statement of claim was considered one of them. The defendant had maximum five 
days for giving response, which could be extended on one occasion based on justified 
application but could not be longer than fifteen days. After the oral pleadings the parties’ acts 
in the action were completed, which was followed by adopting the court decision and passing 
judgment.67 
Within twenty-four hours following completion of the demonstration the court had to address 
all the documents of the case to the seat of experts. By then, involvement of experts had been 
a generally accepted practice in the western world. The Saxon code (1844) did not, the 
Prussian code (1837) did oblige the judge to accept the expert’s opinion.68 Mostly, the court 
requested the seat of experts to issue their opinion at its discretion, and deemed it mandatory 
to request it if it believed that its own expertise was not sufficient to decide the legal dispute 
on the merits in a just manner. On the contrary, Szemere prescribed that it was mandatory for 
the court to address the documents to the seat of experts. It was not surprising that the court 
was not allowed to deviate from the statement issued by the experts on the injury, the court’s 
power was restricted to assessment of the extent of legal sanction. The seat of experts was 
obliged to make a statement on the subject of injury every time, however, only upon the 
court’s call on the amount of indemnity. The experts had fifteen days from receipt to adopt the 
expert’s decision.69 
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The court, in possession of the written pleadings and expert’s opinion, passed its judgment 
(the bill did not set the period available to the court), which could be contested by appeal 
within three days from delivery. The bill specified the Royal Court of Appeal as the court of 
the second instance, and no further legal remedy lay. Consequently, the bill radically 
simplified the feudal judicial process by declaring the judgment of the court of the second 
instance final and unappealable in advance.70 He proposed that the eleven members of the seat 
of experts were to be elected by the general meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
annually. They had to consist of four members of the Academy, three writers and artists 
outside the Academy, two librarians and two sellers of pictures and musical pieces.71 The 
body of experts was to take an oath before the general meeting of the Academy, and the body 
itself was to elect its chairman for a year. It was to adopt its resolutions by simple majority of 
the votes cast but at least presence of five members was necessary to constitute quorum, and 
two of them had to be experts, and if the issue concerned music or the arts, they had to be 
sellers of pictures or music.72 
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IV. The 1906 debate of the Hungarian Lawyers’ Society on the copyright act  
 
VI. 1. Miksa Márton’s speech 
 
Miksa Márton, a member of stage authors’ association, in the part of his speech on the merits 
called the attention to the faults of the copyright act. He did not dwell on the sections of the 
act one by one, instead he pointed out the general faults of the copyright act he had been 
convinced of in practice. 
In his view, since the 1884 copyright act entered into force several factors whose conditions 
the copyright act regulated had changed to a great extent, with special regard to the conditions 
of the stage and writers of the age. In his speech Miksa Márton did not intend to give a 
political opinion or go into arguments, he called the attention of the persons present to the 
following: ”… Hungarian writers are not just priests offering things on the altar of culture: 
Hungarian writers by their pen, orators by their word, painters by their brush are soldiers, 
whose words, writing are their weapon: weapon that unites, that disseminates the Hungarian 
nation that conquers the country for the Hungarian element and ensures continued existence 
of Hungarians.”73 He called the attention to the point that the literary scene did play an 
important role in the life of the nation, fulfilled an outstanding task in maintaining the 
Hungarian mind and anyone who respected literature could be pleased to see that our 
literature was able, in spite of all external pressure, impact, to retain ”its own racial 
Hungarian nature, special Hungarian colour”.74 He set requirements that the copyright act 
was to meet and he wanted to attain through the reform first and foremost. One of his 
requirements was that the act should protect property rights more radically than other 
legislation.  
He points out that the commercial code regulates only the business character of publisher’s 
transactions, and takes into consideration the content of only legal transactions that the author 
enters into with his publisher, and pays no regard to the content of the author’s rights. He 
mentions as an example that German legislation lists item by item the author’s rights that he 
may exercise against the publisher: they include the right of translation and adaptation (the 
latter can play a significant role for musical works), after that he gives a detailed analysis of 
the copyright act. 
He mentions that the copyright act is not radical enough: section 1 of the act contains the 
general provisions, which is the main item of the act—it stipulates provisions regarding 
reproduction, publication and marketing of writer’s, author’s works, however, in his view this 
provision does not contain all essential elements. In Miksa Márton’s opinion even section one 
provides provisions within a rather narrow scope, and later on he dwells on them in details. 
Next he criticises section 6: as if here the rule of law wanted to make up for the deficiencies 
of section one, i.e., the problem that it defined the term of copyright not in accordance with 
requirements; it lists the cases of infringement of copyright. As if the definition of who is that 
violates copyright appeared as a counterbalance from which we might deduce what copyright 
actually is. By that, however, the act raises another problem: in court proceedings both section 
1 and section 6 shall be taken into account, and the judge is bound by both. As it lists 
usurpation in seven points, which can be considered itemised, a case might arise where none 
of the opportunities can be used because it is not included in the listed items, however, 
copyright has been nevertheless violated, and the court cannot declare the case of usurpation 
regarding copyright, thus, the act does not achieve its goal, does not sufficiently protect the 
author and his right. The lecturer argues as follows: ”When the act, whose prime requisite is 
precision, clarity, leaves such gaps with respect to its very first, primary definitions, then it is 
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clear that this will result in uncertainty, instability in judicature…”.75 The thoughts described 
above formulate the opportunity that the judge handles the above-mentioned sections 
extensively for the sake of easier applicability, in this case, however, faith in administration of 
justice can be easily shaken. Miksa Márton refers to the provisions of both the Austrian and 
German copyright act. In his opinion, the German act regulates this field of law quite 
precisely, and believes that the Germans have a perfectly worked out copyright law in spite of 
the conservative elements in it. The Austrian act can serve as an example too; its advantage is 
that in terms of territory it is closer to us, so it can be easier identified with our own 
provisions. On the contrary, he makes critical remarks concerning the French law and does 
not refer to it, arguing that in France the relevant law is outdated, and at the turn of the 
century they apply mostly the results of administration of justice and not itemised provisions. 
The Austrian act gives the definition of the infringement of copyright briefly and concisely: 
”adaptation of the author’s work without the author’s licence shall be considered 
infringement of copyright”.76So, the deficiency of domestic act is that if somebody can freely 
dispose over his own work, then why should he not dispose over its adaptation, use too? In 
judicial practice this raises further problems because for lack of legal regulation only files 
accumulate in cases concerning this issue. It occurs quite often that a drama has been made 
from a short story, narrative, so it is a typical case where adaptation is implemented. In this 
case the law in force at the time does not contain any provision that provides protection for 
the authors against adaptation. As the next example the speaker raises the issue of writer’s 
letters that were published formerly in a collected edition, which was quite a popular genre; 
the act, however, does not even mention them, so does not regulate this subject area, while the 
German act resolutely provides for this too.  
The next serious problem comes from lack of regulation of extracts, in other words, what may 
be borrowed from the work and what not. Section 9 of the act states that ”quoting certain loci 
or minor parts of a work already published shall not be considered infringement of 
copyright”, then in continuation ”inclusion of published minor papers in a restricted volume 
justified by the goal in a greater work that is independent in its content can be considered a 
scientific work”.77 In this part the act discusses what right the author is deprived of, here we 
expect to see a correct, precise definition, however, we find an obscure, unclear statutory 
definition only. Presumably, what gives reason for regular abuses of copyright is that the act 
does not provide proper legal security, moral and ethical value, so anybody can act freely with 
works in this field due to gaps in the law because there is no applicable retaliation against it or 
proper penalty. It follows from the above that authors do not trust the copyright act, contrary 
to criminal rules of law since the provisions set forth in them are clearer and more easily 
understandable and therefore can be enforced, so they guarantee legal security much better. 
Márton asserts that in terms of its structure the copyright act cannot be considered good either 
because it is incomprehensible; also, it occurs that it mixes questions or settles them in parts 
where they cannot be classified into taxonomically. The speaker calls the attention to the 
second sentence of section 1 of the act, which is quite contrary to section 7 of the Austrian 
copyright act; it is clear evidence of this poorly built structure (”regarding works which 
cannot be separated into several parts intellectualy, only jointly are the authors entitled to 
right of disposal”78) Meaning that concerning substantive issues we can speak about 
divisibility, which can be as well proportionate, yet, the right of disposal is indivisible.  
In what follows, the speaker disputes provisions regarding translation, which again would 
need amendments. Translation constitutes the most fundamental element of copyright, so it 
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deserves to be dealt with in more details, just as Miksa Márton did. As it has become clear 
earlier, if the author disposes over publication, marketing of the work, distribution and related 
deadlines and forms, then the author should dispose over translation too since this is one of 
the forms of distribution. Consequently, it is a significant issue who translates the work into 
another language, which is one the author’s prime interests too. It is possible to raise the 
general problem against the act that the author can dispose over translation only in the event 
that the author has reserved his right to it. The provision of the act in section 7, which cannot 
be considered exact again, is as follows: ”…translation of the original work without the 
author’s consent can be considered infringement of copyright if the author has reserved the 
right of translation on the title page of the original work, on condition that translation has 
been commenced during one year and completed during three years from publication of the 
original work”. The above quotation from the act can be perhaps taken as one of the best 
examples of obscure and incomprehensible formulation. More specifically, it does not reveal 
regarding whom it stipulates deadlines and what the date of commencement and date of 
termination of such deadline is. Miksa Márton raised another problem concerning section 7: 
”for theatre plays translation shall be fully completed during six months from publication of 
the original work”. His question to this is “who is to complete it and from when six months is 
calculated from?”79 Although he himself gives answer to the second part of his question 
based on his own experience: it is calculated from the date of the first performance, the 
answer comes soon from the audience: it is the entitled translator who must complete it.  
His next argument concerns sections 46 and 48, to be more precise, he considers these 
injurious. Section 46 of the act provides for infringement of copyright regarding musical 
works: ”any adaptation published without the author’s consent that cannot be considered 
own composition”. Again, he confronts this section with section 32 of the Austrian act, which 
defines the cases where adaptation of a musical work implements violation of rights, and 
where it allows the adapter the following: ”certain variations, fantasies may be, others may 
not be made from certain musical works”.80 After the above-mentioned section, he touches on 
section 48, deemed more injurious by him. Use of a published author’s work as the text of a 
musical work cannot be considered infringement of copyright, and it follows from the above 
that poets’ works can be freely used. Commenting upon this part of the act Márton expounds 
that this is contrary to the author’s most fundamental right since only the author shall dispose 
over the poem or text. This opportunity of use is contrary to equity because the composer uses 
the work and obtains income therefrom, while the author of the original work gets no 
consideration for it although the composer would not have any income without him. Márton 
raises the following example in this respect: ”…’A falu rossza’ [’Scoundrel of the Village’] 
was written as a folk play and composer Jenő Hubay made an opera of it. Mrs Ede Tót sued 
Jenő Hubay for unauthorised use and infringement of copyright. The curia [the Supreme 
Court] passed judgment in accordance with section 48 that texts that owing to their nature 
have significance only with respect to music composition such as texts of operas, oratorios 
shall be taken out of the term of usurpation.”81 
According to Márton the act does not consider protection of dramatic works important 
enough, which is clear from section 50 too, which states that outside stage overtures, parts of 
music between the acts and other parts can be performed without the copyright owner’s 
consent, however, authors lose their source of income due to this section. The Austrian act 
stipulates contrary provisions because consideration shall be paid for using the author’s 
music. Miksa Márton finds section 51 injurious too, which states that musical works 
published in reproduced form and offered for sale can be performed without the copyright 
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owner’s consent provided that the author has not reserved the right of performance on the title 
page or at the beginning of the work. This inflicts the author more than the section on 
translation because public performance of a stage work is the author’s most fundamental 
right. He refers to the fact that German regulation is also liberal but in certain cases only: in 
charity parties where admission is free and contributors perform free of charge; Hungarian 
regulation, however, makes copyright a prey without any restrictions, and binds enforcement 
of copyright to a formality whereas the author cannot be demanded to reserve assertion of a 
formal right separately. 
According to section 52, if there are several authors of the work, paragraphs two and three of 
section 1 shall be applied with respect to public performance with the deviation that 
performance of musical works with words, including musical plays, need the composer’s 
consent only in general. The speaker claims it is hard to understand why the composer’s work 
is judged differently than the librettist’ work, and why greater right of disposal is given to 
him.  
Section 58 of the copyright act applies to performance of theatre plays; it sates that in case of 
violation of rights ”the total income from unauthorised performance without deduction of the 
costs incurred shall be paid as indemnity”. This is contrary to the generally accepted practice 
of the period because the injured could get a certain part only. If this section of the act stood 
indeed, then each author would watch when rules are infringed, would look for conflict so tht 
the total income received could be delivered to him as indemnity. Probably some kind of error 
is hiding here, he says, since in Hungary the basis of compensation can be only the part of the 
total income which serves to determine the author’s royalty.  
The copyright act does not provide for several issues, however, development makes it 
unavoidable to make rules with regard to mechanical reproduction, publication and 
marketing: lawmakers cannot forget that development brings along more modern, more state-
of-the-art technologies that raise problems in law. There is no correct statutory definition for 
the above-mentioned mechanical reproduction, publication and marketing; the German act, on 
the contrary, foreseeing technological development, exhaustively describes what the phrase 
mechanical reproduction covers. It is a particular question whether the phonograph is a 
machine or not, and if copyright can be infringed by reproducing the author’s work through a 
phonograph. According to German regulation, infringement of right cannot be committed 
through a phonograph, the French act, however, regulates these issues stricter because 
phonograph is deemed a means suitable for that.  
From among the rules to be reformed arising in connection with limitation he highlights 
section 36 which states that penalty of infringement of copyright and claim for compensation 
and unlawful enrichment will lapse in three years, and the three years will start on the day 
when distribution of unlawfully reproduced copies commences or publication of the work 
takes place. Márton considers this inequitable, the three years little and determination of the 
commencement of limitation unreasonable. If, for example, the author goes abroad for a 
longer period, during this time somebody might publish his work and if the author returns 
home and learns of what has happened only four years later, then he cannot take action 
against the infringer as the term of assertion of rights has already expired because distribution 
started more than three years before. It would be a more equitable solution if the term of 
limitation was calculated not from commencement of distribution but from the date of 
learning of the facts since this rule protects the author’s interests, therefore, it should be 
adjusted to his information, knowledge of the facts. 
Furthermore, he contests the procedural law part of the act, again based on his experience: he 
does not deem it equitable that the term of passing judgment in copyright related claims is 
longer than one year. In Márton’ practice it had never occurred that the court passed judgment 
within one year in copyright claims: ”…I do not speak about compensation for damage, 
which could be left with the competent court according to the extent of the amount, however, 
the fact of infringement of copyright should be reserved for court of justice and minutes 
proceedings against the flagrant offender, which as we know takes painfully such a long 
time”.82  
Also, he points out how big uncertainty is concerning copyright in our country and refers to 
relations maintained with foreign countries. He finds it injurious that the country ”dropped out 
of” the Berne Convention, and that we do not maintain good relations with several foreign 
states, which has produced a “really robbing practice”. He emphasises that the Authors’ 
Association makes every effort to act within its sphere of authority and, for example, in 
consultation with the US consul in Budapest it tries to create reciprocity between the two 
countries. 
 
 
IV. 2. Géza Kenedi’s speech  
 
In Géza Kenedi’s view it is a generally unfortunate feature of Hungarian lawmaking that all of 
our acts were enacted when they were already considered outdated in the country where they 
came from (often, other branches of law in Hungary lag behind too). He considers our 
copyright act reception of the 1870 German copyright act, however, it was considered 
outdated in Germany by 1884. ”I have wanted to grasp this old statute to criticise it and 
search for great motifs of the act and it always slips out of my hands. I can always find, as the 
honourable speaker detailed it quite well, fragmentary measures, which are bad, have no 
sense in parts or when they have sense they should rather not have that sense”83, Géza 
Kenedi begins his speech on the merits. He shares the opinion of the previous speaker 
regarding reform, so the question is not if reform is needed, since it is obviously clear from 
the present situation, but in which direction it should go. Géza Kenedi’s opinion is different in 
several points from Miksa Márton’s views, who took the floor before him. ”Actully, advanced 
education has not produced many new instruments with respect to expressing thoughts and—
as music is also concerned here—emotions since the date of this act.” Apart from the 
telephone and phonograph, it was motion picture that has appeared as a new instrument, so 
the regulation of only these instruments should be integrated in the act, which the Germans 
have partly done as their act was made in 1901.  
In what follows he refers to some examples in his speech. The first ones include the case of 
the Telephone Herald: he recalls how difficult it was to place it among dogmatic concepts, in 
spite of the fact that its copyright law and press law aspects were unquestionable. (Through 
the Telephone Herald a poem of one of the Hungarian poets was disseminated throughout the 
city. An action was brought in the case; in the claim they asserted that this took place through 
mechanical reproduction; the objection made in the first instance was that this was not 
mechanical only acoustic reproduction. Therefore, they lost the lawsuit in the first instance; in 
the second instance, however, they made use of the fact that the court strictly insisted on 
conceptual definitions, and they based their argument on that. Finally the court declared 
usurpation without being excessively bound by concepts.) A similar problem was raised at 
that time by theft of electricity in terms of criminal law regulation, i.e., whether electricity is 
material or not; it was not decided, yet it was certain that taking it qualifies as theft. German 
regulation dwelled on it separately; it declared that electricity can be stolen although it is not 
material.  
Kenedi asserts that outstanding progress in thoughts and jurisprudence is the main reason for 
reform, and that several concepts have in the meantime been determined more precisely, and 
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that the number of unlawful acts has widened. Concerning copyright, in stead of theft—which 
actually cannot be called theft since the point under review is a right of other nature rather 
than property in the traditional sense—one should speak about misappropriation, infringement 
of the intellectual property of another person. After expounding these thoughts he calls the 
audience’s attention to the point that if they want to make reforms, they should not forget 
about the fact that people usually find loopholes, so it is worth taking great care to explore 
and eliminate them. According to his somewhat idealistic opinion alien to the reactive nature 
of law, it would be an essential aspect if judges were motivated to find frauds before rather 
than after they occur.  
”Protection of author’s rights should be governed, directed every time by two leading 
thoughts in terms of public interest and individual aspect.”84 The core of one of the thoughts 
is that freedom, movement of ideas, thoughts should take place in the whole society as 
extensively as possible without any restrictions. Kenedi’s long-term hope is that free 
spreading should be absolutely unlimited but this can be realised only in the event that the 
state shows greater care for the products of culture, the arts; the other thought is that 
protection of the author—and protection of its own rights, which means copyright 
protection—serves public interest too.  
Kenedi raises the question ”whether it is just that under the umbrella of protection of the 
creative work of human intellect inferior, valueless works and destructive products of the 
mind are given such protection too?”85 By that he means to tell the audience that albeit great 
poets would benefit from this reform, should protection be given to those who write “pulp 
works” with vocabulary and subjects incomparable to true literary works. He notes that he 
shares Márton’s opinion with respect to usurpation, he also thinks that formulation is not 
precise, not perfect: it is worth comparing it to the 1901 German act because we can be 
surprised to experience that in those days the tendency of these laws embraced far more 
developed, far greater interests, which justifies it all the more to make a new act instead of the 
Hungarian copyright act. In his view the difficulty comes from the fact that it should be 
determined in practice who the actual owner of the literary work is; this can easily cause 
problems: is it the author or the agency to whom he has transferred it, or the person to whom 
the agency has transferred it. One should not forget that copyright means exclusivity; and 
Kenedi brings an example: a famous writer sold his work with his name written on it to a 
publisher, who exercised its acquired right; then another publisher took action referring to an 
earlier contract claiming that the author sold it to them earlier, six years before to be precise. 
Also, a case occurred where two, three or more publishers took action claiming that the work 
was sold to them earlier. Kenedi did not refer to names but he added that writers often forget 
which work they have sold already and so plenty of actions are brought. During them ”it 
happens that the suitor comes across a person who has not committed usurpation but stood 
on legal grounds and yet according to the law, since he had not made arrangements in 
advance, he is punished and obliged to pay compensation, at least to reimburse the interest 
although he is innocent”.86 
Copyright protection lasts for fifty years from the death of the author, and this raises further 
questions. German regulation is as follows: regarding these institutions more attention was 
paid to public interest: a period of thirty years from the death of the author was set, with one 
stipulation, however, which meant protection of excellent, appreciated works; more 
specifically if the work was published during these thirty years, then protection lasted for 
another ten years. This stipulation applies to scientific, mathematical works because it often 
occurs that their real value is revealed only later with the progress of technology and then 
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copyrights are reserved for another ten years. This means protection of intellectual work of 
the highest level. Regulation similar to that would stand its ground in our country too, so fifty 
years would be reduced, which would be in the interest of national culture.  
In the Hungarian act restriction of the right to translate a literary work and the author’s 
translation right is unacceptable. It would be senseless and useless to maintain the rule that 
new translations cannot be made for fifty years from the death of the author, therefore ”the 
author should have right to his own work, if he has published it in a certain language, for fifty 
years from his death and if he has this work published in translation himself or by others, this 
should be limited to five years, furthermore, this should be on condition that he can start the 
translation during the first year and should complete it during the three years”.87 This is legal 
injury to the author too, which was solved in a form easier to handle in legislative practice 
abroad. We borrowed this outdated regulation from the earlier 1870 imperial statute; at the 
time of making the German act there was a view prevailing in Germany that the impact of 
literary works and the German intellect should not be restricted when the idea of the empire 
awakens, and thereby they wanted to attain that the idea and culture of the German empire 
”should entrench itself in other countries”. In Hungary this goal was achieved indeed since 
we borrowed the act from them, which cannot be considered a fortunate step, because we 
borrowed all of its faults instead of legislation having analysed this rule more thoroughly and 
having taken amendatory measures to make a more efficient act.  
The next subject area he discussed in his speech was the issue of setting to music. Kenedi was 
also indignant at the procedure used inland against the author. The act was also improper 
because according to its rules it did not qualify as usurpation when an author’s work was used 
for making a musical work, and the text was made together with musical accompaniment. The 
above-mentioned example of ‘The Scoundrel of the Village’ arises again. The inheritors of 
the writer of the work, Ede Tóth sued the writer of the libretto of the opera, who 
misappropriated the work; the case was referred to a national experts committee, which found 
that the all of the figures, names, characters and events that occur in the opera are equal to 
those in the work made by Ede Tóth, so the opera was a complete replica of Tóth’s work, it 
was used without any material changes. The experts committee submitted its findings to the 
court, stating that ”this is usurpation proper and the court declared that—awful explanation 
of letters which Hungary’s judicature cannot get rid of concerning many issues—it was not 
usurpation because the law allowed it.”88 This example clearly shows that the reform of 
copyright law allows of no delay. The German regulation made in 1901 was more advanced 
because according to it certain parts of poems or minor poems can be used for setting them to 
music. 
Then, he speaks about circumstances that unambiguously supports the need for reform. This is 
the issue of translation in a country where culture develops fast by integrating products of art, 
ideas, while works of national literature must be extraordinarily protected. In this country, in 
Hungary it is of key significance what rules on translation of works are like because the 
problem of possible injuries is decided in accordance with them, also, it is questionable what 
international contracts should be by which we regulate the right of translation in line with our 
needs. Hungary “exports” a very low number of literary works abroad; yet, compared to that 
plenty of works come into the country. Our literary balance shows a huge deficit since literary 
works, mostly from Germany, are flowing into the country in large quantities. In this respect 
he raises the question how we should pay for incoming imports and if we do pay tax to a 
foreign culture what we should pay for: ”For multitudes of inferior, weaker, valueless works, 
or is it able to arrange its laws in such fashion that if it protects translation of foreign works, 
then it should provide for translation so that genuinely precious works in the foreign culture 
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that can enrich the nation’s life and culture should be given priority.”89 Undoubtedly, 
international contracts should be concluded on the basis of this principle.  
The next point of his speech was the issue of the Berne Convention. At the time of making the 
Hungarian copyright act, at the end of the 1800’s, the foundations of the Berne Convention 
had been laid already, in spite of that an invalid act was made in Hungary. By 1906, most of 
the European states had ratified the convention, except for Austria-Hungary. The core of the 
Berne Convention is that it provides the author’s right of translation in his own state; abroad, 
it allows ten years for starting translation, if translation has been started, it provides the same 
rights that he enjoys at home; this means much greater security for literary works. By this 
regulatory method valuable Hungarian literary works could obtain foreign markets, so it 
would be important to integrate the rules of the Convention in the reform—this view was 
shared by traders and publishers. At the relevant time it was not in the interest of our country 
not to ratify the international agreement, it was aborted by the Czechs and the Polish to hinder 
breakthrough of German culture in Austria. At the end of his speech Géza Kenedi notes that it 
is very difficult for our lawmaking machinery to adapt the act, although it would be of utmost 
importance to adapt to the needs of the nation: ”Beings that cannot adapt will scrape by or 
waste away: this is a law of nature.”  
 
 
IV. 3. Emil Szalai’s speech 
 
In Emil Szalai’s opinion—following previous speakers—Hungarian copyright act needs 
profound reform, although he does not find the present copyright situation so hopeless, yet, he 
would not highlight Act XVI of 1884 as a masterpiece of lawmaking. It cannot be considered 
a work of high standard either in terms of its wording, concept or structure; however, in the 
hands of a proper judge this rule of law can be used but only if the judge has a feeling for 
literary and artistic life. Applicability of an incomplete, inaccurate act can be helped by 
judicial practice and legal custom, if it does not get stuck on possibly less properly worked out 
statutory provisions, the judge can make up for deficiencies in dispensation of justice. He 
refers to the legal practice of France as an example for efficient application of old rules of law 
where copyright law is in a situation similar to that in Hungary.  
In his opinion the Hungarian act could have been made better if the interests of the persons to 
be protected had been taken into consideration. In defense of the court it can be raised that 
copyright related cases are very rarely referred to them, so very rarely have they been in a 
situation where they had to adopt a decision with regard to copyright. Furthermore, it can be 
stated that artists, writers and publishers endured their cases alleged to be legal injuries 
without taking any action, they did not use protection provided by law, they endured that their 
works were taken unlawfully from them, were abused. Accordingly, such claims have not 
appeared in judicial practice, so far only a few have occurred in the capital city, lots of 
provincial courts have not dealt with any copyright related lawsuits at all. Possibly the 
situation would have been different if only the courts of Budapest, Kolozsvár and 
Marosvásárhely had been vested with power in copyright issues, and the professional standard 
of judging the cases would have been higher. If lawsuit had been conducted before the above-
mentioned courts only, then practice would have matured much better and cases would have 
been handled more professionally since similar cases would have concentrated here, which 
would have made judges’ work easier.  
Szalai would not put emphasis on authors’ legal protection in the reform—in his view this is 
set forth in the present act, and it is a question of interpretation only—instead, he would 
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integrate institutions of social character. In his view, authors’ attention should be called to the 
point that they should seek legal protection and request legal remedy of injuries in court, by 
which authors would recognise that they can obtain pecuniary advantages on the grounds of 
the present act too, and the growing number of illegal works in literary life could be 
eliminated; the most obvious form of that is setting up associations, professional societies, and 
bringing artists together in them.  
Szalai does not consider it right to implement the reform in a form that underlines authors’ 
(pecuniary) interests only and makes regulation paying regard to it, since it must be admitted 
that authors have moral, ethical interests too. Only a part of the authors believe that their 
prime interest is to increase their wealth by their work, lots of them put the emphasis on 
propagating, disseminating their own thoughts, ideas. Some publishers also intend to achieve 
that much rather than increasing pecuniary assets: for there are publishers that have been set 
up as non-profit organisations, for example, a political party or a social movement whose 
raison d’être is to disseminate the idea of literary works, but here the primary aim is not to 
increase proceeds but to recruit adherents and followers to their ideas. Several writers think 
that as acknowledgement of their work they expect an increasingly wide range of people to 
become familiar with their works rather than pecuniary assets. It is in the interest of society 
and the state that works should be disseminated as extensively as possible, however, it is also 
in the interest of them that pecuniary benefits should urge people to think or engage in 
writing, thinking regularly. As a matter of fact, it is also necessary that anybody who has 
talent in writing should be provided with financial means, should be able to earn a living from 
his artistic work. ”Therefore, harmony between culture and author’s financial interests 
should be the guiding line in the reform of copyright law.”90 
The former thought should determine the direction in the reform of copyright law, particularly 
in the field with international aspects and translation. He refers to the train of thoughts in 
Géza Kenedi’speech that domestic literature is not significant in exports, its imports are all the 
more significant. He thinks it should be deliberated whether it is domestic interests and values 
or the works of otherwise well paid authors that should have priority. It is needless to make 
efforts as soon as possible to pay increasingly high customs duties to countries that import 
books duty free, in the form of author’s royalty through regulation of translation rights and 
international agreements. This is an important aspect regarding the issue of joining the Berne 
Convention—therefore, Szalai does not support accession to the Berne Convention either.  
In the reform special emphasis should be laid on the need to revise the new act so that we 
should obtain financial benefit from imported works instead of the currently effective 
regulation under which foreign authors’ works flow into the country without payment of any 
customs duty, by this shift giving a chance to publishers, translators to have foreign literature 
flowing in huge volumes marketed in Hungarian and thereby to generate profit. Competition 
on the market will favour dissemination of high standard foreign works too. Contrary to 
Kenedi’s opinion, he thinks that Hungarian edition of popular scientific works should be 
entered in the market in a much wider scope at a lower price.  
He specifically highlights the issue of the right of public performances because he considers 
its regulation rather obscure. Public performance is a special genre in terms of regulation 
since it is a less palpable work, not a lasting work in the traditional sense; therefore, original, 
independent provisions are required in this respect. Szalai asserts that section 50 of the act, 
which does not protect overtures of plays, is rather injurious. As an example he refers to 
János vitéz [John the Hero] by Pongrác Kacsóh: enterprises set up to present musical 
performances such as music cafes or music-halls allure the public (against payment of 
admission fee or using raised prices) by the music of János vitéz, however, during the 
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performance guests will hear nothing else than the song Egy rózsaszál [A Rose]. In the case of 
another song, a part of a play, which was sung and played by orchestras throughout the 
country, only a minimum amount was paid by the publisher to the author when the author sold 
it to them before the first performance. The Austrian and German law regulates the issue more 
strictly for the benefit of the author, because it orders to pay fee to the author separately for 
each performance, while domestic authors get almost nothing for the right to perform the 
music of plays on the grounds of statutory provisions. Szalai would leave section 51 of the act 
in force with respect to the music of theatre plays too, and he argues that it is often in the 
interest of the composer and theatres to make the song known as extensively as possible to 
allure audience to the performances.  
He calls the chapter of the act on penalties and compensation absolutely useless; he believes it 
needs to be reformed immediately. With respect to fundamental principles this part is 
extremely outdated, and in practice it has been proved that these rules ensure copyright 
protection to a low extent. Statutory provisions regarding usurpation have been made in a 
form typical of criminal law regulation, and perhaps, he adds, that is why the chapter has the 
title penalties. Whereas, the objective would be ”pecuniary indemnity”, and penalty should 
serve the author’s benefit: it seems to be less realistic that, if the author can see that the 
amount received from penalty enriches the state treasury and the author himself gets nothing 
due to his injury, he would bring an action in the case, whereas, if he had pecuniary advantage 
from the lawsuit, in addition to moral indemnity, then he would take action sooner before 
court in case of injury. The German regulation considers the author’s compensation an issue 
of prime importance, the title of the relevant chapter is Rechtsverletzungen: it puts 
compensation in the centre, the issue of penalty is secondary, the amount of the fine imposed 
by the court is payable to the author, and penalty, which is payable to the state treasury, can 
be imposed additionally.  
 
 
IV. 4. Sándor Marton’s speech 
 
Sándor Marton at the beginning of his speech sets his fundamental principles regarding the 
reform. The first thing he mentions is that the author himself should enjoy the financial 
benefits of his work, that is, only the author should be ale to “exploit” intellectual activity 
financially. The other direction is protection of the author’s moral values. The author’s 
protection from two directions gets in conflict with the interest of the state, more specifically 
cultural interests, ”the education developing force implied by the products of human mind 
should be provided for the plenitude, which necessarily involves restriction of the author’s 
claims for protection”.91 Restriction shows itself in the fact that the form into which the 
author casts its work comes only from his own inner self, however, each author draws 
inspiration to make his work from the common treasures of mankind and merely adds his own 
ideas, thoughts to it. Accordingly, he refers to the Italian act that states that the author works 
for mankind, and social order provides the author with enjoyment of his work solely within 
the term of protection. (Marton stresses that Jhering, through the law of persons approach, 
classified usurpation claim as iniuriarum actio, and the only available Roman law reference to 
it in the copyright law systems of the turn of the century is the one that Ulpianus expounded 
when he spoke just about iniuriarum actio: ”…iniuriam damnum accipiemus … culpa datum, 
etiam ab eo, qui nocere noluit”.92) 
Ample literature supported the German law of property approach that copyright is property 
right—in this field Proudhon’s approach was the most extreme: he compares the author who 
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sells his book to a woman who offers her charms for sale. Marton asserts that Roman law and 
the authors of the antiquity left nothing to us with regard to copyright from which we could 
set out in this question; this problem occurred owing to spreading of printing and paper only, 
mostly from publishers’ point of view, since copyright developed from bans on reprints.  
Setting out from the little available legal sources, János Suhajda, in his private law, advises 
writers, judges ”that everybody should help himself as he can”. Marton refers to the case of 
Jenő Rákosi as an example: in 1878 the director of the German theatre in Gyapjú street 
announced performance of the play entitled Niniche, however, the right to perform this play 
was obtained by Jenő Rákosi, director of the Folk Theatre, so they applied to the police for 
banning the performance of the play, and on the opening night of the play the performance 
was banned indeed. As a matter of fact, the director of the German theatre lodged an appeal in 
the case, but the police action was approved in the second instance too. In 1878, when 
copyright acts had been made all over Europe, police intervention in a case of private nature 
was justified by the general principle of prevention. It was under such circumstances that the 
draft bill on writers’ and artists’ property rights was published in the yearbooks of the 
Kisfaludy Society, which was made by László Arany, who acted on the verge of writer’s and 
lawyer’s profession, and which formed the basis of Act XVI of 1884. Marton’s opinion is 
fully identical with the opinion of earlier speakers to the extent that the act on copyright can 
be radically reformed only in the event that publisher’s rights are reformed simultaneously.  
Concerning the right of translation Marton believes that section 7 of the act can be maintained 
to enable works to get to readers extensively. The author’s right is sufficiently protected 
because in the case of his own authorised translation the author enjoys the normal term of 
limitation of copyright, that is, the principle of volenti non fit iniuria prevails. If the author 
does not exercise this right, it can be presumed that he does not want to prevent his work from 
becoming public domain. However, he believes that the reservation and notification procedure 
should be repealed, and he would determine a period of three years uniformly for term of 
protection reserved for the author with respect to translations.  
According to the reasons of the act, the nature of usurpation brings about that copyright injury 
can be remedied if it has been retaliated within a short time. Marton also believes that 
retaliation of usurpation carries criminal law elements, and it follows from this that the party 
injured by usurpation have almost the same rights as the injured party within the scope of acts 
of criminal law with request for prosecution. Determination of the term of limitation creates 
harmony with the criminal code: according to section 22 of the copyright act usurpation is 
implemented upon the first reproduced copy of the work has been (unlawfully) completed, 
however, limitation begins, according to section 36, from commencement of the distribution, 
publication of the work. Only usurpation set forth in section 23 of the copyright act, 
businesslike offering for sale and distribution can be considered usurpation committed against 
the author’s pecuniary interest, however, limitation of the related claim will commence as 
from the last day of distribution. If the author has not intended to exercise his right during the 
three years available, then it can be presumed that he has not considered it injurious.  
Turning to the issue of adaptation, he puts the question to what extent it is allowed and when 
adaptation is usurpation. At this point he condemns German regulation because he finds it too 
strict that it is the author’s exclusive right to arrange his narrative work for the stage and vice 
versa. ”The author’s work is the individual shape made perceptible in which he presents his 
own thoughts.”93 It follows from this that pure plagiarism does not qualify as usurpation: 
processing of the thoughts of other persons might as well produce a new work. Marton asserts 
that the dividing line between plagiarism and usurpation cannot be absolutely marked, it 
should be analysed on a case by case basis whether an independent literary or artistic work 
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has been produced through processing the basic thought. According to paragraph 1 of section 
9, inclusion of minor parts of specific works and minor papers in volume justified by the 
purpose in an independent scientific work is allowed—so it is important that the work into 
which they are imported should be a scientific work of greater importance.  
With respect to works of the fine arts he demands thorough revision of the act. Comparison of 
sections 61 and 62 shows striking analogy: paragraph 2 of section 61 considers remaking 
infringement of copyright even if the original work is imitated in another genre or another 
kind of art; according to paragraph 2 of section 62, however, it shall not be considered 
infringement of copyright when specific replicas are made not for the purpose of marketing. 
”This is the anomaly; while simple copying in the same kind of art can be carried out without 
any hindrance permanently, adaptation in another kind of art requiring separate independent 
work is prohibited even in specific copies.”94  
He raises the issue of infringement of copyright in musical works when adapted to 
gramophone or phonograph. According to the German act this qualifies as reproduction: 
”durch Platten, Walzen und ähnliche Bestandteile von Instrumenten … welche zur 
mechanischen Wiedergabe von Musikstücken dienen”, which is allowed all over Europe, 
except for Hungary. According to section 5 of the copyright act, mechanical reproduction of 
the author’s work can be considered infringement of copyright but according paragraph 2 
writing down is also mechanical reproduction if it is used instead of mechanical reproduction. 
In musical works, it is not the musical notations or the score but the musical thought itself that 
is protected. According to section 45 usurpation—properly applying section 5 and paragraph 
2 thereof—can be committed in all the forms in which the musical thought, the author’s 
combination of sounds are recorded in such fashion that the musical thought can be 
reproduced from it. Notes are merely tools to produce sound; sounds, however, can be remade 
not only by notes but by plenty of other tools, such as phonographs. With regard to protection 
of musical works, Marton asserts, it is not enough to makes sure that musical notations could 
not be duplicated through printing, protection should be provided for writer’s works for the 
case when they are made for the blind by relief printing, and protection is required for musical 
works too when duplication is made not by duplicating notes but by another method.  
Section 22 of the German act contains restriction of composers’ rights, section 9 of the 
Hungarian copyright act lists item-by-item the measures that restrict the author’s natural right, 
however, it does not contain any restrictions regarding permitted forms of reproduction and 
publication. Irrespective of the German regulation, the Hungarian regulation in force at the 
turn of the century qualified marketing of musical works through gramophone as injurious 
conduct.  
In the debate of the German copyright act, the Reichstag requested the chancellor to enter into 
negotiations with the states that acceded to the Berne Convention of 9 September 1886 that 
they should prohibit arranging musical works, without the author’s permit, for any musical 
instrument by which musical works can be reproduced. Thus, they speak about reproduction 
only in the event that the work is produced in a determined number in such form from which 
it becomes possible to communicate the author’s thoughts to others but it does not need to be 
made in the same form as the original. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the same audience 
should be addressed by it, so mechanical reproduction advances perceiving the work by other 
sense organs. With regard to mechanical reproduction they stated that it is equal to printing in 
terms of form, purpose and essence, so it can be classified into the same category as printing 
also in terms of usurpation—albeit, an expert can somewhat enjoy reading musical notations, 
their readability is not condition of the copyright protection of the musical work, the general 
public can enjoy them only in the forms of sounds. Section 46 of the copyright act states that: 
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”Any adaptation of musical works published without the author’s consent that cannot be 
considered own composition shall be considered infringement of copyright. Such as … 
arrangment of musical works for one or several musical instruments … or impression …of 
their melodies.” Marton asserts that it follows from this that the gramophone is an 
arrangement of musical works for gramophone-musical instruments apparatus. 
Marton claims that Kenedi’s standpoint—that copyright protection should not be extended to 
pulp works—is an outdated view. The question occurs to him whether exclusion from 
protection might produce contrary effect and make them more competitive on the market: if a 
work has obscene content indeed, then it belongs to the relevant state of facts of the effective 
criminal code. Their opinions are identical at one point: all printed products should not be 
necessarily provided with copyright protection; at that time there were attempts to protect 
plenty of printed materials by copyright, which owing to judicial dispensation of justice were 
protected indeed (for example, price lists, programs, playbills). The speaker does not consider 
it right because in his view these products belong to the sphere of unfair competition and not 
to the scope of copyright.  
The opinions of Marton and Kenedi regarding state agreements are completely identical: the 
issue of state agreements is an economic issue. He considers the first agreement an erroneous 
measure: our country entered into this agreement with France in 1866 on copyright, when the 
term of protection of translations regarding French works was unlimited, while Hungarian 
works were not provided with any protection. Lacking statistical data, however, relying on his 
information, he asserts that annually approximately five hundred literary works and ca. forty 
stage works in foreign language are staged in translation in Hungary. It follows from this that 
we pay a huge amount abroad for obtaining translation rights, and only a fraction of it is 
returned to us. He believes it would be worth following the German legislative practice and 
narrowing authors’ rights ”in terms of industrial policy”.  
 
 
IV. 5. Samu Fényes’s speech 
 
In his speech Samu Fényes holds the position that the Hungarian copyright act is in every 
respect and by all means the worst possible act. In his view, it would be more favourable for 
the protection of culture and copyright if this regulation did not exist at all.  
Similarly to Miksa Márton, he tries to interpret section 7 of the act, and he finds that this 
section of the act is incomprehensible: ”But we who say that we do not understand it 
understand more of it than those who say that they understand it because those who say they 
understand it do not understand it at all”.95 He believes it is shocking in the act that the first 
possible state of facts regarding usurpation is that anybody who translates a work made in a 
dead language into a living language commits usurpation. He points out that this was 
borrowed from the earlier German regulation and that this regulation was introduced in 
Germany because they wanted to ensure translation rights to the Sprachwissenschaftliche 
Gesellschaft, and it had its significance in Germany since this company published texts in 
eastern dead languages in huge volumes—this is not really needed in Hungary. This means 
that it is much more worth writing works in dead languages and translating them into 
Hungarian because then they will enjoy five years protection. 
He finds that paragraph 3 of section 7 has been indeed worked out in accordance with 
domestic interests: translation without permit shall be considered usurpation only in the event 
that translation has been commenced within one year and has been completed in three years. 
He underlines the incomplete structure of the act when it states in one sentence that 
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publication shall start within one year, in another sentence it sets forth that translation shall be 
started, which is not the same. So, if anybody starts translation within one year and publishes 
it after three years have passed, then it will not qualify as usurpation, however, if he publishes 
it within three years, the case of usurpation does not hold either. It is an interesting point in 
the regulation that translations of theatre plays shall be completed within six months from 
publication of the original. ”As in the introduction the section sets forth the cases of 
usurpation, obviously it should be interpreted that the statement here means that it shall be 
completed within six months from publication of the original to implement usurpation. But it 
has no sense really that it should stipulate quasi as an order how one shall usurp, so only 
another sense can be attributed to this provision.”96 An imperative norm due to its nature 
cannot be qualified as author’s protection.  
It is the fault of the act that it does not sufficiently protect property rights because after one 
year it makes translation free and only one collected edition from several literary works can 
be published under copyright protection. ”Only these two cardinal requirements can be bound 
to copyright: that it should protect the author’s financial interests, his right to his work, i.e., 
property rights; secondly, that it should protect individuality of his work, i.e., moral powers 
and as this act does not achieve these goals, it is necessary to make a law that enforces these 
two postulates.”97  
In the rest of his speech, he discusses Kenedi’s position regarding pulp fiction. Kenedi would 
provide protection against immoral, low standard works, and Samu Fényes agrees with it to 
the extent that there is no forum that would determine what qualifies as obscenity. He adds 
that it is noteworthy that compared to general conditions of world literature the number of 
pornographic works in Hungary is outstandingly high, the reason for it, he says, is presumably 
that they can be taken by anybody, the three years that protect the author pass quickly, and 
after that the work becomes a prey, it is easy to fill the market with it; it costs nothing, it 
needs no science or linguistic skills, and we get a useless literary work. On the contrary, he 
believes scientific works in Hungarian are very rare in the market, apart from a few works. 
Turning the above argument the other way round, copyright should protect trash for long 
years so that writers of trash should deliver their work for reproduction only for high valuable 
consideration and this would make the price of trash rise, so it would not be possible to enter 
the market with cheap publications.  
In Samu Fényes’s opinion, reform of the copyright act can be implemented solely in the event 
that writers are protected against translations and collected editions, and for this reason this 
right of protection should prevail for thirty-forty years from the death of the author with 
regard to translators of foreign works too.  
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V. Elemér Balás P.’s reform proposals 
 
We intend to present reform efforts made in the field of copyright at the beginning of the 20th 
century to reform Act LIV of 1921 through the works of Elemér Balás P. in harmony with the 
Berne Convention and the Rome Convention. 
 
 
IV. 1. Evaluation of the Rome Convention  
 
Act XXIV of 1931 enacting the international agreement made in Rome on protection of 
literary and artistic works introduced essential innovations in copyright law for the benefit of 
authors who were not Hungarian citizens, however, belonged to the Berne Convention—these 
rules did not extend to Hungarian citizens. Balás believed that in this field there was a need 
for harmony because the convention put foreign authors in a considerably more favourable 
position, and new rules represented progress in interpretation of copyright.98 
The innovations that the international Rome agreement implemented are manifold. On the one 
hand, they relate to what kind of protection authors can expect to have, on the other hand, to 
the extent of the protection that authors are provided with. In accordance with the Rome 
Convention the author was entitled, in addition to pecuniary protection, to other protection 
too—although its overall name was not specified in the Convention, specific rights were listed 
in it, which the author was entitled to, according to the Convention, irrespective of economic 
rights, what is more, even in the absence of such rights—thus, to legal protection due to 
personality. The natural condition of these protections was that there should be an intellectual 
work to which such right applies. The Convention widened the scope of works provided with 
copyright protection by enumerating works that the Convention in force at that time did not 
refer to separately; on the other hand, it provided protection for the forms of publication of 
works having been expressly protected anyway that were made significant in practice by new 
progress in technological development, for example, for making public by radio.99 
 
 
V. 2. Impact of the Rome Convention 
 
To state that lectures, preachments and other speeches in general were provided with 
copyright protection too represented innovation only in terms of form. Although Act LIV of 
1921 on Copyright did not refer to these works expressly in addition to author’s works, it is 
indirectly clear from its specific provisions that such oral works are provided with protection 
too. The innovation that clearly ensured application of copyright rules to publication by the 
radio has greater significance.100 
The innovation on personal protection, however, has outstanding significance. Act LIV of 
1921 did not expressly contain any provision which stated as a general principle that the 
author’s moral rights are protected. The Act did not distinguish the author’s economic rights 
from his protection enjoyed in other respects, even less was it set out that pecuniary protection 
was not a prerequisite for enforcement of protection applying to the author’s other interests.101 
By express acknowledgement of the author’s moral rights in law it was not possible to 
maintain the system of regulation of copyright prevailing at that time, which was based on the 
exhaustive enumeration of works provided with copyright protection and of the author’s 
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rights to sell them. In Balás’s view, the proper system was built on general rules, and the 
enumeration of specific works and rights was only a list of examples, and the list of the 
restrictions of the author could be an exception only. Furthermore, he proposed to dispense 
with the division based on the difference of works under copyright protection, to think over 
fundamental concepts of copyright and modernise terminology.102 
 
 
V. 3. Elemér Balás P.’s motions for amendment 
 
V. 3. 1. The intellectual property 
 
Balás tried to grasp the core of intellectual property on the basis of the criteria of originality, 
on the one hand, and suitability for being made public, on the other. Originality does not mean 
newness only but an individually new character. Stressing individual character in the 
determination of intellectual property makes it clear, however, that publication of general 
laws or facts undoubtedly definite in their simplicity in a new form shall be covered by 
copyright protection. Suitability for being made public means recognisability by others, the 
phase of the act of intellectual creation when the work becomes suitable for producing impact 
as a work on those to whom it is available. He stressed: it makes no difference how the 
intellectual work is recorded just as it makes no difference what intellectual value and degree 
of originality the work has. Determination of the character of intellectual property and the 
scope of copyright protection is not an evaluating but a qualifying, logical activity. So, works 
of applied art would continue to be protected intellectual products.103 
 
V. 3. 2. The author 
 
Balás expounds that new acts that will be possibly made should contain the definition of the 
term author. The proposed new system would distinguish between the protection of the 
author’s intellectual and pecuniary merits, and would provide the former in general only for 
real authors in the sense of creators of intellectual products, while it would make it possible to 
exercise economic rights in business transactions too. The necessity of definition is supported 
also by the fact that even in the case of transferring economic rights the author retains 
intellectual rights, thereby mere implementing activity falls out of the scope of the concept of 
the author. Furthermore, it is supported by the fact that in general it is intellectual activity that 
governs and not other, especially business aspects—otherwise of whatever great significance 
with respect to creation of the work.104  
He asserts that the significance of the term of co-authors is especially true regarding motion 
picture works, where numerous contributors perform activity in making the film, which is 
regarded as author’s activity, however, the activity of none of the contributors stand alone and 
cannot be placed in the usual relation of co-operation of co-authors. It must be admitted that 
with respect to the development of a motion picture work the most important aspect is the 
business interest of the company that wants to sell the motion picture work. In Balás’s 
opinion, with respect to the definition of the author of motion picture works the lawmaker 
should adjust to real facts and should state that with respect to motion picture works produced 
within the scope of a business company the protection that the author is entitled to will be 
provided for the person whose entrepreneurial activity has created the film.105  
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Furthermore, full copyright protection shall be given to editors of compilations and creators of 
the method of putting plays on stage as a whole, provided that they have created an 
intellectual product by their intellectual activity. Such authors, however, may be provided 
with protection that leaves the rights of the author of the original work untouched, but their 
protection would be independent of whether copyright protection lies or not in primary 
respects.106 
Balás claims that it is necessary to expressly provide for the author’s intellectual interests and 
their protection. In this respect it should be stated that irrespective of the author’s economic 
rights—what is more even in the case of transferring them—the author will retain his right to 
establish his claim to the authorship of the work, furthermore he retains his right to object to 
any distortion, mutilation of the work or any other change of the work that might be injurious 
to his honour or reputation.107  
It shall be left to the author’s absolute discretion if he creates his work and if he makes it 
public, furthermore, if he makes his capacity as author public. Furthermore, the rule to be 
made affects the author’s intellectual interests, which sets forth that transferred economic 
rights may be transferred to another person only with the author’s or his inheritor’s consent. 
Balás proposes deviation from effective copyright law also to the extent that the author’s 
economic rights do not need to be determined exhaustively; instead, the most important ones 
of them should be listed as examples.108  
With respect to the author’s economic rights, the person who has provided help to the author 
merely by critical remarks, revisions, correction of obvious errors or in a similar form shall be 
regarded identically as a co-author, provided that an agreement to this effect has been entered 
into with the author. This kind of contribution is not a creative activity in the strict sense, 
however, if the author himself deems so, there is no reason for the law to refuse the 
contributor to exercise economic rights a co-author is entitled to, with respect to the work, on 
the grounds of an agreement.109 
 
V. 3. 3. Sanctioning of violation of copyright 
 
Balás, with respect to private law consequences of infringement of copyright, would 
materially deviate from effective copyright law. Accordingly, it would be also possible to 
institute an action merely seeking discontinuance or barring repetition. It would be also a 
material innovation that the injured party, instead of compensation for damage or delivery of 
enrichment, might at its discretion claim equitable fee, furthermore, that, within compensation 
for damage, could claim delivery of net profit exceeding it from the infringer.110  
Also, he was pointing forward when he proposed that punishable cases of infringement of 
copyright should be determined in details. With respect to criminal liability of the owner and 
the principal, if the offence has been committed by a company employee or an agent, and the 
company’s owner or the principal is responsible for wilful or negligent default in fulfilment of 
his supervision or controlling obligation arising from his office, the company’s owner or the 
principal shall be punished due to his offence. The great significance of this provision is 
obvious specifically in the scope of copyright. With respect to determination of penalty it 
should be necessary to deviate from effective copyright law to the extent that application of 
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punisment of imprisonment should be made possible in the case when the perpetrator is 
habitual.111 
 
V. 3. 4. Regulation of new technological achievements 
 
He proposes to regulate specific subjects of the protection of copyright not within the 
frameworks of general rules but among miscellaneous provisions. Works of photography shall 
not be regarded identically as other subjects of copyright since the definition of intellectual 
product cannot be applied in its full extent to works of photography because they are not the 
results of intellectual activity exclusively for in their creation use of machine is indispensable. 
So, he intended to restrict protection of photographs to the extent that it should cover solely 
products of significance exceeding photos produced in industrial form, requiring common, 
mere technical knowledge. Authors of motion picture works shall be regarded in legal terms 
identically as photos.112 
Furthermore, he proposed separate regulation for the protection of text images (illustrations), 
maps, plastic works, globes that cannot be considered works of the fine arts or applied arts, 
geographical, topographical plans, drawings, figures or sketches as well as engineering, 
technical or scientific plans, drawings, figures or sketches not showing newness. As their 
newness is temporal, not individual since finding the particular solution does not arise from 
the peculiarity of a non-recurring individual but depends on chance in time.113  
Also, he made a noteworthy proposal on supplementing the rules of patent law to the extent 
that copyright protection identical with the protection granted to linguistic works shall be 
provided for patent descriptions until a patent is granted or, if a patent has not been granted, 
for five years from publication of the notification in the official journal ordered to serve this 
purpose.114 
With respect to making public by radio Balás expounds that making public by radio is 
publication irrespective whether the author’s work has been published already or not, and as 
such it belongs to the scope of copyright. Making the author’s work public by radio is an 
activity in which reproduction, marketing and publication are carried out simultaneously.115 
Regarding the radio section 56 of the copyright act is significant to the extent that, compared 
to what has been expounded, it is the person who has been named as author in the notification 
advertising the performance that shall be considered—until the contrary has been proved—the 
author of theatre plays, musical plays and musical works not published yet but already 
performed by radio.116 
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 V.  Our copyright acts 
 
In Hungary, as a result of state law relation, the development of author’s rights was similar to 
the process in Austria. Separate legislations of the two states could not prevail until the source 
of publisher’s and author’s rights was the ruler’s power to grant privileges. The first 
regulation of intellectual work was provided by the royal decree no. 12157 on 3 November 
1793. This decree prohibits unlawful reprints under pain of pecuniary fine and compensation 
to be given to the author. It extends right of indemnity to the author’s legal successor 
(cessionarius). The right is bound to limitation, for which no timeframe different from the 
normal was set by the royal decree. It continues to bind new publication to “licence of book 
censors” (censura), however, it extends it to the author’s or his legal successor’s consent. The 
decree does not stipulate any protection for foreign authors. The decree was followed by an 
amendment in 1794, which provides mutual and identical protection in Austria for prints 
published in Hungary and vice versa.  
Increasing needs of life and enhancing circulation of intellectual goods as well as policy 
aimed at setting the press free brought along more independent development of author’s 
rights. The reform movement prevailed sooner in Hungary than in Austria but lawmaking 
results were not introduced. Upon the initiative of the Kisfaludy Society, Bertalan Szemere, in 
addition to acting as chairman, created the first Hungarian copyright bill. The bill was made 
after the 1837 Prussian bill, and was approved at the 1844 national assembly and was 
submitted to the king. The bill referred infringement of author’s rights from the powers of 
public administration to the jurisdiction of criminal courts. The king threw the bill back by an 
evasive warrant for being amended, however, the amendment was not made since by then the 
court was busy making the draft of a new copyright patent for the eternal provinces of 
Austria. 117 
The Austrian patent on protection of literary and artistic property was promulgated on 19 
October 1846, and the king requested the chancellor to issue an opinion on application of the 
patents in Hungary. Based on the report, the Governor’s Council of Buda was instructed to 
redebate the 1844 national assembly bill, paying regard to the rules of the patent effective in 
Austria. The Governor’s Council forwarded the bill and the Austrian laws received from the 
chancellery to the Hungarian Royal Book Reviewing Office for being commented upon and 
making a report. The report was made, and on 27 July 1847 it was submitted to the king, and 
based thereon a new government authority draft of law was made for Hungary, which the 
1847 national assembly should have debated, however, this was prevented by political 
events.118 
In Hungary until 1849 the 1793 royal decree was in force, while in Austria the patent of 19 
October 1846 was effective until the copyright act of 26 December 1895 entered into force. 
Although in Hungary Act XVIII of 1848 declared freedom of the press and released the 
printing house from the shackles of old administrative regulations, and ”Act XXXI of 1848 on 
Theatres” abolished censorship of theatres, the  regulation of author’s rights was not carried 
out. After the fall of the 1848-49 War of Independence, the imperial decree of 29 November 
1852 put the imperial patent of 19 October 1846, together with ABGB, into force also in 
Hungary as from 1 May 1853. This patent had statutory effect until 1861, and in Transylvania 
up to the time when Act XVI of 1884 was enacted.119 
In the course of the overal revision of laws in 1861, at the National Judge’s Conference the 
regulation of copyright was also addressed, however, as there was no constitutional statute in 
                                                 
117
  Knorr 1890. XII. f.; Kenedi 1908. 10. 
118
  Knorr 1890. XIII.; Kenedi 1908. 10. f. 
119
  Knorr 1890. XIII. f.; Kenedi 1908. 11. 
force in this field yet and the NJC wanted to refrain from passing on the Austrian conditions 
of law in this respect too, the following theoretical statement was inserted in Section 23 part I 
of the Temporary Judicial Rules. By acknowledging that intellectual works could constitute 
the subject of property, protection of author’s rights was referred from the scope of 
administrative and criminal courts effective until then to the jurisdiction of civil courts.120 
Although the legal condition so evolved did not reinstate the force of the royal decree of 1793, 
it provided ample room for law-substituting judicial practice as theoretical declaration of 
intellectual property. Nevertheless, we can speak about progress since from then on licencing 
of book printing and reprints by authorities was no longer discussed, and the powers of civil 
court now extended not only to the book but to all literary, fine arts and musical works and 
both their reproduction and public performance.  
General legal conditions were basically not changed by Act XVI of 1867 on the customs and 
commercial union entered into between the countries of the Hungarian crown and other 
provinces either, which mentions in Section 19 of the first customs and trade agreement 
between Hungary and Austria that owing to mutual protection of writer’s and artistic property 
on the territory of both states an agreement would be made through the two legislations. This 
statement was included also in Act XX of 1878 on the customs and commercial union 
between the countries of the Hungarian crown and the rest of the provinces belonging to 
Austria-Hungary, however, it was implemented only in the agreement set forth in Act IX of 
1887, which was entered into between the two states already after putting Act XVI of 1884 
into force.121 
Further regulations are contained in Section 9 of Act XXX of 1868 on enacting the 
Compromise with Croatia and Slavonia, which ranked legislation on writer’s and artistic 
property under the subjects of joint lawmaking, so these fields in this respect were not granted 
autonomy. A notable fact of lawmaking was set forth in Section 2 of Act XVI of 1867, which 
enacted the earlier international agreement entered into by the absolutist government with 
France on 11 December 1866, mutually providing ownership right of intellectual and artistic 
works, and fairly encouraged further development in law. 
Hungarian legislation made the first step in codification concerning statutory regulation of 
Hungarian publisher’s and author’s rights by regulating the publisher’s transaction in title 8 
part II of Act XXXVII of 1875. Although this statutory provision regulated only the legal 
relations of authors of literary, technical or artistic works and publishers engaging in 
reproduction, publication and marketing and solely for the case of lack of any contract; yet, it 
already used the results of legal development attained in Europe. New efforts were boosted 
especially by the German copyright act of 11 June 1870—not only by its stipulations 
satisfying both general needs and requirements of jurisprudence, but by the fact that it was 
edited by clear legal technique and replaced old administrative interventions by regulation of 
court proceedings.122 
In 1867 the Kisfaludy Society took the thread dropped in 1844, and worked out the draft of 
the new copyright bill, however, it reached the Ministry of Justice only. Yet, after entry into 
force of the German statute of 1870, preparation of the act was carried out with greater 
success in the Society of Hungarian Writers and Artists where especially owing to Gyula 
Kováts’s efforts the bill was completed in 1874 already. The bill paid special regard to 
Hungarian conditions that required independent regulation in several respects, however, the 
bill was forced into the background due to the political conditions of the period and other 
tasks to be fulfilled in codification deemed more important, such as the Commercial Code of 
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1875.123 
In the meantime, the German legislation, now having become uniform, continued codification 
of copyright. In 1876, the act on copyright of artistic works and unlawful imitation of 
photographs was made. So, exhaustive sample acts meeting requirements of scientific 
demands were already available to inland reform efforts: it was again the Kisfaludy Society 
that now for the third time, this time joining forces with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
continued the work of codification. László Arany made a single draft of the law on literary, 
artistic and photographic copyrights, Tivadar Pauler Minister of Justice submitted this draft to 
the professional conference and, after it had been reworked, to the House of Representatives 
on 20 November 1882. The judicial committee of the House of Representatives submitted its 
report to the House of Representatives as early as on 9 February 1883, however, general 
debate commenced there on 21 February 1884 only. Upon the instruction of the House of 
Representatives the judicial committee redrafted the text of several sections. The final text of 
the bill was attested by the House of Representatives on 12 March 1884, and the Upper House 
approved it without any changes on 28 March. The act so completed was sanctified by the 
king on 26 April 1884, and it was promulgated in the National Statute Book on 4 May and in 
the House of Representatives by Act XVI of 1884.124 
 
 
VI. 1. General provisions 
 
VI. 1. 1. Introductory provisions and general rules 
 
The theoretical basis of Act XVI of 1884 was borrowed mostly from the German 
Urheberrecht of 1870; the old approach to intellectual property rights was eliminated during 
the preparatory works, and the ministerial proposal considered author’s rights as an 
independent and uniform scope of right. The fields protected by the act are as follows: 
− writer’s works 
− musical works 
− theatre plays 
− all works of the fine arts 
− photography and related reproduced representations  
− maps 
− natural science, geometrical, architectural and other technical drawings and figures. 125 
In covering works of photography with the same protection as writers’ and artistic works it 
was a decisive reason that in our country photography had become a real art, therefore, 
effective protection would serve its further development.126 (Branches of industrial right 
protection were regulated in separate acts.) The act ranked protection of fine art works that 
having lost their original character were used for industrial and applied arts purposes among 
the above. This act protects the author’s right of sale regarding intellectual property in the first 
place. It pays no special regard to personal rights the author is entitled to. The natural basis of 
the author’s right is the artistic form in which the author has ”fixed” it, and the author can 
benefit from that by making it public, in other words, by making it public domain. 
Consequently, as much as it is possible in the circulation of intellectual goods, the act protects 
the author from pecuniary abuses in this procedure.127 
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Restrictions of this protection are as follows: the author is entitled only to the right of 
mechanical reproduction, publication and distribution and for a shorter period to the exclusive 
right of translation; for theatre plays and musical works public performance is the author’s 
exclusive right. The author will not be entitled to protection if he presents certain facts only in 
his work; these facts may be used by other persons too, even if they constitute the core of the 
otherwise protected work; so, the act does not define the term of “intellectual monopoly”. The 
act intends to make it possible for Hungary to enter into regulated copyright circulation with 
other nations too on the grounds of this act, and at the same time establishes unity of law on 
the entire territory of the State, to the extent that it terminates the rule of the Austrian open 
order of 1846 being in force until then in the Transylvania parts, and extends the scope of the 
act to Croatia and Slavonia. Regarding the issue of limitation, the bill considered thirty years’ 
term of protection from the death of the author more appropriate for the sake of spreading of 
intellectual works, however, the House of Representatives approved fifty years’ term of 
protection paying regard to creators’ earning conditions.128  
Statutory legal consequences of usurpation: fine, compensation for damage and confiscation, 
which the judge may connect with provisional seizure of the disputed work—the legal 
grounds of the penalty is fraud involved in usurpation, and recognition of the fact that it is not 
possible to protect the author’s lawful interests purely by private law tools. In imposing the 
penalty, malice and negligence showing in usurpation can be taken into account; in the 
absence thereof penalty does not lie, and compensation is confined to delivery of unlawfully 
obtained profit only. It was the author or his legal successor injured in his rights who was 
entitled to propose penalty; so, it was not possible to impose the penalty ex officio. The entire 
proceedings were remitted to the powers of civil (private law) courts, and the act granted 
discretionary powers, before the general procedure reform already, paying regard to the 
judge’s difficulties in proving loss and malice. As a ”correction” thereof, in Budapest and 
Zagreb they ordered to set up permanent law and experts committees to address professional 
issues. In order to ensure timeframe of translation, the act borrowed the institution of 
registration from earlier French and German law.129 The act set the limitation of the claim in 
three years both with respect to penalty and compensation; however, the legal consequence of 
confiscation and annihilation did not lapse, and so it could be requested even after limitation 
of the claim until the usurped work was circulated or it was possible to find the assets that 
could be confiscated.  
With respect to publisher’s rights, Act LIV of 1921 left the regulations on publisher’s 
transactions set forth in title VIII part two of Act XXXVII of 1875 (Commercial Code) 
untouched. These rules were applied solely with respect to publisher’s transactions between 
the author and his publisher but even in this scope only in the event that the contracting 
parties did not regulate their legal relations otherwise or left them unregulated regarding 
certain questions. In case of infringement of the publisher’s right outside the scope of the 
publisher’s transactions (usurpation), it was the provisions set out in section 6 of the act rather 
than the provisions on publisher’s transactions that were to be applied, even if usurpation was 
committed by the author himself.130 
The lawmaker considered Act LIV of 1921 outdated in its approach since fundamental 
changes took place after the Second World War. Structural changes in cultural life made 
adoption of new copyright rules a current issue. The main objective of Act III of 1969 
formulated that it was to harmonise encouragement of individuals’ disposition of creation and 
protection of authors’ moral and economic rights with the requirements of the development 
and cultural needs of society. Accordingly, the act distinguishes the author’s so-called moral 
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rights from economic rights related to use of the work. Respecting inherent, moral rights 
means that the author can decide on making the work public and can challenge all 
unauthorised changes in or use of the work. Moral rights cannot be sold or purchased, cannot 
be transferred and will not lapse.  
The act strengthens protection of authors and their works with respect to economic rights too. 
In this respect it is a fundamental thesis that any use of the creation requires the author’s 
consent, and it can be carried out against a fee only. Furthermore, the act takes society’s 
general interests into consideration, especially in two respects. a) It enables the radio and 
television to broadcast programmes on various works without the author’s consent but with 
the name indicated and against a fee, and to deliver such programmes to other radios. Also, it 
allows that in case of aids made of any work already made public, for scientific, general 
education or education purposes, excerpts or independent works of smaller volume could be 
used to the extent justified by this purpose. b) It excludes that authors’ legal successors could 
protest without good cause against further use of works already made public. In this case the 
court may supersede the licence to use against a fee. 
The act takes into account that owing to the technical development over the four decades 
passed from Act LIV of 1921 new genres have evolved, and extends copyright protection to 
them. So, industrial designer’s activity, i.e., industrial design, increasingly develops as a 
peculiar branch of art. The act, paying regard to the function, peculiarity of the scope of use of 
industrial design, sets the frameworks of rights related to industrial designs.131 Furthermore, 
technological development made it necessary to set itemised determination of copyrights 
related to filmmaking, radio and television. The act regulates, in theory, the issue who and to 
what extent is entitled to right of use of works made under employment relation. In 
accordance with the act, right of use of the work, based on the content of the author’s 
obligation in his sphere of work and the employment relation, belongs to the employer—
within the sphere of activity of the employer organisation. 
Identically with the present regulation, the act stipulates that the term of protection of 
copyright covers author’s life and fifty years from the death of the author. 
Development of copyright has raised the question of protection of performers’ performances. 
The act represents progress also in this respect as it states that the authorisation of the 
performer or, in case of ensembles, of the leader and soloists will be required for recording 
the performance for the purposes of marketing or public performance or for broadcasting the 
performance to persons not present, and that the performer will be usually entitled to fee for 
such use.132 The act also provides for performers’ moral rights. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the act discontinues the concept of Act LIV of 1921: it 
puts writers’ works in the focus of regulation and relates general provisions to them. The act, 
avoiding excessive literature-centeredness, stipulates general provisions covering all branches 
of art in a separate chapter. 
Introductory provisions cover the scope of the act and contain fundamental rules of exercising 
copyright. The provisions encompass the scope of object, territory of enforcement of statutory 
protection, other fundamental statutory provisions to be applied in the scope of object as well 
as determination of the person entitled to exercise copyrights and clarify the content of 
copyright. 
The act protects results developed in literature, science and arts. Specifying these results as 
works of creation, on the one hand, highlights the fact that the result protected by law has 
been developed by some kind of activity peculiar even in the scope of intellectual work, and, 
on the other hand, refers to the fact that the result has become perceptible in some form. Legal 
protection does not distinguish works in terms of quality: it is social use that provides grounds 
                                                 
131
  Petrik 1990. 257. ff. 
132
  Petrik 1990. 266. ff. 
for legal protection. The act refers to the efficient moral and financial support that our state 
provides for institutions which further authors’ creative work. 
Beyond the scope of works as set out above, however, the act extends the limits of its 
protection to so-called neighbouring rights.133 It is in this scope that the act protects artistic 
performance of performers who present a considerable part of author’s works to society and 
products of intellectual work close to creation (figures, technical drawings, maps, visual aids, 
etc.). However, for practical reasons, it was necessary to remove the results of intellectual 
works made during any administration activity (for example, rules of law, resolutions, rules of 
procedure, announcements, standards, files, submissions, etc.) from the scope of protection of 
the act. 
Social impact of authors’ works is not restricted to the territory of one country; therefore, 
attention had to be paid to international relations too. The scope of the act extends primarily to 
works made public on the territory of Hungary; the act deviates from this territorial principle 
in the event that a work which is made public first abroad is the work of a Hungarian citizen 
or protection of a foreign author’s work published abroad is provided by international treaty 
or reciprocity.  
Copyright law must refer back to the force of general civil law and labour law rules in each 
case when the act does not intend to enforce any special copyright rule. So, for example, in 
specific contracts on use of an author’s work special protection rules must be enforced; at the 
same time the rules on contracts stipulated in general in the Civil Code, not affected by the 
special provisions of copyright law, must be applied too. Furthermore, special regulation is 
required for copyrighted use of works created under employment relation; if, however, an 
author maintaining employment relation, for example, refuses to make such a work, then 
general labour law consequences must be applied in accordance with the rules of the Labour 
Code rather than copyright law.134 
The act connects author’s rights with the creative work of the author who creates the work. If 
the work has been made as a result of creative work, the author will be entitled to copyright 
protection even if he has possibly used another author’s work for his work. Accordingly, 
copyright protection will be provided for adaptation or translation of other persons’ works if 
thereby the author creates a work that carries signs of creative work. Also, on the grounds of 
the above, copyright protection cannot be provided, for example, for rough translation of 
texts. 
It often occurs that a work presents to us the result of several authors’ creative work; 
regarding these cases the act gives guidance on how to exercise copyright. A uniform whole 
developed by joint work in which co-authors’ work efforts are not and cannot be separated 
can be joint work of several authors. In this case, as a matter of fact, co-authors can dispose 
over the work only jointly and not independently of each other; they can challenge only 
violation of copyright independently.135 Also, the case arises when there are several authors of 
a work but the parts of the work created by specific authors can be separated, without injury 
to the work. Exercise of copyrights must be provided for such co-authors independently of 
each other.136 Collected works is again a different case. For example, publication of selected 
short stories to present 20th century short stories is collected works, where specific short 
stories are works independent of each other, yet they come to constitute a single work as a 
result of editing, selecting and arranging. So, it is justified that the act should provide the 
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editor with copyright for the entire body of such collected works, while it should not restrict 
independent copyright of the authors of specific works.137 
Sometimes, the author of the work does not intend to indicate his name or uses another name. 
Also for these cases the act must determine the person who is entitled to exercise copyright.138 
For lack of knowledge of the identity of the author, this can be the person who has made the 
work public for the first time. The act regulates the case of unknown authors paying regard to 
the new provisions of the Berne Convention revised in 1967 in Stockholm. This provision 
makes it possible for authors’ interest representation organisations to provide copyright 
protection for folk art works from unknown authors, in line with the author’s probable 
citizenship. Section 7 gives a concise definition of copyrights, specifying two branches of 
author’s rights: the author’s moral rights and the author’s economic rights. 
Act LXXVI of 1999 determines intellectual performances both positively and negatively. The 
main objective of the act is to protect literary, scientific and artistic works; furthermore, the 
act extends to protection of performances of performers, producers of phonograms, radio and 
television organisations and filmmakers. These performances are related to use of author’s 
works; therefore, the term of neighbouring rights (related rights) was introduced as the name 
of rights arising from their protection. However, the act—contrary to our formerly effective 
law—would not provide protection belonging to a separate category (so-called neighbouring 
rights protection) for results of other activities related to author’s creative work. If they meet 
the requirement of originality, as a matter of fact, works deserving copyright protection can be 
created (and are created) in these forms of expression too.139 
The act sustains the basic principles of the formerly effective law.140 The act—similarly to our 
formerly effective law—uses the phrases ‘creation’ and ‘work’ as synonyms; both denote the 
object of copyright protection. Copyright classification is independent of classification of 
intellectual performances according to other branches of law, and does not affect enforcement 
of other rules of law regarding use of the work. That is why, for example, tax law 
classification can be separated from the copyright classification of the work, and it follows 
form this that provision of some architectural work with copyright protection does not affect 
applicability of rules regarding construction administration.141 
The act enumerates works to be covered by protection, main types of works only as examples, 
mainly the genres that can be considered traditional based on our formerly effective law, and 
those regulated by peculiar rules of a special level by the act. Basically, these types of works 
are mentioned in international treaties and foreign legislations in the lists given as examples 
on objects of protection. During preparation of the bill, several lawmakers urged that the lists 
of types of work given as examples should be supplemented; these initiatives, however, 
seemed less well-founded because the enumeration in the act is not exhaustive; in accordance 
with the general rule these intellectual performances can be provided with copyright 
protection too if they are of an individual, original character. On the other hand, the act does 
not set special rules with respect to these types of works anyway, and some of them can be 
ranked among one of the categories set out in the act.142 With regard to software, general rules 
applicable also to literary works govern, together with special rules set forth in chapter VI of 
the act to protect software. So, the act meets requirements of both international and Union 
legal harmonisation by not making protection subject to meeting any other conditions beyond 
having an individual, original character with regard to software either. With respect to 
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computer programs, there is only one criterion of originality: whether it is the author’s own 
intellectual product. 
Due to termination of neighbouring rights protection it is necessary to make it clear that 
photographic works and map works and other cartographic works are also covered by 
copyright protection.143 
It follows form the general principle of the permissibility of the so-called parallel protection 
that an author’s work can be simultaneously ranked among some industrial right protection 
category.  
The provisions of the act circumscribe the object of copyright protection from the negative 
side: with interpreting character they declare that certain intellectual performances cannot be 
ranked among author’s works, and they exclude intellectual products, which could otherwise 
meet the criteria of copyright protection, from protection.  
The new regulation expresses that the objects of copyright protection cannot be ideas, 
principles, concepts, procedures, operation methods or mathematical operations.  
The act discontinues the approach that in a rather abortive way attempted to cover works of 
folk art and folklore with copyright protection as anonymous works. The standard text makes 
it clear that expressions of folklore are not provided with copyright protection, among others 
due to unidentifiability of the subject of copyright. This, as a matter of fact, does not imply 
that the act would exclude protection of folk art inspired works with individual, original 
character; authors of such works continue to be entitled to copyright protection. 
Today, use of author’s works is not limited to the territory of a single country. Works of 
literature, art and science usually cross borders of countries; copyright legal relations 
traditionally involve foreign elements, whose weight, significance increasingly grow as 
international relations widen and deepen.144 
Copyright is characterised by territoriality, in other words, its scope is restricted to the 
territory of the state that provides protection. The author does not, cannot have uniform 
copyrights extending to the entire world, protection of his work is the sum total of the rights 
provided by specific national laws, and these rights might differ from country to country. 
These rights are merely supplemented by the minimum rights provided through the unified 
substantive law rules of in international treaties, and they are restricted—with exceptional 
character—by the rules of comparing the terms of protection.145 On applicability of rules of 
specific national legal systems to foreigners, special rules can be found practically in each 
legal system, they are the so-called alien rights provisions (Fremdenrecht). Section 2 of the 
act sets forth these rules with regard to copyright protection. The personal and territorial scope 
of the act is adjusted to formerly effective regulation.  
To the question which national law governs the protection that a foreign author or other 
foreign copyright owner is entitled to, the answer is: as a state of facts containing a foreign 
element is concerned—in accordance with Law Decree No. 13 of 1979 on international 
private law—it is the international private law of the country in which protection is applied 
for, i.e., on the territory of which the existence, protection and enforceability of copyright 
becomes questionable that will govern. However, contrary to the collision norm ordering 
application of lex loci protectionis, priority is given (paying regard also to the provisions set 
out in Section 2 of the Law Decree) to the rules of international agreements that cover 
judgement of copyright relations containing foreign elements. 
The most important of them is Article 5 of the Berne Convention, whose paragraphs (1) and 
(2) demands countries of the Union to provide national treatment to each other’s citizens, i.e., 
to treat them as nationals. With respect to works protected by the Convention authors will 
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enjoy the rights in each country of the Union—except for the country of origin of the work—
that relevant statutes provide for nationals at present and in the future as well as the rights that 
the Convention separately provides (so-called minimum rights). Enjoyment and exercise of 
such rights cannot be made subject to any required formalities and is independent of whether 
the work is covered by protection in its country of origin. This international treaty 
requirement of national treatment fills both Section 2 Act III of 1969 and the provision with 
identical numbering of the act with content. 
In addition to the Berne Convention, the requirement of national treatment is contained, 
among others, in the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) and the American-Hungarian 
bilateral agreement on protection of intellectual products. WIPO’s Copyright Treaty refers to 
the provisions on national treatment of the Berne Convention: in accordance with its Article 3, 
the provisions set forth in Articles 2-6 of the Berne Convention—consequently applying to 
national treatment too—must be applied mutatis mutandis to the protection provided by the 
Treaty146. Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement also demands national treatment provided that 
the Berne Convention or the Rome Convention does not allow any exception or reservation. 
Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement demands, in addition to national treatment, provision of the 
most-favoured-nation treatment in the field of intellectual property. 
Copyright belongs to the scope of private law, the Hungarian Civil Code (Ptk.) is the mother 
legislation of copyright law and both Act III of 1969 and the act create a general regulation 
background for it. 
However, contrary to formerly effective regulation, the act dispenses with reference to the 
Labour Code. The reason for that is double: first, labour law regulation can have significance 
almost exclusively for works created in employment relation or other similar legal relation 
(so, in the application of Section 30 of the act); in other words, the Labour Code is far from 
maintaining a relation with copyright act as the Civil Code does; secondly, as a consequence 
of Section 30 paragraph (7) of the act, with respect to works created under employment 
relation or other similar legal relation not only the Labour Code but other statutes, which 
regulate types of legal relations concerned, can play a part. 
The act does not change the basic principle that the original copyright owner can be only the 
natural person (author) who creates the work. Also, it is a rule preserved from formerly 
effective law that adaptation, translation of another author’s work will be also covered by 
copyright protection if it has an individual, original character. Protection provided for such 
works, however, cannot and must not involve violation of the rights the author of the original 
work is entitled to.  
The act—paying regard to problems, interpretation difficulties in legal practice—corrects 
regulation concerning original works of joint authorship; it differentiates joint works in terms 
of whether their parts can be used independently. Separability of parts is a prerequisite for 
usability; therefore, the act does not specifically refer to this criterion. Connected works 
concern connection of independent parts usually belonging to various types of works, for 
example, prose and musical parts, by mutual resolution resulting in a new quality. Such works 
can be various: first, they can be produced by setting an already existing work in a new work 
created by joint decision; secondly, they can be produced by creating parts of the work jointly, 
paying regard to each other. For this latter group it would be inequitable if the author could 
connect his own part from the already successful joint work without his co-author’s consent 
with another author’s work.147 
Recent waves of technical development has made modern copyright law codification in 
several countries introduce the category of collective, jointly created work and and regulate it 
at variance from the general. This kind of work is characterised by the fact that authors 
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cooperate in creating the work, whose contributions are united in the so produced uniform 
work that it is not possible to determine rights of specific authors separately. It is also 
characteristic of these works that their creation is initiated and controlled by an external 
person or organisation. For such works it is justified that the copyright owner should be the 
organisation or person that has initiated and controlled creation of the work and after that 
made the completed work public in his/its own name. This could be attained by the law 
classifying the said person or organisation the original subject of copyrights from the first, but 
it seems to be more appropriate that copyright should devolve on the strength of the law, and 
should belong to the person or organisation in question as the legal successor of the author.148 
Also, in its text the act confirms the currently prevailing approach—paying regard to 
Directive 9/96/EC on the legal protection of databases—that protection can be given to 
compilations as collected works whose parts are not covered by copyright protection and are 
not considered works either. On the other hand, it makes it clear that copyright protection is 
conditional upon the content of the data store being individually, originally selected or 
arranged, edited; in other words, selection and arrangement of the elements of the data store 
should be the result of intellectual creative work. Similarly, it is reasonable to confirm in rule 
of law that copyright protection applying to data stores as collected works does not extend to 
the data, information that constitute their content. 
The act does not change the provisions of the formerly effective law that in connection with 
works made public without any name or under adopted name copyrights will be exercised 
until the author reveals his identity by the person who made the work public for the first 
time.149 
During preparation of the bill, a part of our theoretical jurists and several of interest protection 
organisations of authors supported the monist concept, i.e., the approach that interprets 
copyright as an inseparable unit of moral and economic rights. On the other hand, several 
copyright experts and numerous interest protection organisations of users and neighbouring 
rights holders seemed to be the adherent of the dualist approach, urging introduction of 
alienability of author’s economic rights. The new regulation reflects the compromise that has 
developed as a result of these disputes; it seems to be indispensable to review it. 
The act—by drafting Section 9 paragraph (1)—makes it clear that the author is entitled to the 
sum total of various rights inseparable from each other in relation to the work. Following the 
structure of the formerly effective act and internationally accepted division it ranks these 
rights into two groups: it distinguishes between moral and economic rights, the author is 
entitled to the sum total of these rights in accordance with the act. This means that the new 
regulation no longer considers copyright a uniform right that would appear as a combination 
of moral and economic partial rights inseparable from each other from the first. The act sets 
out from the same general rule that moral rights cannot be alienated, this rule ([Section 9 
paragraph (3)], however, is now not more than statutory prohibition serving the author’s 
interest protection claims. This rule prohibits something that would be otherwise possible both 
in concept and practice. So, the act does not presume that moral rights and economic rights 
the author is entitled to are necessarily inseparable from each other and that for this reason 
transferability of the latter is excluded from the first. This is proved absolutely convincingly 
by the fact that the act allows several exceptions to the general prohibitive rule, important in 
practical aspects. 
It should be noted that in accordance with Section 55 of the act provisions regarding use 
contracts must be applied properly to contracts on transfer of author’s economic rights, and 
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that within the scope of neighbouring rights protection—in the absence of statutory 
prohibition—economic rights can be transferred.150 
 
VI. 1. 2. Regulation of moral rights 
 
The object of transfer can be only economic rights to sell, use the work. On the other hand, 
even in the case of unlimited transfer of copyright, the rights that are inseparably related to the 
author’s person will stay with the author; specifically the right of the author that only he can 
make any changes in his work (including the title of the work) and that changes can be carried 
out by other persons only with the author’s permit. As the author’s important inherent rights 
are meant to protect his moral interests regarding the work, internationally such rights of the 
author are known as droit moral. The author’s moral rights cannot be asserted after the term 
of protection has passed, that is, over fifty years from the death of the author; after that works 
of lasting value are sufficiently protected by the public against changes injuring the memory 
of the author. 
Section 3 of Act XVI of 1884 prohibits that in case of transfer of copyright the author should 
make any changes in his work that infringes the lawful interest of the person to whom he 
transfers his copyright. However, the act does not contain any provisions that the person who 
has obtained copyright shall not carry out any changes infringing the author’s lawful interest 
without the author’s consent that do not fall within the term of adaptation, reworking, etc. The 
Royal Curia considered it permissible to make changes even in the absence of the author’s 
consent of which it could be presumed that the author would not refuse to give his consent to. 
Under such restrictions, proper sale of copyright should be made possible for the person who 
has obtained copyright; especially for plays it should be considered permissible for the person 
who has obtained the right of performance to carry out changes in the play even without the 
author’s consent in order to make it successful, which obviously does not injure the author. 
Although moral rights do not constitute the object of transfer, the author is not barred from 
making agreements stating that he authorises the person to whom he has transferred his 
copyright to act against anybody who makes unauthorised changes in the work.151 
It might occur that the person indicated on the work is not the author of the work. In this 
respect the decision of the Royal Curia governs.152 
In accordance with the act, in the absence of transfer between living persons, after the death 
of the author copyright will belong primarily to the person to whom the author has transferred 
it by measures in case of his death; in the absence of such measures, copyright will devolve to 
his lawful inheritors. If copyright so devolves to several persons, then in accordance with the 
nature of the matter the rules on co-authors whose parts are inseparable will be applied to 
them.153 If the author dies without any inheritors, the State does not have right of inheritance 
according to the law; by termination of the copyright the work becomes free. It is obvious, 
however, that the rights belonging to the author that he has transferred to other persons will 
continue to hold during the term of protection even after his death. If one of the co-authors 
dies without any inheritor, then his part will not become free; instead, his copyright will 
devolve to the rest of co-authors or their legal successors.154 
Section 11 stipulates how long protection is ensured against infringement of copyright, 
according to the main rule. The aim of protection is that the author and his legal successors 
(inheritors, the inheritors of his assignment) should enjoy the fruits of the work accomplished 
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by him because during this term of protection copyright holds on specific works; 
consequently, they are protected against reproduction. The general term of protection 
determined in this section extends to as yet unpublished works, to lectures, recitations and 
readings held for the purposes of education and entertainment as well as to all works already 
made public if they have been published under the author’s real name.155 
The author’s name should be indicated on the title page or in the dedication but maximum 
after the preface. It is very important because if the name is indicated on any other part of the 
work, then the term of protection will be set according to the rule on works published without 
the author’s name; so, it will be shorter. If a work is published in several volumes and the first 
volume is published without the author’s name, then this edition will be covered by the term 
of protection applying to works published without the author’s name even if the next volume 
is published with the author’s name.156  
If a work is published in several editions, the term of protection might change depending on 
whether any changes have been made in the work between the editions. Unchanged editions 
in general and editions published with changes if they are published during the author’s life 
will not influence the term of protection, the general rule will remain in force; and it makes no 
difference when the new edition is published because each edition is covered by protection of 
the same content. If, however, the changed edition is published after the author’s death, this 
will establish a new term of protection, which depends on whether the change, adaptation, 
enlargement has been made by the author or a third party, and whether the new edition—in 
case it was issued by the author—has been published during the term of protection passing for 
the benefit of inheritors or after its termination. If the changes have been carried out by the 
author, and the changed work was published after the author’s death during the term of 
protection passing for the benefit of inheritors, then the term of protection will be fifty years 
from the death of the author. If, alternatively, the changes have been made by a third party, 
new copyright will arise on these changes, which, however, applies to the changes only and 
not to other content of the work, so they will be covered by the formerly established shorter 
term of protection. This is important because thereby it can be reproduced by anybody once 
the term of protection on the original content of the work has expired.  
Section 12 of Act XVI of 1884 discussed in the above paragraphs regulates term of protection 
of works made by several authors and divides them into three groups. In this case co-authors 
should be considered a single person with regard to the work, who will be considered a living 
person until at least one of the authors is alive, that is, the term of protection of the work 
commences from the date it is created and will last for fifty years after the death of the 
surviving author.157 
Collected works also belongs here, and again can be classified into three groups. The first 
group is made up by collected works where specific authors’ contributions are organically 
interrelated, constituting an integral whole. Regarding this integral whole the editor will be 
covered by protection identical with the protection provided for the author, so the term of 
protection will cover the lifetime of the editor and will extend to fifty years after his death. 
The same rule applies to collected works not published yet and collected works edited from 
documents and contributions not covered by the protection of law.158 Again this rule should 
be applied to the collection of telegrams and reports collected for being published in 
newspapers or published in duplicated form because adopting them in another work without 
authorisation is considered infringement of copyright by the law; subsequently, it provides 
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such collector with protection identical with the protection provided for the author, that is, the 
general rules govern with regard to him too.159 
The second group contains collected works that are made up of several authors’ contributions 
separated from each other, covering separate subjects, which are bound together externally 
and compiled by an editor without making any connection between them. Such compilations 
as an integral whole are not provided with protection, only each contribution independently. 
In calculation of the term of protection, in both cases attention should be paid to whether the 
names of the authors of contributions have been indicated. If they have, general rules will 
govern; if they have not, there are again two options: if the author’s name is included 
subsequently, the general rule will govern, if it is not, then the work will be protected for fifty 
years from the first edition only.160 
Finally, a separate group is constituted by articles, newsitems published in newspapers, 
periodicals that cannot be considered literary or scientific papers, and larger articles, 
newsitems at the beginning of which prohibition of reprint has been expressed, because 
regarding them Section 9 of the act states that they are not covered by protection, that is, 
determination of term of protection is out of question. The law protects such collected works 
for fifty years from the death of the orator, and, as orators are regarded identically as authors, 
it is clear that their work will be protected against infringement of copyright during their 
lifetime too. 161 
Section 13 expounds exactly how long the term of protection will be depending on whether 
the name of the author or authors is indicated on the work or not. Again, three options can be 
specified. The act binds the longest term of protection to meeting the condition that the 
author’s real—or acknowledged literary name—should be indicated on a defined part of the 
work. The act does not give an exact definition of literary name but it can be deduced that 
names whose bearer is generally known can be considered acknowledged. Such 
acknowledgement is, however, relative, and we cannot speak about it in case of an author of a 
“first work”. For such works the act accepts the solution that the authors’ names are indicated 
at the end of contributions. A work is published under pseudonym when the work is published 
not under the author’s real name but some other name. 
The first edition, publication, marketing of the work is considered first publication. No matter 
what name is indicated on the work, the term of protection must be calculated from that date. 
The act does not stipulate what happens if the work does not contain the date of the first 
publication, however, this becomes clear from the objective of the regulation since the 
lawmaker’s intention was—by demanding indication of the date of publication for works 
written under pseudonym or without any name—that the author should have right of action in 
case of infringement of copyright without the need to disclose his name. If the author has 
satisfied this condition (has indicated the date), then expiry of the term of protection should be 
proved by the person who claims such expiry. If the author has not indicated the date of 
publication, then it is he who has to prove that the term of protection set forth in law has not 
expired yet. The third case is when the author does not indicate the date of publication, but 
notifies his real name for being registered, because then expiry of term of protection must be 
proved again by the person who claims it.162  
It is by all means true that the date of the first publication of the work is the real date when the 
work is actually published since it is usual to print the number of the next year on books that 
come out in the last month of the year. As a matter of fact, here again the fact that the book 
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was published in the previous year must be proved by the person who claims it because until 
it is proved, presumption will be bound to the printed date. 163 
The term of protection of works so published will attain the longest duration (set according to 
the general rule) only in the event that the author notifies his name for being registered. 
Registration will not be substituted by making the author’s name public in any other form, not 
even by the fact that later the author publishes his same book under his own name because 
this new edition can enjoy the longer term of protection but the term of protection of the 
earlier edition without any name will continue to be shorter.  
Section 14 regulates term of protection of works published after the death of the author. A 
work published after the death of the author is a work completed during the author’s life but 
published only after his death. A work made jointly by several authors one of whom was still 
alive when the work was published cannot be considered a work published after the death of 
the author. Term of protection of works published after death of the author can be determined 
in two forms. The general case is that term of protection lasts for fifty years from death of the 
author. If, for example, a work is published thirty years after the death of the author, the term 
of protection regarding him will last for another twenty years. Term of protection will extend 
only in the event that the work is published after forty-five years but within fifty years from 
the death of the author, because in this case it will be provided with five years’ protection. 
Consequently, when the work is published in the forty-ninth year from the death of the author, 
then the five years will be calculated from that time. The aim of this rule is to enable the legal 
successors of the author to remedy their default regarding publication but they should not be 
given any larger, longer allowance. However, a work published after the death of the author 
will be covered by protection only in the event that it is actually published during fifty years 
from death of the author. 
Section 15 determines term of protection of specific works published by the legal persons 
defined in them. In Section 10 it has been already set out that although only a natural person 
can be the author of a writer’s work, certain legal persons can nevertheless also have 
derivative copyright and therefore legal protection regarding writer’s works published by 
them. Legal persons defined in this section will be provided with legal protection if they can 
be considered equal to the author. Section 2 stipulates when they can be considered equal: a 
work consisting of the literary contributions of several persons shall be considered an integral 
work; therefore, the editor will be judged identically as the author, i.e., will be provided with 
legal protection. Consequently, the act protects legal persons and public institutions as editors. 
It follows form this that only collected works that can be considered an integral whole may be 
covered by protection.164  
As a matter of fact, legal persons can publish other kinds of works too, but this provision does 
not apply to their term of protection. On the one hand, they are writer’s works where 
contributions are not connected with each other in content and do not constitute an integral 
whole. Regarding these works specific contributions are protected depending on whether the 
names of their authors have been indicated or not; on the other hand, legal persons can publish 
writer’s works created by a single author and covering an integral subject. 165 
Section 16 sets the term of protection of works published in several volumes or parts, paying 
regard to the case when specific editions are connected with each other in content. This 
provision sets a rule only on works published under pseudonym or without a name, or works 
published by academies, universities, bodies, other legal persons and public institutions 
because only for these works is it necessary to calculate term of protection from the first 
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publication. Regarding other works it is not fundamental when the first volume was published 
or how much time has passed between publication of the volumes. 166 
So, in accordance with this section, term of protection of works published in several volumes 
or parts will commence from the first publication of each volume or part. This implements the 
basic principle that each volume and each part must be considered a separate writer’s work; 
therefore, term of protection must be determined for them separately. For works published in 
several volumes or parts which are connected with each other, protection commences from 
publication of the last volume or part. It is always the quality, content of the writer’s work that 
determines when various volumes, parts are connected with each other. It does not influence 
determination of this connection whether the several volumes or parts are published under one 
title or several titles. The act ensures that the term of protection of works so published should 
not be too long, pursuant to this rule; for this reason, it additionally stipulates that whenever a 
period longer than three years passes between publication of specific volumes or parts, then 
both those published earlier and those coming out after three years will be considered separate 
works. 
Section 17 determines the period of prohibition of translation. The act stipulates protection of 
a short period for these translations because society’s intellectual interest would be impaired if 
publication of a work in Hungarian or its adaptation in Hungarian adjusted to the needs and 
conditions of the Hungarian public depended on the author’s consent due to a long term of 
protection. To ensure that these translations should be covered by five years’ protection, as a 
matter of fact, requires satisfaction of the conditions referred to above: publication of the 
translation should commence within one year and should be completed within three years 
from publication of the original work; for theatre plays this should be completed within six 
months; and in both cases commencement and completion of the translation should be 
notified for being registered. For translations, each volume, part of the original work is 
considered an independent work, and five years’ protection will commence from the first 
publication of each volume or part of the authorised translation.167 
Finally, Section 18 formulates the rule of calculating term of protection. Except for theatre 
plays, any other case will be governed by this rule of the act drafted for expediency. Often 
there might be doubts as to exactly on what date a work or translation was published or what 
day the author died; for this reason, the year in which the event took place should not be 
included in the duration of the term of protection. This rule cannot be applied to plays because 
concerning them only six months from publication are available for completion of translation; 
so, in this case it is the day of publication that counts. Civil law gives guidance on calculating 
the commencement and termination of term of protection. Accordingly, when the deadline is 
determined in years, as it is done in Section 18, then the year of commencement is the year 
that follows the year of publication of the work or translation or the author’s death. The final 
date of translation of plays falls on the day of the sixth month which is numerically equal to 
the day of publication of the original work. If this day is missing from the sixth month, then 
the final date will fall on the last day of the sixth month.168 
In cases when it depends on the copyright owner’s determined act bound to time whether term 
of protection commences indeed, i.e., his legal claim is established by his own act, it will be 
the copyright owner’s burden to prove that the term of protection still lasts. The burden of 
proof will turn round in case of the general term of protection; so, it will not bind the 
copyright owner, because in this case the deadline will start from the death of the author, or, 
the surviving author, in case of several authors, and this fact must be proved by the person 
who claims it. If he can prove it, or if death is a fact of public knowledge, then again it will be 
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the copyright owner’s burden to prove that the fifty years have not passed yet. If the author’s 
death is uncertain, the author’s death must be proved by the person who wants to assert rights 
from this fact. So, if somebody wants to duplicate a work, he will be obliged to prove that the 
author has been dead for more than fifty years. If the author’s death cannot be evidenced by 
public deed, then it must be proved by court and the date of death must be determined on the 
grounds of testimonies. If the author has disappeared, then the day determined by court during 
the presumption of death proceedings must be considered the day of death with respect to the 
duration of term of protection. In doing so the court must take three rules into account. If 
eighty years have passed from birth of the disappeared author and his place of residence has 
been unknown for ten years, then it is the day following it, or, without paying regard to his 
date of birth, if the author’s place of residence has been unknown for thirty years already, then 
it is the day following it, finally, if the author has suffered serious injury in war or has been 
otherwise shipwrecked or has been in mortal danger, then it is the day following mortal 
danger that will be considered the day of death of the disappeared author. Presumption of 
death, however, does not exclude demonstration of the fact that the disappeared author died 
earlier or later than that day or that he is still alive.169 
Act LIV of 1921 stipulates the general rule that the protection that the act provides for the 
author will cover the author’s entire lifetime and fifty years from his death.170 The author can 
expect to receive higher valuable consideration from publishers, if the publisher is entitled to 
the right of exclusive publication for a longer duration even after the death of the author, 
which, of course, will terminate upon expiry of the term of protection. This term of protection 
will extend to all author’s rights regarding works under protection, including the right of 
making public by radio. Photographic works are exceptions to fifty years’ term of protection; 
furthermore, motion picture works that are photographic works assembled without any 
grouping in terms of their content will be regarded identically as the above.171 In this case 
term of protection is regulated by Section 75 of the act172. Act LIV of 1921 does not contain a 
separate term of protection with respect to right of translation; so, the duration of the term of 
translation will be governed also by these provisions.173 
With regard to term of protection of works made by co-authors jointly the act applies the 
former regulation. Protection of fifty years after the death of the author will be provided for 
collection of speeches only in the event that it was published in the author’s lifetime or the 
latest ten years after his death. If the collected edition of the speeches was not published 
maximum ten years after the death of the orator, then their collected edition will become 
free.174 
A work can be published with the author’s real name, under pseudonym or without indicating 
his name (anonymously).175 An author’s well-known writer’s or artist name, of which at least 
professional circles know which author uses them, will be regarded as the real name176. 
According to the ruling of the Royal Curia, it is prohibited to use a name as pseudonym that is 
identical with the name of a living person or when use of the pseudonym allows to draw the 
erroneous conclusion in certain circles of the public that the work comes from an author 
whose name is identical with the pseudonym. According to the above-mentioned ruling of the 
Royal Curia, it is forbidden to use a name identical with the name of any dead author as 
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pseudonym if use of such name is suitable for arising the belief in the public that the author of 
the work is the writer known under such name. It is allowed to use the name of a dead writer 
as pseudonym who has been obviously forgotten by the public, and the name of a long time 
dead and currently well-known writer can be used as pseudonym if such use of name is not 
suitable for misleading the public. Works published under pseudonym or without indicating 
the author’s name will be protected for fifty years from the first publication.177 
The author will always have the right to have his work published subsequently with his real or 
well-known name indicated on it, thereby he attains that protection should extend to fifty 
years from his death; furthermore, he can achieve this goal by notifying his name within fifty 
years from the first publication to the Patents Court for being registered.178  
Academies, universities, educational institutions, bodies and other legal persons will be 
considered the author of a work if no individual author is named on the work published in an 
edition under their name179. The regulation here is again identical with the rules of Act XVI of 
1884. 
In accordance with Section 16 of the act for works published in several volumes or parts 
duration of the term of protection must be calculated from the first publication of each volume 
or part if the date of publication governs in terms of determining the term of protection. This 
will be the case when the work was published under pseudonym or without indicating the 
author’s name on the work and when the work was published by an academy, university or 
other legal person without naming any individual author. Contrary to works published under 
the author’s name or his well-known writer’s (artist) name, the term of protection will always 
commence from the death of the author, even if the works have been published in items.180 
Term of protection will be calculated from publication of each volume or part when the 
volumes or parts do not discuss the same closed material and they are maximum loosely 
connected with each other. If, on the contrary, the volumes or parts discuss the same material 
connected with each other, then the term of protection must be calculated from publication of 
the last volume or part, unless more then ten years have passed between publication of 
specific volumes or parts181. 
When making Act III of 1969 the lawmaker paid regard to the fact that the copyright act of 
1921 had been criticised because it did not distinguish between moral rights and economic 
rights. Judicial practice has developed the rule that even in case of transfer of copyright the 
author will continue to have the right to claim authorship and to protest against any changes in 
his work injurious to him. By then jurisprudence had clarified that relations connected with 
intellectual works are fundamentally not relations under property law. This view is reflected 
in the legislative practice of countries at the time, which almost without exception 
emphatically provides protection for moral rights, separated from economic rights, both 
during the lifetime and after the death of the author. 
Among moral rights the first and perhaps the most significant issue is to decide if the author 
considers his work suitable, ready for being used by society, and if in view of that he consents 
to making his work public. In this rule social, appreciation of the will of creative man is 
manifested, and this rule is only strengthened by the provision that before making it public, it 
is forbidden to inform the public on any material content of the work either without the 
author’s consent.182 
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The next right within moral rights is the author’s right to indicate a name and its reversed 
form the right to omit name (anonymity). Accordingly, the author can publish his work 
without indicating any name or under pseudonym and everybody will be obliged to respect 
this decision. The right to name demands indication of the author’s name not only on the work 
itself but on each and every occasion when his work is presented, quoted, described. In this 
case the designation of the name is adjusted to the form of presentation, description, use (for 
example, in the programme in concerts, on the playbill in theatre performances, in the 
programme in radio broadcasts, etc.) The right of anonymity has a peculiar case: exclusion of 
indication of name in connection with works produced in employment relation, which is 
discussed in details by Section 14. The author’s right to name includes the claim that he can 
demand that his such right should not be doubted by anybody. As a matter of fact, only the 
real author of the work will be entitled to this right. 
Protection of the work against changes, distortions is solved in various legal systems basically 
in a similar way but fairly diversely in terms of regulation. One of the solutions intends to 
bind any changes in the author’s work to the author’s permit, the other solution prohibits 
merely changes expressly injurious to the author. The act sets out from the consideration that 
any unauthorised use of and changes in the work itself violates the author’s moral rights. The 
act determines the cases of lawful uses and changes, and considers any and all uses and 
changes outside this scope unlawful.183 
Several copyright acts define the right of withdrawal, the core of which is that the author can 
for good cause (changing his artistic approach, modifying his earlier views, etc.) withdraw his 
permit already given to making the work public, or can prohibit the otherwise lawful further 
use of his work. This right quite properly expresses that the relation between the author and 
his work will not break off by making the work public.184 However, to avoid that this right 
could not be exercised abusively, the act requires not only existence of good cause but 
stipulates that the author should compensate for any damage arising until the date of making 
the statement.185 In case of disputes, the decision of the court governs both with respect to 
good cause and claim for compensation binding the author, which is suitable for taking 
mutual interests into account.186 This right cannot be applied to works produced in 
employment relation, however, here again the author will have the right, arising from his right 
to name, to demand omission of his name from a work no longer acknowledged as his won. 
Owing to the nature of the thing, it is the author who is entitled to exercise moral rights during 
his lifetime; however, they will be worthy of protection after the death of the author too. 
Lawmakers of various countries usually recognised that it was society’s responsibility to 
esnure this protection based on the underlying theoretical postulate of appreciation of creative 
work and preservation of social, cultural treasures. Carrying through this principle in practice 
shows differences in several respects. Certain legal systems entrust exclusively social 
organisations to fulfil this social responsibility; others allow to a lower or higher extent the 
author’s descendants to have a say. The act, by pointing out that moral rights are inalienable 
and unlimited in time, chooses the following solution: during the term of protection of 
economic rights these rights should be exercised by those who have obtained also the 
economic entitlements of the author’s rights by virtue of right of inheritance, and after that 
interest representation organisations can take action to protect the rights most important for 
society.187 In the event that the author has entrusted a determined person or organisation to 
care for his scientific or artistic estate, then during the fifty years’ term of protection it will be 
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the person or organisation so entrusted and not the inheritors who can take action to protect 
the rights.  
Act LXXVI of 1999 regulates moral rights by building on the formerly effective Act III of 
1969 and introducing new elements. The act does not fundamentally change the nature of the 
author’s moral rights: the author’s work gives rise to personal civic rights, which create a 
legal relation with absolute structure and negative content. Personal rights as set out in the 
Civil Code must be respected by everybody, they are protected by law. Regarding the author’s 
moral rights, this protection is added up by the special rules of the copyright act and the 
general rules of the Civil Code; nevertheless, the moral rights that the author is entitled to 
concerning the intellectual property must be differentiated from the personal rights that 
anybody is entitled to without any intellectual property. The provisions regarding the author’s 
moral rights set out in the copyright act do not exclude and do not affect application of the 
general rules on personal rights set out in the Civil Code. Accordingly, for example, the 
provisions set forth in Section 75 (3) of the Civil Code apply also to the author’s moral rights: 
moral rights will not be violated by the conduct to which the copyright owner has consented 
to, on condition that giving such consent does not infringe or endanger social interest. Any 
contract or unilateral statement otherwise restricting moral rights are null and void.188 
The author’s inherent rights are inseparable from the author’s person: they shall not devolve, 
be transferred to any other person; these rights shall not be validly waived; this is confirmed 
by Section 9 paragraph (2) of the act. Only economic rights can be the object of transfer, 
devolution or waiver, which, however, does not affect moral rights. The author’s moral and 
economic rights can part, that is why the act does not sustain the rule of the formerly effective 
act that describes unauthorised use of the work as a conduct violating the author’s moral 
rights too.189 
It is a general civil law principle that personal rights can be asserted personally only. Section 
85 (3) of the Civil Code provides for assertion of personal rights only in case of injuring the 
memory and reputation of a dead person, which is contrary to public interest too. Breaking 
through these general civil law principles, the formerly effective act provides for assertion of 
moral rights after the term of protection and for unlimitedness of moral rights in time.190 The 
act chooses a solution closer to practice and general civil law principles, more strictly 
following the tendency of international development of law: the author’s moral rights will be 
covered by protection also within the term of protection regulated in Section 31. After the 
death of the author, moral rights related to intellectual works can be exercised within the term 
of protection by the person whom the author has entrusted with caring for his literary, 
scientific or artistic estate. If there is no such person, or if he does not take actions properly, 
the person who obtains the author’s economic rights by virtue of inheriting can exercise moral 
rights too. So, within term of protection these rules exclude application of the provisions set 
out in Section 85 (3) of the Civil Code pertaining to the author’s moral rights related to the 
work, regulated by law. These latter rules, however, can be applied once the term of 
protection of copyrights has expired. Nevertheless, if the conduct in question might infringe 
the author’s right to indicate a name within the term of protection—in addition to those 
authorised to do so in Section 85 (3) of the Civil Code—the collective rights management 
organisation or author’s interest representation organisation concerned can also take action, 
after termination of the term of protection, by virtue of injuring the memory of the author. 
This provision guarantees that—no matter how much time has passed—the author’s name 
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should be always indicated on his work.191 In accordance with the act, the author will be 
entitled to moral rights named in the former acts, the right to the integrity of the work. 
The act also contains rules at special level on moral rights and their exercise. It contains 
provisions as set out below: on moral rights of owners of neighbouring rights Section 75, 
Section 79 and Section 81.  
Finally, it should be noted that certain opinions in legal literature count freedom of scientific 
and artistic works ensured by Section 70/G. of the Constitution also among personal rights.192 
Taking the formerly effective law as its basis, the act regulates the right to make the work 
public, raising specific rules set out in the present implementing decree to statutory level. The 
right to make the work public actually means the authorisation of the author to decide: 
whether he discloses his work to the public or keeps it secret. In the latter case, the right that 
holds on the grounds of copyright can be supplemented by the protection of privacy ensured 
by Section 81 of the Civil Code. 
The option to use the work is related to making it public. Making the work public itself—
except for the cases of free use (Sections 33–41)—does not create the possibility of use, and 
in case of works not made public free use cannot be considered at all: in accordance with 
Section 33 (1) only works made public can be used freely, in adherence to other provisions of 
the act.193 
To perform a use contract, the author must authorise making his work public; if he refuses to 
do so, he will be in breach of contract; however, his statement cannot be substituted on the 
grounds of the above. Furthermore, the act sets up a reversible presumption that in accordance 
with the use contract the author consents to informing the public on the content of the work 
adjusted to the goal of use. On the other hand, in accordance with the provisions set forth in 
Section 30 (5) the author’s consent must be considered given on the strength of the law when 
making the work is the author’s obligation arising from his employment relation: delivery of 
the work is considered consent to making it public.194 Finally, reversible presumption 
supports that a work found after the author’s death was meant by the author to be made 
public. It is possible to prove the contrary when the author during his lifetime or his legal 
successor later on makes a statement of exclusion on forbidding to make the work public.195 
For works of unknown authors, the first publication of the work will determine 
commencement of the term of protection as a general rule, and the term of protection of works 
made jointly must be in each case calculated from the publication of the work. Also, there are 
legal effects related to failure to make the work public and publication of works not made 
public yet. Making the work public can be carried out upon the author’s unilateral order; 
similarly, the author can withdraw his work unilaterally. Obviously, the author can withdraw 
his permit to make his work public only until the work has not been made public, after that, 
the author can prohibit further use only, in which case the work must be considered—from the 
date of the statement on withdrawal or a later date set out therein—as if it had not been made 
public. This legal effect might prevent the completion of the use contract, at the same time it 
excludes acts falling within the scope of free use in relation to the work, paying regard to the 
provisions set forth in Section 33 (1). Permitting publication of the work is not subject to any 
required formalities, however, claim to protect obtained rights makes exercise of the right of 
withdrawal subject to required formalities: withdrawal will be considered valid solely in 
writing with a good cause specified therein, which is to be defined more precisely in practice, 
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where—paying regard to the unchanging nature of the term—it will be possible in the future 
to draw on experience of legal cases of the past.196 
Withdrawal and barring is the unilateral right of the author, however, by exercising this right 
he shall not violate rights and lawful interests of others; so, he shall be obliged to compensate 
the user for any damage arising from withdrawing the permit or prohibiting further use, which 
obligation covers merely losses arising until communication of the statement. Dogmatically, 
however, this is actually not compensation for damage but indemnification. Exercise of the 
right of withdrawal (barring) authorises the author to cancel use contracts too. The terms and 
consequences of exercising this right of cancellation are regulated by Section 53 of the act. 
Exercise of the right of withdrawal (barring) shall not restrict entitlement to economic rights 
different from the author’s right in enjoying and exercising these rights.  
It is a new element in the regulation of indication of name that the act sets practical 
requirements to be met in asserting this right, paying regard mainly to conditions of modern 
forms of use: the author can exercise the right to indicate his name in line with the character 
of use. For works made in employment relation the relation between the right to indicate 
name and employer’s right is regulated in Section 30 (5) of the act.197 
In harmony with the provisions set forth in Section 6 (1) of the Berne Convention, nobody 
may doubt that the author can establish his claim to the authorship of the work. Authorship 
depends only on satisfaction of the requirement on the merits defined in Section 4 (1), its 
acknowledgement has no required formalities, it is not bound to registration or other similar 
authority acts. The act returns to the rule set out in Section 6 of the Berne Convention; so, it 
classifies merely distortion or mutilation of the work or any other change in the work that 
might be injurious to the author’s honour or reputation infringement of rights. 
 
VI. 1. 3. Regulation of economic rights 
 
The property right character of copyright raises the question how the author’s creditor can 
claim his satisfaction from the writer’s work that constitutes part of the author’s property and 
whether the creditor can compel the author through foreclosure to publish his work for the 
purpose of financial benefiting. In view of the fact that during publication of writer’s works, 
in addition to financial benefiting, other aspects are asserted, it is the author’s sole right to 
decide on publication; if, however, this has taken place, the financial benefit arising therefrom 
could be seized in accordance with Act XVI of 1884.198  Also, copyright can be seized when 
the author or his inheritors have already transferred it to another person; also, during 
foreclosure against the publisher of the writer’s work the copyright obtained by the publisher 
can be seized; what is more, in spite of the publisher’s will a second edition can be carried out 
by the bailiff on condition that he has obtained copyright during the court proceedings; or in 
accordance with these rules, the author’s bankruptcy creditors can divide the economic value 
of copyright in accordance with bankruptcy law. 
The author’s intellectual activity becomes embodied in the created work, so it falls within the 
scope of the term thing in the sense of private law; therefore, it is the object of the right of 
ownership. The act regulates acquisition of works of the fine arts and applied arts as well as 
works regarded identically as them and works of photography stating that copyright shall not 
be considered transferred through the author giving his such work into another person’s 
ownership.199 
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Regarding writer’s and musical works, the act states that even the possessor of the manuscript 
or its reproduced copy will be entitled to duplication solely with the author’s consent. 
Obviously, in everyday life the issue has significance in case of transfer of ownership of 
paintings, statues and other similar works of applied arts or photography, where the original 
of the work is the subject of purchase and sale. In this respect the act can be interpreted to the 
extent that even if the work in question is a work not made public yet, the author—in the 
absence of any stipulation to the contrary—has not reserved the right to make the work 
assigned into ownership public from among the rights set forth in copyright; in other words, 
the owner must be considered authorised by the author to make public and publish the work 
got into his ownership. For the person who acquires the ownership of the painting, statue from 
the author will be entitled to transfer, alienate it owing to his right of ownership without the 
need to ask for the author’s consent thereto. It follows from the above that this person can 
display the painting, statue in his ownership for the purpose of sale, can enter them to public 
auction unless he has been expressly barred by the author from doing so. Also, such person 
must obtain the author’s consent to duplication of the work already given into his ownership, 
to marketing the copies produced.200 In accordance with the act, for the author the object of 
foreclosure can be solely the pecuniary advantage that the author is entitled to as a result of 
his having sold or asserted the copyright. Furthermore, the amount of damages payable to the 
author through enforcement of infringement claim will be also pecuniary benefit that can be 
subjected to foreclosure. These provisions are applicable both to writer’s works and other 
works as well as public performances of theatre plays, musical plays and musical works as 
appropriate.201 If the author offers the created painting, statue for sale, thereby he makes his 
work public, in this case nothing will prevent such copies from being made subject to 
foreclosure or auction. Against the author, for the benefit of the person to whom he has 
transferred his copyright, delivery of the original copy held by him can be forced in order to 
sell the work, after foreclosure, only in the event that transfer of copyright was meant to apply 
to the fully completed work. If anybody acquires ownership of any copy of a work not made 
public yet, then during the foreclosure conducted against him such copy can be made subject 
to auction because it follows from transfer of ownership that the author has not reserved the 
right to publish, make public the work assigned as property.202 
In Act III of 1969, the author’s economic rights and the restrictions of copyright jointly 
determine economic relations with respect to use of the work. 
It is a common feature of economic rights the author is entitled to that valuable consideration, 
fee will be provided for the author for the use of the work that makes it available to the 
members of society.203 Determination of the forms of social use that provide grounds for 
claim for such fee can be made either by listing such forms item by item or by a proper 
general definition. The act chooses the latter form, and in addition to the general definition of 
use, it determines the restrictions of copyright by an enumerating method, i.e., the cases when 
it will be entitled to so-called free use without any fee to the author. Also, it is the advantage 
of general determination that the provisions of the act can be applied to cases where 
technological development discloses new forms of use, therefore, the act states the principle 
in general that in the absence of any provisions of the act to the contrary any use of the work 
requires the consent of the author (or his legal successor after his death), and such use will be 
carried out against a fee, except for the cases set out in the act. The act connects the rule of 
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protection of the title with this group of questions, because the title itself is not a work; 
however, if it has an independent character, its use requires the author’s consent.204 
Owing to technological development, enhanced public transport and entertainment needs and 
possibilities, community aspects of creative work considered typically individual earlier have 
come to the front. It becomes frequent that works covered by copyright protection are made 
under employment relation. The act reckons with these conditions changed as a result of 
social development when it regulates the issues related to works created under employment 
relation. The act sets out from the principle that individual creative work manifests itself even 
under changed conditions and it must be protected. On the other hand, it should be taken into 
account that this work is made possible and facilitated by organisations to ensure social use of 
the result of the work. Simultaneous satisfaction of these two conditions requires suitable 
equalisation of the creator’s and the employer’s interests.205 
On the one hand, the employer acquires right of use on works created under employment 
relation, but this right is restricted by two elements. One of them is the content of employment 
relation: primarily this is what determines whether the author was obliged to create, for what 
purpose and what work. The other one is the employer’s scope of operation: the employer 
does not acquire right of disposal over any use of the work that is outside the employer’s 
scope of activity.206 Secondly, the author has right of use outside the employer’s scope of 
activity, however, in exercising this right the author is obliged to take the employer’s lawful 
interests into consideration. To ensure this, the act stipulates that the employer’s consent is 
required for exercising the author’s right of disposal, which the employer can refuse to give 
solely with good cause. Thirdly, the rules that restrict exercise of the right of use in time will 
prevail with respect to works made in employment relation too. If the work is further used 
after the period determined in rule of law, the right of disposal will belong to the author. This 
ensures that he should get the statutory author’s fee on the new edition, in addition to the 
salary received in employment relation. Also, the author will dispose over his work if during 
such determined period the employer does not exercise its right of use at all.  
The provisions regarding use of works made in employment relation do not affect the author’s 
moral rights, so the author will be entitled to the right to claim authorship, the right to indicate 
name and protection against unauthorised use or distortion. Restricting conditions related to 
the use of the work arise from labour law commitments; within the employer organisation the 
author’s work can be changed by the competent superior even if the author does not agree 
with it; in this case, however, the author can claim omission of the indication of the name.207 
Here it should be added that in accordance with Section 11 a person under employment 
relation will not have the right of withdrawal either since this would thwart use of the work 
made in employment relation. With respect to such works the right of making them public 
will be asserted through the author consenting to making the work public by delivery of his 
work; if the author refuses to deliver the work deemed unsuitable, his act will be considered 
breach of employment relation, which brings about labour law consequences. 
It is a peculiar feature of copyright that during a determined period after the death of the 
author the author’s legal successors will dispose over the use of the work, and in return for 
their consent they will enjoy the author’s fees received. In accordance with Act LIV of 1921, 
the duration of the term of protection following the death of the author is fifty years, which 
complies with generally accepted international practice. Although the fifty years’ term of 
protection will in certain cases bring about that inheritors far from the dead author will receive 
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author’s fees, the act—in harmony with Act LIV of 1921—sustains this fifty years’ term of 
protection.  
Our old copyright law determined the author’s economic rights for specific genres, and 
determined the state of facts of usurpation by naming specific economic rights applying to all 
genres. Section 13 (1) of the formerly effective Act III of 1969 provides for the author’s 
economic rights in the form of a so-called general clause: any use of the work requires the 
author’s consent, in the absence of any provisions in the act to the contrary; and use means the 
process that communicates the work or a part of it to the public. Our copyright law translates 
this general right to particularly defined titles concerning specific genres, building on 
experience and terms of former legal practice.  
Our formerly effective law determines these economic rights partly for use of works in 
material form, partly for use implemented in non-material form. This regulation technique, on 
the one hand, made it possible to circumscribe author’s economic rights with relative security, 
and, on the other hand, through the general clause it remained sufficiently flexible to enable 
legal practice to follow technological development as well as economic and social changes.  
The general clause supplemented by a list of cases as examples will continue to be needed, 
however, the general clause of our formerly effective law needs to be revised. Although acts 
of use are usually built on each other gradually, this does not change the fact that even the 
very first use will be subject to licence and fees; and the process does not by all means need to 
be fully carried out. Furthermore, reference to the public in the formerly effective clause is a 
disputable element. Regarding works that can be performed, played, copied, copyrighted use 
can be implemented within the private sphere too; what is more, today this kind of use is 
becoming typical. The significance of personal enjoyment, use of works without any 
mediators is growing; the dividing line between the private and the public is becoming 
indistinct. In the future, copyright law cannot focus merely on public use of works carried out 
in the cultural market. The new term of use should extend to this use of works for private 
purposes en masse; furthermore, the term of public should be revised. Finally, it should be 
noted that, albeit, it would have been expedient to replace the phrase ’use’ by another phrase, 
in order to maintain continuity of legal practice the act preserves the present terminology. 
Act III of 1969 determines the author’s economic rights in general as right to authorise use.  
However, it is reasonable that the general clause of the new regulation should take a logical 
step backwards, and deduce it from the author’s exclusive right to utilise the work that any 
other person shall utilise the work solely with his authorisation.208 
General rules on economic rights indicate that the two basic types of use are use in material 
form and use in non-material form. The typical cases of use in material form are reproduction, 
distribution and exhibition, while forms of use in non-material form are public performance, 
communication to the public and retransmission and adaptation.209 
In judicial practice there are several precedents of the new element in regulation that in the 
future the author will be entitled to exclusive right of commercial utilisation of the 
characteristic and original shape contained in the work and giving licence to such 
utilisation.210 
The act sets the author’s claim for a fee, which is in proportion to the income related to use, 
within a general scope, with a principle edge. The term of income related to use is wider than 
the term of income arising from use; it extends, for example, to sponsoring and other support 
received for use. Loss-making of use will not consume the author’s claim for fee.211 
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The act regulates the peculiar case of the general obligation of information, set out in Section 
277 (3) of the Civil Code, adjusted to use of author’s works: the user is obliged to provide 
information on the form and extent of use. 
The listed forms of use are typical in practice, and fit in with the system of terms used in 
international treaties, European Community guidelines and modern foreign legislations.212 
The powers, scope of specific economic rights are specified jointly by the rules of this chapter 
of the act and provisions regarding free use. As the right of exhibition can apply only to 
determined types of works from the first, this form of use and the economic rights related 
thereto are regulated by Chapter X. 
As it is expedient to extend the right of reproduction of the work and the right to give licence 
thereto by widening the term of reproduction, the regulation should express that recording of 
the work and making a single copy will be also reproduction, whatever purpose it is made for. 
It is reasonable to change the former narrower term, focusing on producing physical copies of 
works so that it should embrace any and all recordings that make the work directly or 
indirectly perceptible. Regarding works of architecture, implementation, reconstruction of the 
work should be considered reproduction. Duplication should contain fixation of works in 
sound and visual recording. Paying regard to growing significance of computer programs, 
data stores and distribution of works through computer networks, by the new regulation it 
should be made unambiguously clear that temporary electronic storing and producing of 
works transmitted over computer networks in a material form will be considered reproduction 
too. 
Concerning reproduction, it was justified to sustain the rule stipulating joint management of 
so-called mechanical small rights, which is based on Article 13 of the Berne Convention. The 
extension of the scope of the rule logically comes from the content of Section 18 of the act. 
The formulation of the rule stipulating mandatory collective rights management follows the 
example of the German and Austrian statutes, the provision setting the exception from that 
maintains harmony with Article 14 paragraph (3) of the Berne Convention.213 
Paying regard to copying for private purposes it was necessary to introduce further economic 
rights. 
By now, photocopying of works distributed in printed form and duplicating them in other 
similar forms have attained such volumes and have become so widespread that claim for fee 
by virtue of copying for private purposes must be extended to works distributed in printed 
form. The basis of this reprography royalty is the price of reprographic equipment and their 
accessories. Special rules apply to businesses that provide photocopying services for valuable 
consideration. The act does not extend the obligation to pay reprographic fee to institutions 
that otherwise carry out photocopying in large volumes, thereby avoiding unfavourable 
budget and other effects.  
Furthermore, Section 35 of Act LXXVI of 1999 makes it clear that copying specific works 
and certain cases of making copies continue to be subject to the author’s licence; asserting, 
collecting and allocating all the royalties payable on them is the task of a collective rights 
management organisation. 
Only at certain points does the formerly effective regulation provide expressly for the 
distribution of the copies of the work and the right to authorise distribution. Elsewhere, Act III 
of 1969 and the decrees related to it define marketing of copies of works and the rights related 
to it. Within the scope of neighbouring rights it stipulates exclusive right on marketing 
phonograms. The term publication/edition can be separated relatively clearly from the term 
distribution and marketing: according to prevailing approach publication/edition shall be 
interpreted as producing or causing to produce the work by any procedure suitable for that, at 
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one time or at times directly following each other, in several, determined number of copies, 
for the purpose of distribution for the public. It is not quite clear whether the fact that 
distribution (marketing) depends on the author’s special consent makes distribution 
(marketing) an act of use separate from or being a part of publication/edition. The new 
regulation interprets peculiar issues of publication of books and sheet music as a uniform 
process containing acts of use of recording, reproduction and distribution (marketing) and 
provides for them within the scope of special rules of use contracts.214 
The act names distribution as form of use and establishes exclusive right for the benefit of the 
author to license distribution of the work and its duplicated copies, regarding each type of 
work. Distribution shall be making the original copy and reproduced copies (duplicated 
copies) of the work available to the public as right of distribution applies to specific 
preparatory acts too. 
The act generally acknowledges lending right. Right of distribution through leasing does not 
apply to buildings and works of applied arts; however, the right to lend designs will anyway 
continue to hold. Lending right can be transferred and can devolve. Regarding films, the 
directive connects presumption of transfer of this right with the film contract [Section 66 (1) 
of the act attaches similar legal effect to film contracts]. In connection with that the act 
stipulates that the author’s claim for equitable remuneration will continue to hold after 
transfer of the leasing right to the film or phonogram producer. 
Remuneration can be demanded from the film or phonogram producer, through collective 
rights management; the author cannot waive it. 
Article 5 of Directive 92/100/EEC allows relatively extensive and large restriction of lending 
right. Exclusive right can be reduced to claim for fee, but authors should by all means receive 
fee at least on public lending and rental and works set in phonograms, film works and 
computer programs; however, certain institutions can be exempted from payment of the fee. 
The act fills this elbowroom of regulation by subtle legal classification of rental. Regarding 
works listed in Section 23 (3) it acknowledges exclusive right; rental of any other work will 
give rise to claim for fee only, which can be enforced solely through collective rights 
management. Section 39 allows exception to both rules for the benefit of libraries operated as 
public collections, which can freely lend copies of the work to the public; this exception, 
however, does not apply to software and data stores operated by information technology tools. 
In terms of legal harmonisation, it is reasonable that the new regulation should provide for 
exhaustion of this right, in connection with right of distribution. It follows form our bilateral 
agreement entered into with the United States of America that our copyright law should reject 
the international right exhaustion principle. Paying regard to all the above, the act specifically 
provides for right exhaustion: if the copy of the work has been marketed by the author or, 
with his express consent, by another person through purchase and sale or transfer of 
ownership otherwise, inland, thereafter right of distribution cannot be exercised, except for 
rental and lending right and importing right. 
If right of distribution extended only to marketing implemented through sale or transfer of 
ownership under other title, there would be no need to declare that exhaustion of distribution 
right does not affect the rental and lending right on copies of the work, however, the act 
stipulates provisions right to the contrary. So, it is necessary to state that rental and lending 
right will continue to hold after exhaustion of distribution right.215 
After accession to the European Union these provisions shall extend to marketing on the 
entire territory of the Community. 
As the act attaches right exhaustion effect to marketing inland, it seems to be obvious too that 
marketing abroad does not exhaust exclusive right of marketing in Hungary; which involves 
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that the author will be entitled to exclusive right to import the copy of the work into the 
country. However, paying regard to our bilateral agreement entered into with the United 
States of America, it is reasonable to make it clear that distribution right contains importing 
right.216 
Performance of the work is one of the basic types of use. The work becomes perceptible in 
such form that its physical copies are not delivered to the audience even temporarily for this 
purpose. Public performance, use in non-material form typically takes place in the joint 
presence of the user (service provider) and the person who finds pleasure in the work, while in 
the other basic case of use in non-material form, in communication of the work to the public, 
the relation is indirect, the work becomes perceptible to persons not present.217 
The act does not consider only traditional live performance a performance; instead, it states 
that performance is when the work is made perceptible by some technical means or method.  
Reference to display on screens aims at modernisation: display can be implemented on a 
computer monitor just as on a television screen at a restaurant or other similar places. 
Performance will be considered public when it is carried out at a place available to the public 
or at any place where persons outside the family and its company or acquaintances gather or 
can gather. 
Historically, first it was common management of public performing rights that authors set up 
a company for; these rights cannot be exercised in any other form even today; their individual 
assertion against several thousands of users is practically ruled out. The act also stipulates 
collective rights management in this scope, relying on formerly effective law and certain 
foreign solutions. A peculiar form of making works of the fine arts perceptible to the persons 
present is exhibition, which is regulated in Section 69 of the act. WIPO’s Copyright Treaty 
determines right of communication to the public generally, extending it to broadcasting. In 
accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty authors of literary and artistic works are entitled to 
exclusive right to authorise communication of their work to the public. This right will hold 
irrespective whether communication is carried out with or without wire. Consequently, this 
provision of the new agreement embraces communication, making available the work in any 
form to persons not present on the site and extends to all genres.218 
The act basically follows this construction by regulating broadcasting as the basic case of 
communication to the public. Provisions regarding broadcasting mostly preserve the formerly 
effective law, which was modernised by Act VII of 1994 in harmony with the Council’s 
Directive 93/83/EEC. 
A new element in regulation of broadcasting is the settlement of issues related to encrypted 
transmissions, disputed in practice so far. It should be considered broadcasting and does not 
qualify as cable retransmission regulated in Section 28 (2) if the means of decrypting of the 
programme received encrypted from satellite and fed into the cable network is not for sale in 
trade, i.e., cannot be purchased by anybody, or if the programme received from satellite 
without encrypting is encrypted at the headstation of the cable network. The rules of 
broadcasting and cable distribution of own programmes shall be applied to these two cases 
too. Furthermore, it is a change that the act makes both recording enabling repeated 
broadcasting and recording for the first broadcasting subject to licence.219 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty contains a phrase, basically, with the aim of giving an 
international law answer to on demand distribution of works implemented on computer 
networks. According to the Treaty, one of the cases of communication to the public is when 
the work is made available to the public in such a way that its members can access the work 
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from the place and at a time individually chosen by them. It should be added that this 
provision of the Treaty, actually, does not adjust the term of publicity to new technological 
development; instead, it makes it clear that communication of the work to the public will be 
implemented even if access to the work is provided for the public in such a way that its 
members can simultaneously decide on the time and place of transmission, retrieval. In 
compliance with all that the act regulates communication to the public both in general and 
with regard to this specific case. 
Maintaining the status as set out in the formerly effective law, the act stipulates collective 
rights management for licensing the rest of forms of broadcasting and communication to the 
public.220 
The act regulates two cases of retransmission. If retransmission is not simultaneous or is 
implemented by changes, Section 28 (1) will govern. If the work is retransmitted to the public 
simultaneously and without changes by involving an organisation other than the original 
broadcasting organisation, paragraph (2) will govern; in this case, the author’s consent must 
be considered given if the fee determined in advance is paid to the collective rights 
management organisation. The act regulates this latter version of use basically by borrowing 
the formerly effective law, in harmony with Directive 93/83/EEC. Determination of allocation 
rates allowing a different agreement is a new element. The consultation procedure regulated 
in Sections 102–105 of the act can be used also in connection with the authors’ retransmission 
right.221 
At variance with Section 4 of Act III of 1969, Act LXXVI of 1999 must protect not only the 
work produced through adaptation but must provide economic rights for the author for the 
adaptation of his work, expressly binding it to his licence.222 
Provisions regarding works made in employment relation must be applied, in accordance with 
the act, to works produced in public service and public servant relation too. 
Outside the scope of the above-mentioned legal relations, the parties can dispose over the 
author’s economic rights, taking other provisions of the act into account: agreement on 
economic rights related to works made under contract falls within the scope of research, 
principal and agent contracts, articles of association and other contracts. 
In accordance with Article 3 paragraph (3) of Directive 91/250/EEC on legal protection of 
computer programmes, solely the employer should be authorised to exercise economic rights 
related to the program if it has been created by the employee in fulfilling his obligations or 
acting in accordance with the employer’s instructions (however, the contract between the 
parties can set different provisions). Although this rule of the Directive applies to software 
only, it is expedient to follow this regulation logic in internal codification with respect to all 
genres, with the deviation that it is reasonable to exclude the employee’s claim for copyright 
fee only in the event of software and data stores. 
Acquisition of right by the employer can be made possible by various kinds of codification 
methods, from among them the act chooses devolution of right attached to the fact of delivery 
of the work, occurring on the strength of the law (however, it is possible to make a different 
agreement). Contrary to the rule set out in Section 14 (2) of Act III of 1969, the employer 
acquires economic rights for the entire duration of the term of protection, if however the 
employer gives permit to use to another person or transfers economic rights related to the 
work to another person, the author will be entitled to proper fee. Even devolution of economic 
rights to the employer wil not terminate the author’s claim for fee that continues to hold after 
transfer of the right of use in accordance with the act. 
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With respect to term of protection, copyrights and related rights, Act III of 1969 basically 
complies with stipulations of international treaties and the rules of the European Community 
legislation, Directive 93/98/EEC harmonising the term of protection of copyright and certain 
related rights. Term of protection of moral rights is identical with that of economic rights, 
provisions on term of protection identically apply to these two kinds of copyrights. 
Protection of works whose term of protection should be calculated not from the year of the 
death of the author will expire if the work is not made pubic within seventy years from the 
date of creating the work. In relation to this rule, it is expedient to stipulate that on works with 
expired term of protection not made public, protection ensuring rights in content identical 
with the author’s economic rights will be enjoyed by the person who lawfully makes such 
work public or communicates such work to the public for the first time. The duration of this 
special protection is twenty-five years from the first day of the year following publication.223 
 
VI. 1. 4. Restrictions of copyright 
 
Copyright is exclusive; however, it can be exercised solely within the restrictions set out in 
rule of law, marking the dividing lines of its social function. To create an author’s work, 
primarily a creative person’s individual skills, artistic, literary, scientific vein, outstanding 
achievement over the average are required; however, the impact of social environment cannot 
be underestimated in making the work. Consequently, legal regulation needs to make efforts 
to guarantee not only the author’s moral and economic interests but also to create 
opportunities for the possibly most extensive undisturbed social use of interesting works.224 
The author’s copyright powers are opposed to general cultural interests of society. It is the 
author’s interest to have legal dominion over his work excluding everybody, and that he alone 
should determine the economic conditions of publication too; it is, however, the interest of 
society that intellectual goods should spread as fast and as easily as possible. Between these 
two opposing interests the statutory protection of the author’s right arises from the 
consideration that a vivid intellectual product that meets the need of the public will be 
properly assured only in the event that the authors are also assured with respect to the 
expected economic benefits and moral advantages of their work. 
Before independent acknowledgement of copyright, protection implied by conclusion of 
contracts and honesty tolerably assured author’s rights against usurpation, especially 
plagiarism—even in the absence of statutory protection. The force of awareness of old 
customary law continued to prevail beside statutory law until the beginning of the 20th 
century, and shows itself both in the fact that also the public considers plagiarism unlawful 
and in several literary and publisher’s customs that preserve the author’s powers outside the 
law too in highly vivid circulation of thoughts.225 
The source of restrictions lies not only in coarse public interest but also in the public 
knowledge that the author does not develop his own thoughts alone. Intellectually, he also 
draws on the treasures of thoughts of the past and the present, even if he has original thoughts 
and ideas. All the more if he presents the existing material of knowledge according to a new 
plan, in a new form and better adaptation to the public—great masses of literary and other 
artistic works are such. From these facts come the conclusion in harmony with public interest 
that society or the State can restrict the author’s right as much as it is required and made 
possible by the need to ensure smooth development. 226 
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Legislative restrictions of copyright apply basically and primarily to economic rights the 
author is entitled to, which does not mean that moral rights are unrestricted; they are also 
governed by general clauses of civil law that set forth the obligation of exercise of rights 
according to rules and the prohibition of abuse of rights. Certain restraints of moral rights can 
be observed regarding service works, in the restriction of right of notice linked to revoking 
consent given to use; and, as a matter of fact, the author himself can use the means of self-
limitation, for example under a contractual agreement. In the widest, at the same time 
simplifying sense, the term of protection can mean restriction of the author’s economic rights 
although it is more proper to consider it the limit of protection, and these restrictions prevail 
within this limit.227  
In the state of development of the period, restrictions apply partly to the limits of copyright, 
partly to its duration. The former include especially when minor works serving the benefits of 
education and general education are made free, and charity performances are excluded from 
the scope of the concept of usurpation in certain cases, and it is allowed to quote from alien 
authors’ works, include short extracts from poems in music. To determine the scope of all 
these is a secondary task, which sometimes involves quite a lot of practical difficulties. 228 
Restrictions in time include term of limitation of right of action and even more the general 
limitation of copyright itself for the benefit of society, which should be more properly called 
the extinction, amortisation of copyright. It is in it that the legal claim by which society lays 
claim to the authors’ works is manifested the most definitely, which was not clearly expressed 
in the period of the theory of intellectual property.229 
Legislations usually set the term of amortisation in 30-50 years from the death of the author. 
Certain statutes set shorter term of limitation, i.e., extinction on certain works, so on 
translation of author’s works.  
All these and restrictions similar to them belong to the open questions of further development 
of copyright in science, just as eminent domain of the State regarding copyrighted works 
considered prominently important in terms of general education. Legislations preceding Act 
XVI of 1884 omitted eminent domain paying regard to the author’s moral rights, or perhaps 
because the author’s interest of benefiting sufficiently ensured spreading of such works; 
consequently, restriction did not appear to be necessary in this respect.230  
Act III of 1969 contains the provisions that restrain assertion of author’s rights in an effort to 
harmonise social and individual interests; a part of these restrictions are contained in Act LIV 
of 1921 too.231 The rules as set out in Act LIV of 1921 are further developed by the act: it 
regulates restrictions of copyright in three groups (free use, use without the author’s consent 
against fee and authorising use for social interest).232 Restriction of author’s rights can, as a 
matter of fact, apply in any case to works already made public.  
Free use of author’s works is the strongest restriction of the author’s rights because such use 
is free of charges in the cases regulated in the act and does not require the author’s consent. 
The act ensures free use to quote a part of already published works faithfully or to adopt them 
for the purposes of school education and dissemination of scientific knowledge; in both cases, 
however, it is obligatory to indicate the source and the name of the author of the specified 
work.233 This scope includes organised training of workers and vocational and political further 
training carried out at armed forces. It is a further case of free use of alien works when 
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somebody produces a new, independent work through creative work by using a work already 
published. Thus, the rules of copyright law do not provide monopoly on some subject, 
copyright cannot exclude anybody from reworking the topic of a former work again. 
However, adaptation of an alien work to the stage, film, radio or television as well as in the 
same genre must be excluded from free use.234 
Making a copy of a work made public also belongs to the scope of free use if the copy does 
not serve the aim of marketing or profit-making (so it is for private purposes) and otherwise 
does not injure the author’s lawful interest. However, architectural works and technical 
facilities had to be taken out of the scope of the provision because making a copy of them 
basically means implementation of marketing and profit-making.235 
It is within the frameworks of free use that the act facilitates operation of means of mass 
communication. Free use of facts and news primarily subject to passing of time and topical 
economic and political articles with the source indicated cannot be avoided by copyright 
regulations anywhere. Free use of articles is, as a matter of fact, restricted in case of 
reservation of right of making public (which is usually indicated when they are published). 
This provision has already prevailed in our copyright law in the field of the press; yet, it is 
reasonable to extend it to the radio and television. A special provision is required for 
presenting works of the fine arts and applied arts, etc. by the television on an ad hoc basis, as 
a set or scenery.236 
The act makes it free to perform author’s works for school purposes. Furthermore, it is 
considered free use to perform these works incidentally at private gatherings and mass 
demonstrations if use does not serve the aim of profit-making or increasing profit even 
indirectly, and participants do not receive any fee.  
It is a further case of restricting author’s rights when the work can be used without the 
author’s consent but proper fee must be paid to the author of the work used. This solution is 
the case of the so-called implied licence when the author’s license to use is substituted by 
statutory provision. This implied licence is granted by all new copyright regulations to 
broadcasting organisations. The act confines implied licence to unchanged broadcasting of 
works already made public, and binds broadcasting of public performances to the organising 
body’s consent, barring the case when agreement between the author and the user excludes or 
restricts broadcast.237 
Concerning broadcasting organisations’ implied licence it was necessary to clarify their right 
to make sound or visual recordings of works that can be broadcast, for the purposes of their 
transmission, without the author’s consent but against fee. On the other hand, this right of 
broadcasting organisations necessarily demands that their program compiled against a fee can 
be adopted by other broadcasting organisations only with their consent, and that they can be 
recorded with their consent for the purposes of marketing or public performance. These 
provisions, as a matter of fact, do not affect authors’ claim for fee set according to relevant 
implementing decrees. 
It is a peculiar case of restricting copyright when the author’s legal successors should refuse 
without good cause to give their consent necessary for further use of a work already made 
public, it can be substituted by court decision based on its deliberation provided that otherwise 
it is not in conflict with international treaties. Free use, confining exclusive right to claim for 
fee, implied licence and—in a broad interpretation of the term—right exhaustion and 
obligatory collective rights management are kept in evidence within the restraints of 
copyright. The terminology of international treaties refers to exceptions to copyright law and 
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restrictions of this right. This chapter of the act is basically aimed at regulation of the cases of 
free use. 
It is a common feature of the cases of free use that they affect only economic rights and apply 
exclusively to works made public. The Berne Convention provides for the possibility to 
restrict the exclusive right of reproduction, stating that countries of the Union are entitled to 
making reproduction of works possible in special cases, on condition that such reproduction is 
not detrimental to normal use of the work and does not injure the author’s lawful interests 
without cause. 
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, basically, extends the requirement set out in Section 9 (2) 
of the Berne Convention to all the cases of free use and the other restraints of copyright. It 
should be added, however, that the exceptions and restrictions allowed in the Berne 
Convention, if they are properly applied, are by no means detrimental to the normal use of the 
work and do not injure the lawful interests of copyright owners without cause. Therefore, 
under usual and normal circumstances there is no conflict between the Berne Convention and 
the TRIPS Agreement in the scope of issues of exceptions to economic rights and restrictions 
of economic rights. 
A general opinion has been developed on Act III of 1969 that it complies with the provisions 
of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement also with respect to restrictions of 
economic rights, however, legal practice turned the attention to several anomalies which 
called for overall revision of the regulation in this field too. Basically, the measure of the 
examination is the system of criteria determined in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.  It 
was not justified to widen the scope of cases of free use, the definition set out in Section 16 of 
Act III of 1969 could survive and detailed rules of specific cases of such use needed 
modification.238 
The act introduced a common rule for all cases of free use that defines general criteria of free 
use in compliance with the provisions set forth in the Berne Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement. This provision—Section 33 (2)—based on the basic principle provisions of the 
Civil Code, makes it clear that exceptions to the author’s economic rights can be permitted 
solely for use implemented within the limits of fair practice and only to the extent necessary 
for and in the form adjusted to achieving the goal served by making use free. These criteria 
are enforced as requirements in application of law; they can be referred to in connection with 
peculiar, special cases of free use regulated in other provisions of the act.239 Section 33 of the 
act excludes extensive interpretation of the rules of free use. 
Section 34 of the act does not change rules of quoting and adopting considerably. Although 
formerly effective law was from time to time criticised for not giving the exact definition of 
quoting and determination of its possible volume, yet, it would be hard to regulate this issue 
in more details than it is done in the present regulation. 
 
VI. 1. 5. Contracts of use and transfer 
 
Transferring copyright is an indisputable requirement of practical life, it was satisfied by 
Section 3 of Act XVI of 1884. Transfer of copyright can be called assignment entered into 
between living persons through contract, which assignment mediates passing of rights in all 
the cases where transfer is not carried out through giving into possession. 
In transferring copyright it is possible to distinguish between the fact of assignment and the 
legal relation it is based on (causa cessionis).240 The fact of assignment is the fact that enables 
the acquirer to exercise exclusive right of reproduction for his own benefit. Regarding 
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author’s works that have been duplicated already, the fact of assignment can be summed up in 
manifestation of will to transfer copyright. The legal grounds for assignment is legal 
transaction or other legal relation that obliges the author to transfer in spite of his will, i.e., it 
is assignment by necessity. Anybody who makes author’s works, documents in an alien 
matter will be obliged to transfer the intellectual property to the authoriser, if, however, the 
authoriser waives ownership of intellectual ideas, the author will not be prevented by anything 
from asserting copyright so obtained. Ordering an author’s work usually does not establish the 
obligation to transfer copyright; however, the publisher’s order does not provide grounds for 
assignment by necessity of copyright but it does not rule out that such legal relation between 
the publisher and the author can be regulated under publisher’s contract. An exception to it is 
the case of engagement purely under employment relation where, for example, the publisher 
engages a translator against regular monthly salary. In such cases the publisher has acquired 
the exclusive right of reproduction on translations, however, not the original right but as a 
derivative copyright, and that through assignment by necessity. 
Transfer of copyright under contract can be based on purchase and sale, gift or other legal 
transaction (but not on publisher’s transaction), which is aimed at alienation of copyright. 
Concerning contracts on alienation of copyright the question can arise whether the objective 
of the contract of alienation has been transfer of the property or the right of reproduction. 
Copyright can be considered transferred through alienation of the manuscript when the 
intention of the contracting parties has been aimed at transfer of the right of reproduction. 
Otherwise, it can be presumed from delivery of the manuscript that delivery aims at transfer 
of the right of reproduction. Validity of transfer of copyright is not bound to written 
contract.241 
Inheritability of copyright is accepted in every European regulation on this subject matter; on 
the other hand, it is an acknowledged principle that copyright cannot be considered purely 
family property, cannot devolve from generation to generation infinitely. The act does not 
contain any provisions different from existing rules regarding inheritors within the scope of 
inheritance as set out in copyright law. The act sets forth that copyright will devolve, it 
follows form this that the author’s inheritors can pass this right to their inheritors, and in the 
event that the author has several inheritors, copyright will be divided in proportion to 
hereditary parts. Copyright can be bequeathed, in this case the legatee will acquire all titles 
arising from copyright.242 
It arises as a question whether the publisher can sublicence its publisher’s right without the 
author’s approval. The act does not contain any provisions with regard to legal relations 
arising from publisher’s contract between the author and the publisher; these legal relations 
have been regulated in the act on publisher’s transactions.243  
The act does not extend the right of devolution of the Saint Crown on derelict estates to 
copyrights for the sake of public interest as it is the country’s interest that intellectual 
properties should spread as extensively as possible. This goal is ensured much more when 
they can be distributed and made public by everybody freely, and it cannot be the task of the 
State to make public and sell author’s works found in estates.  
When Act LIV of 1921 speaks about transfer of copyright,244 this should be interpreted as 
economic rights on sale, utilisation, exploitation of the work. According to the act the author 
can transfer his copyright between living persons or for the case of his death; for lack of it 
copyright will devolve to his lawful inheritor(s).245 
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It can be restricted by stipulating that the author permits publication of the work only in a 
certain form, and it can apply to the content of the right the author is entitled to, a certain 
duration or a determined field. It depends on the author which right he intends to transfer to 
another person from among the rights to sell, market, duplicate, make public, transmit to 
mechanical equipment.246 
In the event that the author has transferred his right without having expressly excluded 
devolution of any of the rights to sell the work, then the rights to sell the work will devolve to 
the person to whom the author has transferred his copyright only when the author has 
transferred his copyright expressly without any limitation, or has transferred expressly his all 
rights. If he has transferred his rights in general only, without having expressly excluded 
devolution of specific rights, then according to the circumstances of the given case it is 
allowed to interpret the contract so as that it has not aimed at transfer of certain titles.247 
It is a frequently disputed question whether in case of transfer of author’s rights without any 
conditions it is the author or the person to whom he has transferred his copyright that will be 
entitled to the rights to sell that had not existed yet when the transfer was carried out or of 
which the parties could not have even thought of. In the case of transfer of copyright and 
entering into publisher’s transaction, usually it should be presumed that the will of the 
contracting parties have been aimed at transfer of only the titles that were known at that time 
to the contracting parties or that the opportunities of exploitation of such titles might have 
been before the eyes of the contracting parties at that time; consequently, the titles that the 
contracting parties could not have thought of, could not have reckoned with as an option when 
entering into the contract cannot be considered transferred rights unless the contracting 
parties’ will contrary to the above can be deduced from the content of the contract or existing 
circumstances. Also, it should be decided on the grounds of rule of law whether it is the 
author or the person to whom he has transferred his right that is entitled to the right of 
recording on gramophone, transmission by radio, adaptation to film, adaptation to sound 
film.248  
According to the legal standpoint of the Royal Curia, transfer of copyright is a sales 
transaction, where the valuable consideration payable to the author in return for transfer of 
copyright will be defined in view of the opportunities of sale available at the time of transfer. 
It would not be fair if pecuniary benefits arising from sales opportunities not foreseen at the 
time of transfer should be given to another party and not to the author. In transfer of 
copyright, transfer of the thing can be implemented only in the event that the person to whom 
the author has transferred his right without any limitations or with restrictions will acquire 
exclusive right to sell the transferred rights.249 If as such the transfer, either in a restricted or 
not restricted form, is exclusive, then, in compliance with the transfer, the relevant copyrights 
will belong to the person who has acquired them exclusively; in other words, the latter will 
become the subject of the relevant copyrights, in this case his exclusive right acquired from 
the author will be of a law-of-thing nature, hence he will be entitled to bring an infringement 
action against anybody who usurps the copyrights that have been transferred to him; so, even 
against the author. If, however, the party contracting with the author does not acquire 
exclusive right to sell the work in a certain direction from the author, then transfer of 
copyright as transfer of the thing will not hold even within the frameworks of the permitted 
sale. In the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, the transfer must be considered 
exclusive, except when the parties’ will to the contrary can be deduced from the 
circumstances of the case. 
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It occurs quite often that a famous writer, composer, artist contracts with a contractor his 
works to be created in the future, against fee to be paid annually or per item.250 
The act, involving this issue in its scope of regulation, states the following. Copyright can be 
transferred also with respect to works to be created in the future, such contract can be 
cancelled by half year’s notice if the transfer applies to the author’s works to be created in the 
future in general or a determined type of his works to be created in the future in general. A 
contract entered into on transfer of specific works to be created in the future cannot be 
cancelled, and cancellation does not affect already created works. By allowing cancellation 
the act intends to make it possible for the party to be exempted from further scope of the 
contract through cancellation if the contract should put a heavy burden on him later on. Both 
of the parties are entitled to right of cancellation. To ensure that the party should not be able 
to exercise right of cancellation to the detriment of the other party’s lawful interests shortly 
after entering into the contract of transfer, the act stipulates that cancellation can be exercised 
with legal effect only in the event that five years have already passed from conclusion of the 
contract. It is for the benefit of the author as the economically weaker party that the act 
provides that any agreement deviating from the above rules that is detrimental to the author 
will be void.251 
Publisher’s transactions belong to transactions aimed at transfer of copyright. Publisher’s 
transactions are transactions by which somebody (the publisher) acquires exclusive right from 
the author or his legal successor to reproduce, make public and market literary, technical or 
artistic works either completed or to be created. Rules on publisher’s transactions must be 
applied only to transactions entered into by entities who are professional publishers, or by 
traders within their business.252 
The publisher’s transaction will be subject to the rules set out in the Commercial Code only in 
the event that somebody both acquires the right and obliges itself to publish the work. 
Publisher’s transactions also contain transfer of copyright with the restriction that the 
publisher will be granted the right to reproduce, make public and market the work solely in 
the volume determined in the contract, otherwise only within the limits of statutory provisions 
pertaining to publisher’s transactions, for, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the 
right of translation will not devolve to the publisher.253 
Section 522 of the Commercial Code stipulates with regard to the interpretation of publisher’s 
transactions that in case of doubt the contract gives title only to a single publication of the 
work. In publisher’s transactions transfer is usually restricted in time too when the publisher’s 
transaction is confined to one or several editions. Upon termination of the scope of publisher’s 
transaction the publisher’s right will revert to the author anyway.254 The publisher can 
sublicence the publisher’s right (unless anything to the contrary arises from the content of the 
publisher’s transaction) without the author’s consent but will remain responsible to the author 
for completion of the publisher’s transaction in conformity with contract. Actually, it is a 
transaction on commission rather than publisher’s transaction that is entered into when the 
publisher publishes the work, in its own name but without having acquired the publisher’s 
right as exclusive right, for the benefit or at the expense of the author.255 It might occur that a 
publisher, believing that it can publish it, has already printed a work in proper number of 
copies or has sent it to the bookseller, and at this point another publisher brings an action 
against it, certifies an exclusive right, stronger and acquired earlier, and on these grounds 
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sequesters or causes to confiscate the inventory issued by the other publisher.256 The 
requirement of good faith, which is the basis of dealings, demands that publishers engaged in 
publishing books as a business activity, even if they do not maintain business relations, should 
inform each other whether one of them holds any exclusive right to publish a work 
(translation) that will prevent the other publisher from publishing the work (translation); 
making a statement can be enforced by judgment too.257 
If somebody makes a work for somebody else within the scope of his employment or activity 
based on service or contractor’s agreement as fulfilment of the obligation assumed by him, 
then it should be decided according to the circumstances of the given case to what extent the 
copyright on the work will devolve even without special stipulation to the employer or the 
customer placing the order as a result of the contract concluded on providing such work. 
There is no general rule of law stating that, in the event that somebody is obliged to make and 
deliver a work covered by protection to his employer as a result of service or other similar 
contract, then, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, the copyright of the work 
should devolve to the employer as a result of the contract without any restrictions. The issue 
of devolution of copyright should be addressed always by taking the circumstances of the 
given case into account, by deciding for what purposes and for what kind of disposal the 
employer has been provided with the work, according to the stipulation set forth in the 
contract or the contracting parties’ presumable will.258 
When he transfers his copyright, the author will be usually materially interested in ensuring 
that the person who has acquired the rights to sell the work should indeed exercise such 
rights.259 
Contractual relations affect the author’s interest absolutely directly since legal regulation in 
force in this respect will get the author to receive valuable consideration for his work; in spite 
of that Act LIV of 1921 contained no rules at all on settlement of contractual issues, and left 
the contract to the parties’ unlimited autonomy260. The very few provisions pertaining to 
copyright contracts were contained in the Commercial Code; for this reason, Act III of 1969 
gives authorisation that in determined cases rule of law should permit conclusion of use 
contracts only with the assistance of organisations authorised to do so. 
The principle of regulating contracts, also followed by our Civil Code, is permissivity. 
Dispositive, permissive rules, accordingly, give guidance to the parties, replace the 
contractual will where the parties have not stipulated any provisions, and in general they make 
it possible for the contracting parties to settle the terms of contract by agreement at variance 
with the rules of the act. This principle of civil law is enforced in copyright law with the 
restriction that the act does not allow any deviation to the detriment of the author from the 
rules that serve protection of the author’s interest. Also, the provisions of the implementing 
decrees issued on the grounds of the act that expressly forbid deviations have binding force 
too; their most frequent case is determination of author’s fees. Entering into force the above 
described rules is served by the provision of the act that states that in case of infringement of 
these rules the contract will remain in force but the unlawful stipulation will be replaced by 
the relevant provisions of the act. Use contracts must be made in writing, in accordance with 
general practice, only rule of law can provide exception to it in cases of less significance or 
occurring en masse.261 
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Based on practice of entering into contracts and experience obtained by judges in application 
of law, the act records some explanatory rules, which helps to explore the parties’ contractual 
will. These rules take the side of the author in disputed cases. Accordingly, right of use will 
be exclusive only in case of special stipulation; the user shall not sublicence the acquired 
rights; sale of the copy of the work embodying the creation itself will not pass rights of use to 
the buyer; and the copy delivered for use will remain in the author’s ownership.262 
Use contracts frequently include contracts on works to be created in the future, and as a result 
of the nature of the thing, they offer more opportunities for disputes than use contracts that 
cover already completed works. In this respect the act regulates the order how it can be 
established whether the work made on the grounds of appointment is in conformity with the 
contract—it specifies the consequences of providing improper works.263 It is the user’s 
obligation to make a statement on acceptance of the work delivered under contract, in specific 
genres and branches of use; the implementing decree can set a proper deadline for it. The user 
will have the right to return a completed work with good cause to the author for correction. 
Reference to good cause means that the user cannot exercise this right abusively, and if he 
carries out correction of the work without cause he will be in breach of contract. On the other 
hand, if the author refuses correction without cause, he shall bear the consequences of breach 
of contract. Even with both parties’ conduct in good faith, it might occur that the work after 
correction would continue to be unsuitable for use. In such cases the parties must bear risk of 
failure jointly, which is expressed by the rule that provides moderate fee for the author in this 
case.264 
The rule on alterations indispensable or obviously necessary for use, not affecting the core of 
the work implies the parties’ obligation to cooperate. To ensure use, the author is obliged to 
carry out such alterations, and if it is not possible, the user can also carry out the alterations.265 
At this point the act regulates two kinds of use contracts, owing to their overall character and 
being widespread: publication contracts and broadcasting contracts; in addition to them, 
among provisions on specific genres, the act provides for stage performance contracts and 
film contracts. According to the rule determining publication contracts, the author is obliged 
to make the work available to the publisher and the publisher is obliged to pay the fee, against 
which it will the have the right to publish and market the work. In the absence of expressed 
contractual provision, the right of publication does not contain the right of translation; yet, it 
usually provides exclusivity for the content of the contract; works made for compilations, 
dailies and periodicals are exceptions to this rule. 
The act sustains the very significant provision set out in rules of law on copyright after the 
Second World War that publication contracts shall cover a determined period or determined 
number of copies only. The act allows the option to make exceptions to the rule: practically, it 
occurs when the right to publish a foreign work in Hungary is acquired in accordance with 
international practice. 
The publisher will have the right to publish the work but will not be bound by any obligation 
in this respect that can be legally enforced by law, if, however, the publisher fails to publish 
the work within a proper timeframe, the author will have the right to withdraw from the 
contract and claim reimbursement of his fee because the risk of failure not imputable to the 
author must be borne by the publisher.266 
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A new named contract is broadcasting contract, where consequences of delayed use are 
identical with those under publication contracts.267 
Maintenance of inalienability of the author’s economic rights—implemented as a general 
rule—made it necessary for Act LXXVI of 1999 to liberalise rules of use contracts to a great 
extent. 
Certain types of use contracts are regulated sporadically in Act III of 1969 and in a dozen of 
ministerial decrees. The effective copyright act sets all the rules of use contracts in a single 
statute. The act continues to name publication contracts and film contracts as separate contract 
types, and defines specific rules of contracts on use of software.268 In addition to the above, it 
is not reasonable to introduce or maintain further contract types; this, however, will not rule 
out that provisions on specific work types should extend to contractual issues.269  
In accordance with Section 205 of the Civil Code, execution of the contract requires the 
parties’ agreement on material issue and issues classified as material by any of them. If the 
use contract is entered into under general contractual terms and conditions, the provisions on 
such terms and conditions of the Civil Code govern. Paying regard to these rules of the Civil 
Code, it does not seem to be reasonable that Act III of 1969 should provide separately for 
mandatory content elements of use contracts. It would not be expedient, and would be alien to 
our civil law, if the act contained mandatory content elements for lack of which the contract 
would be considered void; lack of agreement on material issues can prevent execution of the 
contract only. Instead, regulation should aim to help the parties to attain targeted legal effects; 
so, it is expedient to make such provisions that make it possible to enter into and maintain the 
contract even in lack of agreement on specific issues. It is especially true on specifying forms 
of use. Licence to use is confined to the form of use indispensable for implementing the 
objective of the contract if the forms of use it extends to are not expressly specified in the 
contract. Also, there is a need for explanatory rules to protect the author and make the user 
interested in clearly determining the terms and conditions of the contract; that is why the act 
stipulates that an interpretation more favourable to the author must be accepted when the 
content of the use contract cannot be clearly construed.270 
The act defines the meaning of exclusive and non-exclusive licence. It stipulates that non-
exclusive licence to use granted before entering into the contract granting exclusive licence to 
use will survive, except when the contract between the author and the user acquiring non-
exclusive right to use expressly sets forth provisions to the contrary.271 
One of the fundamental cases of terminating the contract is when the entitled person of the 
licence to use does not commence use of the work within the timeframe determined in the 
contract. Foreseeing this case it is expedient to give right of cancellation to the author, 
however, only in the event that the licence to use is exclusive. Also, right of cancellation can 
be given to the author in the event that the user exercises the rights granted by the exclusive 
licence to use in a form obviously unsuitable for implementing the objective of the contract or 
contrary to intended use. As regulation of use contracts is basically permissive, the author can 
stipulate right of cancellation in the above cases in contracts granting non-exclusive right to 
use too, or it is possible to attach legal consequences to failure to use or the user’s improper 
exercise of rights also in contracts ensuring exclusive licence to use.272 
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VI. 2. Provisions regarding specific genres 
 
VI. 2. 1. Literary works 
 
Section 1 of Act XVI of 1884 resolutely states the principle that solely the author of writer’s 
works shall have the right to reproduce, publish and market writer’s works, infringement of 
this right will involve compensation for damage and culpability. 
The subject of protection provided by the act is the author of the writer’s work; yet, the 
question might arise who can be considered the author of writer’s work. The act does not 
define it but it can be declared unambiguously that it is the person through whose intellectual 
activity the writer’s work has been created that must be considered the author.273 The object 
of protection is the writer’s work, whose reproduction can result in law of property/property 
right benefits, and this is typically not the manuscript or the picture itself but the given form 
of appearance which is suitable for imitation or mechanical reproduction. Consequently, 
copyright is an absolute right without corporeal object; its content is constituted by the right 
of reproduction or imitation and by the fact that third parties can be excluded from exercising 
this right. The author’s right to reproduce his work at his discretion arises from natural 
freedom and is not subject to acquiring any special right. The author can lose this title, but it 
is not copyright itself that disappears because it will terminate only after term of protection 
expires. Copyright is a property right, which is undoubtedly confirmed by Section 3 of the act. 
Property right significance of literary papers is different from their literary value, the act 
basically applies to law of property aspects; therefore, works with lower literary value will be 
provided with protection identical with the protection given to more valuable scientific 
works.274 
Nor does the act determine what can be considered writer’s work. It can be declared that the 
term of writer’s work depends on joint satisfaction of the following two conditions: on the one 
hand, whether the work is the result of the author’s own intellectual activity; on the other 
hand, that it should be a product that is suitable for literary circulation, publication. This latter 
condition definitely appears in the text of the act since by copyright the act means right of 
mechanical reproduction, i.e., the right by which the writer’s work can be placed in literary 
circulation through printing or other activity; it follows from this that a work that is not 
suitable for this due to its nature cannot be the object of copyright.275 
In general, a writer’s work is all thoughts expressed in external physical features. In terms of 
the act, however, any and all intellectual products, i.e., literary papers, that cannot be 
considered a drama or is not connected with a musical work shall be writer’s work: this shall 
include, as a matter of fact, literary genres recited in spoken language, which are ranked by 
the act to Section 6 (6).  
Based on practice, papers without any literary value, lists, registers, compilations, business 
advertisements, circulars, playbills, copy-books, price lists, invitations, appeals, 
announcements meant for public distribution shall not be considered writer’s works. Sent 
private letters are not protected against publication by Act LIV of 1921 either; the sender of 
the letter and secrecy of letters were protected by the provisions of the Criminal Code. The 
same holds good of the so-called letters that—if otherwise they cannot be considered writer’s 
works—do not fall within the scope of protection of Act LIV of 1921. Abstracts from writer’s 
works, if they appear in newspapers, and serve short description of regular scientific works, 
shall not be considered usurpation, except for abstracts of musical works.276 Writer’s works 
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shall be always considered protected against adaptation, be it from one genre to another or 
within the same genre. 
The act indicates the “scope of exclusive legal dominion” of the author of writer’s work over 
his work by the terms reproduction, publication and marketing, and in such form that these 
triple titles belong to the author both jointly and separately. In other words, the author’s 
powers will be infringed by the person who only reproduces his work without his consent, i.e., 
merely publishes or markets his work, printed either lawfully or unlawfully, without title to do 
so. By these three terms the act specifies solely the powers of the author of writer’s work, but 
this theoretical specification is not complete and cannot be considered a general statement that 
would specify the powers of the author of all copyrighted works.277  
The ”scope of legal dominion” of the author of writer’s work extends not only to his written 
works but to his certain presentation, recitations and readings. He is also entitled to right of 
publication of certain public speeches, however, only with respect to collected editions, 
furthermore, to right of translation of his work into other languages, and the translator of the 
translated works will be entitled with respect to the translation to all the rights that the author 
is entitled to with respect to his work. However, the act does not protect works already made 
public against public performance, except for theatre plays and musical works.278 
The author of musical works—apart from translation rights that cannot be applied here—in 
addition to the rights the author of writer’s works is entitled to, have exclusive rights to adapt, 
abridge and arrange his work and perform his work in public. The author of theatre plays, 
including musical plays, in addition to public performing rights on his work, has exclusive 
right of translation and adaptation. The author of works of the fine arts has exclusive right to 
remaking, making public and marketing. Technical works, on condition that they cannot be 
considered works of the fine arts owing to their function, will be provided in every respect by 
protection granted to literary works, or else by protection given to works of the fine arts. 
Regarding photos, the author of the original photograph has exclusive right to remake, make 
public and market his work.279 
The author is the person whose intellectual activity creates the work; this applies both to 
writer’s and other copyrighted works. As the term author is exclusive in the act, the person 
who has entrusted the author to create a work can be by no means considered an author, not 
even if he has ordered the work from the author against fee or advance payment, or has 
contributed to the work by his design or advice.280  
Those who participate in creating author’s works as ”contributors” at newspapers, periodicals 
under leadership of an editor do not have independent author’s legal status but are taken into 
account as independent authors with respect to the independent writer’s works or fine art 
works created by them. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, contributors of 
newspapers or periodicals assign the independent copyrighted work created by them, as 
authors, to the company for making it public once, i.e. for a single publication, and their 
further rights regarding it will remain untouched.  
Section 12 of Act LIV of 1921 speaks about co-authors when the same work is created by the 
intellectual activity of two or more persons aimed at one purpose. The circumstance that that 
the co-author’s name is not indicated on the work does not prevent the work at all from 
having several authors in terms of copyright law. In case the parts cannot be separated the act 
sets forth that each of the authors is authorised to reproduce, make public and market the 
work, however, subject to compensation to be given in advance, the amount of which will be 
determined by court at its discretion in disputes, but even in legal proceedings the authorised 
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party must wait for the court decision since without it by making the joint work public he 
would expose himself to legal consequences of usurpation.281  
Individual intellectual activity manifests itself in subordinated scope too; it is not absolutely 
necessary that it should represent creation of a new object. The act does not distinguish 
protection between works made public and works not made public; so, it will be considered 
infringement of copyright when an unprinted manuscript is published without the author’s 
consent.282 
The first page of a printed work or a work in manuscript is usually the title page that indicates 
the subject matter of the work and in many cases produces serious effect with respect to the 
financial profit the author or the publisher expects to receive from making the work public. It 
arises as a question whether it can be considered infringement of copyright if somebody uses 
the title of an alien work in an unchanged form for an otherwise independent work. The title 
of the book does not serve to communicate thoughts, its prime aim is to indicate the writer’s 
work; therefore, it cannot be considered writer’s work—although it constitutes a part of it—
and it follows from this that the use of the title of an alien book itself will not implement 
infringement of copyright. Losses arising from such use belong to the scope of causing 
damage to property, pecuniary loss rather than to copyright law, and makes it possible for the 
person concerned to bring an action seeking prohibition of use and claim for compensation.283 
It is considerably different from the issue of using the title whether the so-called “re-issue 
under a new title” (Titelausgabe) is lawful, i.e., the activity when the publisher adds a new 
title page and year of publication to copies of an older edition and indicates that the work has 
been published in new edition. Although in bookseller’s business it is not regarded as fair 
practice, it is stressed that in this scope the fact of infringement of copyright will not hold 
even if the author has not given his consent to it, since what happens now is remarketing 
copies lawfully reproduced already. This argument will be sound only in the event that the 
author has transferred his copyright on his work without any reservations and infinitely to the 
publisher. If the author has assigned his work for only one edition (and that in a determined 
number of copies), then the publisher shall not effect any changes or modifications on specific 
parts of the work—in addition to publishing the determined number of copies, the manuscript 
and the mastercopy constituting a supplementary part of it. In this case, the publisher cannot 
reproduce specific parts of the work without the author’s consent beyond the determined 
number of copies, and can market the produced copies solely under the title page edited by the 
author, with the number of the real edition attached to it.284  
The question occurs whether each of the persons participating in creating the writer’s work 
can be considered a contributor. It should be noted in advance that owing to the character of 
the thing none of the persons who deal with the work after it has been created are 
contributors. The act provides protection solely to the author, so the answer will be given by 
the term that defines author’s capacity. As it has been mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter, the author is the person through whose intellectual activity the writer’s work is 
created; so, every and each person who carry out such activity during creation of the work is 
author or contributor; accordingly the party placing the order or the sponsor—as they do not 
carry out any intellectual activity during creation of the work—are not contributors. 
Nevertheless, it might occur that somebody brings contributions to the making of the work in 
such fashion that his activity does not qualify as author’s activity—such non-independent 
contribution is a typical case of assistance—if its direction and content are determined by 
another person in such form that the work created during the contribution can be considered, 
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in terms of its intellectual content, the work of the person who determines it rather than the 
work of the person who directly creates it. The cases of such non-independent contribution 
can be determined only in particular cases, individually. It is important to note: the 
circumstance that one of the contributors has been indicated on the writer’s work as author 
does not exclude demonstration of the fact that several people have carried out activity jointly 
in creating the work, however, until this has been proved the presumption that the author of 
the work is the person who is indicated on the first edition of the work will prevail. The act 
vests contributors with equal rights, each of them can exercise the right of reproduction, 
making public and marketing, as matter of fact, subject to satisfaction of the pecuniary claims 
of the rest of the contributors. 
In accordance with Section 2 of Act XVI of 1884, collected works can be classified into three 
groups: 
− The first group contains collected works where the contributions of each contributor are 
organically connected and constitute an integral whole (encyclopaedias). 
− The second group contains collected works that are made up of several contributors’ 
works separated from each other, covering separate subject matters in such form that they are 
compiled externally by the publisher, editor without any internal connections between specific 
parts (scientific periodicals, newspapers). 
− The third group contains collected works that are compiled and published by the editor 
from documents not subject to the scope of the act. 
Regarding works that belong to the first group the act sets out from the basic principle that if 
somebody publishes an independent work edited from the works of several contributors as 
parts, which itself constitutes an integral whole and he accomplishes it by obtaining, selecting 
and compiling specific parts according to a determined plan, then this will be real author’s 
activity and as such will be entitled to protection by law. The collected works belonging to the 
second group as integral wholes, contrary to the above, are not covered by protection; in this 
case, as the act protects solely author’s activity and the editor does not carry out any author’s 
activity, only the specific parts will be protected. In the cases belonging to the third group, 
collected works are compiled from as yet unpublished documents, contributions not covered 
by legal protection (public property documents), where editing provides sufficient reasons for 
their protection, it being specified that preparatory activity without real publication will not 
establish editor’s rights. 
Regarding collected works, copyright will belong to the authors of specific parts. The aim of 
this measure can be formulated in the intention to set a limit to the editor’s copyright. The 
editor can use copyright for himself to the extent that it is the result of his creative activity, 
that is, he has connected specific parts into an integral whole and thereby he has created an 
independent writer’s work. However, he will not have copyright on specific parts even in this 
case, since they owe their creation to the authors of specific parts and not to the editor. It does 
follow from the above, however, that, in addition to assigning specific parts for the collected 
work, the authors of specific parts would be authorised to sell and print their works separately. 
Act LIV of 1921 protects writer’s works,285 musical works,286 works of the fine arts and 
applied arts,287 photographic works,288 text images, motion picture works,289 maps, designs, 
drawings, figures and plastic arts works determined in the act290. Furthermore, treaties 
separately refer to scientific works, the act classifies them under the term works covered by 
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protection. Although the Rome Convention specifically lists lectures, addresses, religious and 
other speeches of similar character, in accordance with the act lectures, addresses, speeches 
will be protected only in the event that they serve the purposes of education or entertainment, 
however, both the act and the treaties are silent about what provides the work with the 
capacity due to which it is covered by protection. The act declares exclusivity of copyright; 
paying regard to this it has a law-of-things nature, and owing to that the author can assert this 
against anybody who injures him in his copyright. Concerning this regulation the act defines 
the following terms.291 
− Reproduction: reproduction/duplication of the work in any procedure. It makes no 
difference whether the copy made of the work makes the work perceptible directly or by 
setting a mechanical equipment going. 292 
− Making public: any form of making the work (or merely its material content) public 
for the first time. The author must be granted the right to decide at its sole discretion if he 
wants to make his work public and in what form. New publication of a work already made 
public once by the person authorised to do so is no longer the author’s exclusive right.293 
− Publication (appearance): it is different from making public because it contains the 
purpose of marketing (putting into circulation) as published works are those that have been 
lawfully issued. Also, works shall be considered published when their reproduced copies are 
made obtainable, available to the public, that is, they are offered for sale or are otherwise 
distributed. Publication: Any form of making the work public, which can be unlawful too.294 
− Marketing (putting into circulation): commencing marketing of the copies made of the 
work, which enables the public to obtain specific copies of the work. A person who keeps a 
copy of the work in stock for sale or keeps it ready for sale will also market the work.  
− Keeping in circulation: it is different from marketing (putting into circulation) to the 
extent that the publisher is the party who puts the work into circulation, and the trader—if the 
work has been published not by him—is only the party who keeps the work in circulation.295 
The right of reproduction, making public and marketing does not amount to the sum total of 
the exclusive rights of the author provided by the act. In addition to the above, the author has 
exclusive right to public performance of theatre plays, musical plays and motion picture 
works even after they have been made public, to presentation of works of the fine arts already 
made public, by mechanical or optical equipment for business purposes. The author has the 
right to issue exclusive licence to another person to sell his work in his own translation, use, 
adaptation, i.e., to reproduce, make public and market the translation, use, adaptation of the 
work made by him. These rights apply to the sale of the work. Furthermore, the author has 
exclusive right to decide whether his name should be indicated on his work or any changes 
can be made in his work. These are the author’s moral rights.296 
Anybody who uses an author’s work with his consent for the purposes of another genre, 
adapts it without creating an independent original work or translates the work of another 
person will not become a co-author, and can dispose over the work produced by use, adapted 
or translated only without injury to the rights the author of the original work is entitled to, i.e., 
can sell the work so created solely with the consent of the original author.297 
The act states that reproduction, making public and marketing of the translation of writer’s 
works into any language without the author’s consent shall be considered infringement of 
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copyright.298 Actually, anybody can translate a writer’s work but the consent of the author of 
the original work will be required for selling the already completed translation, for public 
performance of the translation of theatre plays and for communication of the translation to the 
public by radio.299 In accordance with Section 8 of the act translations, adaptations, indirect 
acquisitions, any reworking and use of the original work enjoy protection identical with the 
protection granted to the original work, without injuring the rights the author of the original 
work is entitled to; this protection, however, will be obviously granted to utilisations, 
adaptations only if they represent peculiar individual intellectual activity. If the work created 
by using the original work departs from the original work to such an extent that it is presented 
as a new original work, the author will have the right to dispose over it without paying regard 
to the rights of the author of the original work.300  
As translations and the completed adaptations contain the original work, in the former 
reference must be always made to the author of the original work as it was indicated on the 
original work, but by indicating the translator’s or adapter’s own name or pseudonym or 
otherwise it must be expressed that the translation, adaptation does not arise from the author 
of the original work because otherwise it will violate the moral rights of the latter.301 With 
regard to the scope of the right to translation, use and adaptation, the contract entered into 
between the parties governs; so, for example, if somebody can acquire right to translate the 
work into another language, to rework or adapt it in any form, then, in the absence of any 
other stipulation, here again the acquired right must be considered exclusive unless the 
contrary can be deduced from the circumstances of the case.302 To sell the work completed 
with the permit of the author of the original work, the translator, user, adapter—in the absence 
of any agreement to the contrary—will not have to obtain the consent of the author of the 
original work except when the relevant sale is such that the parties could not have kept it in 
view when giving the permit.303 
If somebody has acquired right from the author of the original work to translate, adapt the 
work, etc., then within the permit obtained from the author on the grounds of the right he is 
entitled to he will have the right to act against anybody who violates him in his right. The 
translator, adapter, user, with respect to their activity, will be entitled to copyright separate 
from the copyright of the author of the original work, and they will not become co-author of 
the author of the original work either unless co-authorship can be deduced from the parties’ 
agreement according to the circumstances of the case. They will be protected against third 
parties with respect to their own completed work just as the author of the work.304 
Special provisions with regard to literary works were adopted by Act III of 1969 on the 
frequent case when collected works compiled by scientific institutions or state bodies are 
published. In accordance with the provisions known in our copyright law, in this case author’s 
rights are exercised by the institution (body) carrying out compilation, and the term of 
protection of the work must be calculated from the year following the year of first publication. 
Without this provision, scientific institutions and state bodies could not exercise author’s 
rights on the collected work as an integral whole, their work would not be covered by 
copyright protection. Nevertheless, author’s of specific parts can continue to exercise their 
rights on such specific parts, beside the author’s rights covering the entire work that the 
institution (body) carrying out compilation is entitled to.305 
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In accordance with the act, author’s fee must be paid on public performance of literary works 
not meant for stage, if otherwise the case of free use regulated in Sections 16–21 does not 
hold. Implementation of this rule is facilitated by the adopted statutory protection on giving 
the author’s consent through discharging the author’s fee. For works not meant for stage 
presented in public performance are literary works of short volume where obtaining the 
author’s consent for specific occasions would make use difficult.306 
Author’s rights must be enforced also with respect to illustrations of literary works by 
stipulating the author’s consent. 
 
VI. 2. 2. Dramatic works 
 
Act XVI of 1884 restricts right of public performance to theatre plays, musical plays and 
musical works, for they are usually meant to be presented to the public in artists’ 
performance. There is no need for reservation of rights, whereas the act does not bind public 
performance of other writer’s works to the author’s permit if they have already been made 
public. 
Theatre plays can consist of one part to be played by the performer in the stage presentation 
written down in the work. Public performance of plays reserved for the author should usually 
mean their stage performance, i.e., a performance carried out through playing parts arranged 
in scenes. Recitation of plays or certain parts thereof already made public is allowed because 
such recitation cannot be considered public performance of the play in terms of copyright law, 
whereas recitation of plays where parts are performed to a certain extent falls within the scope 
of prohibition of public performance. Communication of theatre plays to the public by radio 
requires the author’s consent. Stage performance of plays can be carried out by living persons, 
by reproducing their performance by living persons in a film or by puppets.307 
Musical plays shall mean theatre plays where the words and music are organically connected, 
such as operas and operettas. Musical plays and theatre plays include oratorios if they are 
“equipped with” choruses and private parts.308  
Special gatherings held under names of casinos, clubs with a large number of members and 
other similar names lack the character of family gathering due to the number of persons 
authorised to attend. So, in terms of the application of the copyright act they qualify as public 
performance even if associations hold these special gatherings at their own premises without 
admission fee and they can be attended only by members of the association and possibly 
members of their families or the guests they can invite. Section 50 of Act LIV of 1921 
considers pantomimes, dumb shows and choreographic works, in terms of copyright law, 
either theatre plays or—if they have music—musical plays based on their content309, 
emphasising that these works are protected works in every respect. In accordance with the 
Berne (Rome) Convention, oral works can be covered by protection only in the event that the 
form they are staged is fixed in writing or otherwise, i.e., in any form. This act does not bind 
protection to such prerequisite, although the ministerial reasons for the act refer to the above-
mentioned provision of the Convention.  
The act covers theatre plays, musical plays and musical works created through translation, 
use, adaptation also with respect to public performance by protection similar to that provided 
for literary works. The translator of the yet protected play will have exclusive right of public 
                                                 
306
  Petrik 1990. 176. 
307
  Knorr 1890. 147; Kenedi 1908. 158. 
308
  Alföldy 1936. 129. ff. 
309
  Szalai 1922b 33. f. 
performance of the completed translation only in the event that the author of the play has 
transferred this right to the translator.310 
In accordance with Section 52 of the act, right of public performance extends to the 
mechanical performance mentioned in Section 6 (9). The act prohibits public performance of 
plays, musical plays and musical works both when such works are performed directly by 
persons in public and when the public performance is communicated by equipment serving 
mechanical performance to the public, in the presence of audience gathered at a determined 
place. Section 53 sets exception to the provision on co-authors that without prejudice to the 
rights the authors are entitled to against each other it is sufficient to have the composer’s 
consent to performing a musical work with words; so, there is no need for the librettist’s 
consent, on condition that the author of the words has given consent to setting his work to 
music. The act removes musical works from the scope of this exceptional provision, whose 
public performance requires the consent of both the librettist and the composer. When 
regarding other musical works the act considers the composer’s consent sufficient, it stresses 
that it does not affect the rights the authors have against each other. 
Section 54 extends the rules set regarding writer’s works to the right of public performance, if 
they are suitable for that, with respect to the content of copyright. Section 55 stipulates that 
provisions of Sections 11-17 shall be applied properly to the duration of the right of public 
performance, but the act separately provides for works created under pseudonym or without 
indicating the author’s name and bequeathed works. In accordance with Section 57, anybody 
who performs or causes to perform a theatre play, musical work or certain parts of such works 
without the author’s consent wilfully or negligently commits infringement of copyright.  To 
ensure that restaurants, cafés and other public places of entertainment can be efficiently 
controlled in terms of public performance of musical works, the Association of Hungarian 
Librettists, Composers and Music Publishers was founded to prevent unauthorised 
performances and protect public performances of musical works outside the stage (petit droit). 
The scope of the cooperative society does not include stage performance of pieces of music 
contained in musical works, related to theatre plays. According to its standing order, every 
newly accessed member is obliged to make a statement, in which it transfers the right of 
public performance of all its musical works to the Cooperative Society, irrespective whether 
the author has notified its musical work to the Cooperative Society or not. Thereby, owing to 
the fact of accession, the Cooperative Society acquires the right of publication of all the 
author’s musical works, except for the musical works that have been made for a determined 
night-club or stage and for musical works with foreign words obtained for such purpose; the 
Cooperative Society brings these works to the notice of its clients in the journal of the 
Cooperative Society. Those who perform or cause to perform musical works in public will 
acquire right to public performance of protected works from the Cooperative Society against 
payment of royalty in a determined amount, and the net income received from royalty will be 
allocated between the authors according to a determined rate, enabling them to earn a 
living.311 Thereby they want to avoid that those who acquire right to perform protected 
musical works from the Cooperative Society against payment of royalty in a determined 
amount could be held responsible for the performance. The author himself has the right of 
public performance of theatre plays and musical works, but mostly it is the publisher to whom 
the author transfers the right of public performance. The author of a play will usually enter 
into a contract with the stage publisher in order to ensure possibly the most successful stage 
performance and sale of his play. Under such contracts the author assigns exclusive right of 
disposal over the stage performance to the publisher it being specified that on the grounds of 
the contract the publisher will have the right and will be obliged to take steps necessary for 
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protecting copyright. The publisher is obliged to deliver income based on determined 
settlement of accounts to the author, after deducting the commission the publisher is entitled 
to under the contract. Quite often, in the contract the author usually assigns the right to 
translate, adapt the play, make a film of it, and communicate it by radio to the stage publisher. 
The Society of Hungarian Stage Authors was founded for the benefit of stage authors with the 
aim to develop national literature, represent and protect intellectual and financial interests of 
stage authors and translators. For the benefit of its members, it collects royalties payable on 
public performances of dramatic works and takes statutory actions against theatres not paying 
author’s fees. It does not dispose over members’ theatre plays, however, it has the right to 
give permit for amateur performances of theatre plays; against payment of royalty, also on 
works whose authors are not members of the Society. As entrusted by its members, the 
Society handles the royalties received from making their works public by radio.312 
Section 58 properly extends the provisions on legal consequences of infringement to rights of 
public performance but does not refer to Section 22313 because as a whole it is not suitable for 
being extended to public performances. Section 59314 properly extends the rules on judicial 
proceedings, copyright expert committee, limitation and registration set out for writer’s 
works, if they are suitable for it, to rights of public performance. 
With respect to performance of theatre plays made public, Act LIV of 1921 provided special 
allowance for amateur art groups: the performance does not require the author’s prior consent, 
furthermore, no royalty shall be paid if the performance does not serve the purpose of profit-
making or increasing profit and participants are not paid any fee.  
 
VI. 2. 3. Musical works 
 
Musical works are also intellectual products, they are produced and sold in the same form as 
literary products. The intellectual activity that shows itself in a composer’s composition needs 
the same legal protection as literary products. The form of appearance of musical works is 
quite diverse; be it any form it will be covered by copyright protection if they have certain 
requisites. Such requisites are, for example, that they should be the product of the author’s 
intellectual activity and they should be such musical works that can be published. The act sees 
the cause for protection in the fact that musical works, just as writer’s works, are distributed 
by printing and engraving, and that the composer has the same relation to his composition as 
the author to his writer’s work. So, the composer will have the exclusive right to mechanical 
reproduction, publication and marketing of his work.315 That is why Section 45 states that the 
provisions of Sections 1–6 and Sections 9–44 are applicable also to the composer’s right of 
reproduction, making public and marketing. Concerning musical compositions, infringement 
of copyright will be implemented not only when they are simply copied but also when the 
work is adapted in any form that basically cannot be considered individual composition. 
Whereas the act allows that existing musical works could be freely used in creating a new 
work which results in one’s own intellectual product. Quodlibets, if they consist of small 
parts, bars adopted from specific works, do not implement infringement, when the source is 
specified as in case of quotations adopted in literary works.316  
Section 47 sets the same exceptions with regard to musical works, with slight deviation, as 
Section 9 regarding writer’s works. So, compared to writer’s works the difference is that the 
act does not allow adopting of musical works in collected works meant for ecclesiastical use, 
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and it stipulates that the only condition of quoting and adopting is that the author or the source 
must be specified.317 
Section 48 mentions merely exceptional cases regarding musical works, their existence do not 
implement infringement of rights either. This section stresses the case from among conducts 
implementing infringement of rights when a writer’s work is used as the words of a musical 
work, provided that these words are written down, printed together with musical 
accompaniment. The reason for that is that in such cases the music itself constitutes the 
material part of the creation, and the writer’s work is not seriously injured by such use; 
however, even in this case the condition will prevail that it should be a work already 
published or the author should give his consent to use of a work not published yet. The act 
removes writer’s works that are owing to their nature written only for musical compositions 
such as operas, operettas and oratorios from among writer’s works that can be used as words. 
Furthermore, this section states that the author’s consent is required for publishing words 
without musical accompaniment. This applies to works that are usually performed with 
musical accompaniment.  
Act LIV of 1921 takes over rules on musical works from the former statute. It is allowed to 
use the tune of a musical work covered by protection if a new original work is created through 
use. Whether a new original work has been created will be decided by court, possibly on the 
grounds of an expert’s opinion. In accordance with the act, it is the author who has exclusive 
right to reproduce, make public and market musical works within the term of protection. 
Reproduction can be carried out by musical notations through prints, manual copying or 
recording on gramophone records and film, while marketing means putting specific copies of 
prints, manual copying, gramophone, film recordings into circulation.318 
Reproduction, making public and marketing of musical works can be the subject of 
publisher’s transaction. Section 46 properly extends rules set for the content of copyright 
concerning writer’s works to musical works. Provisions of Section 6 (9) applicable to musical 
works provide mechanical performances with mechanical protection against their use.319 
Setting a writer’ work to music requires the permit of the author of the writer’s work. Act 
XVI of 1884 allowed use of already published writer’s works as words of musical works for 
joint printing without the consent of the author of the writer’s work.320 The 1921 act modified 
this provision because it cannot be harmonised with the spirit of the Berne Convention and 
because it is unfair to demand that, on the one hand, the poet should tolerate that his poem is 
set to music even in spite of his will, on the other hand, that the words should not receive the 
part from the financial result of the musical work it is lawfully entitled to.321 Actually, 
anybody has the right to set a writer’s work to music, but if he reproduces, markets the 
writer’s work set to music without the permit of the author of the writer’s work, then he 
commits infringement determined in Section 5. 
Section 2322 allows that the audience of a concert should follow the words of the performed 
musical piece by reading which advances understanding and enhances enjoyment of the 
performance. To protect librettists’ interests, the act allows production of these copies of the 
programme solely for the audience of the concert,323 the right of reproduction of the words 
belongs to the director of the relevant public musical performance. Section 48 properly 
extends the provisions set with regard to term of protection, legal consequences of 
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infringement, judicial proceedings, copyright expert committee, limitation and registration 
concerning writer’s works to musical works. 
In everyday circulation, the author’s mechanical rights mean the author’s exclusive right to 
sell the work by gramophone and other similar equipment but mechanical rights do not mean 
the right of recording on film and transmission by radio. To the marketed gramophone records 
they stick the “licence marks”, including author’s royalty, of the person who has the 
mechanical rights on the work, to prove that the gramophone record containing the protected 
work is in circulation with the permit of the subject of mechanical rights and that royalty has 
been discharged for the protected work. In terms of copyright, sale of gramophone records 
must be considered unlawful where the licence mark has been attached to such records but the 
stuck on licence mark has later fallen off; in this case it is necessary to obtain special licence 
(additional mark) of the person (body) who owns the rights to sell.324 
Public performance of musical works already made public—except for stage performance of 
musical works or complete performance of musical works meant for the stage—is facilitated 
worldwide by copyright laws and international agreements, which presume that the author’s 
consent has been given to the performance against payment of fee. 
This arrangement was enforced by Act III of 1969 too. There are words available for a part of 
musical works, which are covered by protection as independent writer’s works. The act solves 
this question by stating that in performing musical pieces music is primary and words have 
auxiliary additional role only; therefore, under copyright protection obligation to pay fee is 
adjusted to the protection of the musical work.325 
 
VI. 2. 4. Films and other audio-visual works  
 
Films are always made by using several author’s works and are the result of collective 
activity; at the same time, they are presented to the audience as a uniform creation. Act LIV of 
1921 reckons with this peculiar feature of films when, on the one hand, it recognises rights of 
authors who bring contributions to the making of the film, and, on the other hand, it authorises 
the film factory to exercise their economic rights against third parties as legal successors 
exclusively. By this solution the act does not take over the presumption known in some 
copyright acts that the author of the film is the producer of the film; yet, it properly ensures 
the rights of the film factory regarding the film.326 
The film factory acquires the right of distribution and public performance on the film made by 
using various author’s works, without restrictions. The act gives the author right of 
withdrawal if the film factory does not record the work on film or does not complete the film. 
Concerning withdrawal, the act restricts the author’s claim for fee to the case where the author 
has carried out creative work expressly for the purposes of the film. At the same time, the act 
contains competition rule for the benefit of the film that the author can enter into a new film 
contract on an identical topic within ten years from completion of the film only with the 
consent of the film factory.327 
In addition to film factories, other bodies deal with making films, it is therefore reasonable to 
put these bodies in a legal position identical with that of film factories if they enter into film 
contracts. 
In the case of the act in force today, characteristic features of creating and using film works 
and international norms alike make it necessary and possible to regulate these works at special 
level.  
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The act defines the term of the producer of the film, which has significance in regulating 
producers’ neighbouring rights, however, the person who extends credit to the film producer, 
sponsors production and places the order are not considered producers. Film producers 
contribute to creation of the film by organisation performance, in this regard they enter into 
film contracts and direct filmmaking contracts with authors on creating the work. As a matter 
of fact, film production requires other civil law contracts too, so especially principal and 
agent, contractor’s, credit and rental agreements; framework rules pertaining to them are 
contained in Section 64. Finalisation, final editing is a peculiar form of author’s moral rights, 
in accordance with Section 65 copyrights on the entirety of the film as a work with several 
authors can be exercised only after that.328 
Film contract is a peculiar type of use contracts. The act regulates devolution of rights of use 
in more details and in a more subtle form than Section 41 (3) of the formerly effective Act III 
of 1969, and allows stipulations to the contrary.  
 
VI. 2. 5. Technical, fine arts and applied art works 
 
Works of the fine arts are not pure imitations of specific figures of reality; instead, the artist 
communicates his own thoughts, ideas, emotions by these figures; so, in order to consider an 
object a work of the fine arts it is necessary that its creator should be controlled by an 
aesthetic goal, which becomes complete in the creator’s “activity to give shape”, i.e., that 
some object should be made of his thoughts.  
Act XVI of 1884 protects the author of the work, i.e., only the person who has created the 
work, who has the individual intellectual work, will have copyright on the work, however, 
assessment of this copyright can be excluded by the fact if the work is in conflict with law.329  
Several persons can contribute to creating a work of the fine arts, for example, when specific 
parts of a work are created by several persons, or various phases of creating a work are 
implemented by different creators. In such cases, as a matter of fact, each co-author will have 
copyright regarding his own activity. If the co-authors’ works are so closely interrelated that 
they cannot be externally distinguished, or, even if the parts created by specific authors can be 
externally distinguished but they constitute an integral whole only when put together, then we 
can speak about a single copyright, which can be asserted by each author, giving 
indemnification to the rest of the authors. If the authors’ works can be distinguished, they 
constitute independent parts of the work, there is separate copyright on each of the separable 
parts, which they can assert separately. In creating fine art works, contributions can be 
brought by persons who only assist others in carrying out the work, this kind of contribution 
does not generate co-authorship.330  
The creative process can involve a person who entrusts the artist with making the work. Such 
a person will contribute as the party placing the order, who is usually not entitled to original 
copyright but can enter into a contract with the creator under which the author transfers 
copyright to him without any or with certain restrictions. Publishers can be involved in 
relation to fine art works if the object of publication is engravings. The publisher will have 
copyright on the original work only in the event that it is the author or acquires this right 
through transfer. The editor or the publisher who compiles collected works from specific fine 
art works will have copyright similar to that of editors of collected literary works.331  
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Adaptation is basically different from copying/reprography because it means alteration of the 
alien work through artistic activity by which a new fine art work is created. The adapter will 
have original copyright on this new work.  
Section 61 of the act uses the term ”remaking” collectively for any act that prejudices 
copyright of fine art works. Usually this covers three cases. One of them is copying the work, 
i.e., the process where the perpetrator produces each part of remaking by free artist activity: 
either by repeating the procedure used in the original or using another artistic procedure, for 
example, drawing an oil painting. The other is mechanical remaking where external aids are 
used to produce copies, such as, for example, making a photo or impression. The third one is 
mechanical reproduction where first a copy of the picture suitable for duplication is made 
from the original by free artistic activity that later can be reproduced. It is unauthorised 
remaking of fine art works and not making them public that the act prohibits, because the 
right of making public and marketing belongs to the author, which the author does not lose 
and is not restricted by another person making it public.332  
Remaking can be committed by several persons jointly, who are to be punished as 
perpetrators or parties privy to the act, if they are bad faith. Imitation means borrowing the 
technique, form of representation of the artist’s specific works, and as this kind of imitation 
does not mean conveying the material content of a work, the act does not classify it as 
violation of copyright. The act protects the author from remaking, i.e., repeating his work with 
identical content but it does not forbid other persons to use it freely for producing their new 
intellectual product. The act does not prohibit making copies that are made by amateurs or 
students for their own use. Subject to meeting certain conditions, statutory prohibition does 
not apply to single or manual copying made without mechanical equipment for 
reproduction.333 
Section 62 does not consider remaking of works (statues) permanently erected in streets, 
public domain and other similar public places in another genre infringement of copyright.  
It was justified for the sake of literature to remove remaking from the scope of statutory 
prohibition where an artist makes a fine art work public as writer’s requisite in a writer’s work 
for the purpose of interpretation, demonstration, illustration. As a matter of fact, uniting with 
literary content does not mean that the artist has waived his author’s right. The act makes 
inclusion in a work without the author’s consent subject to meeting two conditions: (i) the text 
should appear as main object beside the copy of the picture so that the latter should function 
merely as explanation, (ii) remaking should apply only to specific works. 334  
Remaking of specific works can be included in non-scientific and certain literary works too, 
however, the act demands that remaking should be closely connected with the new creation, 
writer’s work.335  
In the creation of writer’s works, in addition to the author’s intellectual activity, only the 
printer’s work can appear, who does not acquire copyright, only if it is expressly transferred 
to him; however, in remaking fine art works usually other artistic work is involved, which is 
usually carried out by an artist with a different approach and requires a different kind of talent 
than for making the original work. Remaking fine art works is the exclusive right of the 
author of the work, who, however, can permit lawful remaking, or, once the work has become 
public domain, there is no need for the author’s consent. The creator of lawful remaking will 
acquire copyright on his new own work, which is justified by the fact that remaking of a 
work, if it is not done mechanically, will always contain an artistic element, or presumes 
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intellectual creative activity, which has the right to be protected against unauthorised 
remaking. 
Narrowing this scope, the act expressly prescribes that copyright protection shall be given 
solely to remaking that is carried out in a genre or kind of art different from the original. The 
other case is when the lawful remaker can be considered author regarding his work, if the 
exclusive right of the author of the original work terminates and thereby the work becomes 
public domain. This is different from the above to the extent that in that case the term of 
protection of the original work might expire sooner than that of the remade work, while in this 
case only the remaking can be protected from the first.336 
It follows from the law of property character of copyright that it can be divided, which is 
clearly shown by the fact that the authorised party either transfers the right restrictively or 
transfers the entire right but for the benefit of several persons. 
Copyright is attached to the author as a person, for this reason, if somebody acquires 
ownership of a fine art work, he will not get in possession of copyright; furthermore, adverse 
possession and foreclosure do not lie with regard to copyright. This justifies the provision of 
the act that by transferring ownership of a fine art work the right of remaking cannot be 
considered assigned. Sale of the original work can involve ordering of remaking or transfer of 
copyright only in the event that it becomes unambiguously clear from the conduct aimed at 
the above.337 
The person placing the order (principal) is usually a person who entrusts the artist with 
producing the work. The act itself does not establish original copyright for the principal but he 
can agree with the author on derivative copyright, i.e., the contract between them will give 
answer to the issue of the principal’s copyright. The act deviates from this rule with regard to 
portraits and likenesses of statues, because when ordering them the principal will undoubtedly 
have right of remaking and it is in his personal interest that his portrait should not be made 
public in spite of his will, provided that the principal desires that his own portrait should be 
made. In this case the creator cannot duplicate the ordered portrait in spite of the principal’s 
will either before or after delivering the work. Consequently, the owner will not be 
automatically entitled to the right of remaking, however, he can prevent others from carrying 
out remaking or he can make it difficult since the work is in his possession and he can exclude 
anybody from it. In spite of that the lawmaker did not think that he should restrict ownership 
right due to copyright protection, what is more, he states that the owner is not obliged to 
deliver the work to the author or his legal successor for remaking.338  
Applied art works, i.e., industrial products are produced by the same technical means as fine 
art works, however, industrial products serve external, physical use. Fine art works, by being 
made for industrial products, lose the protection provided by this act, and, having become a 
supplementary part of industrial products, fall within the scope of regulation regarding such 
products.339  
Section 60 of Act LIV of 1921340 provides for copyright protection of fine art works. The act 
covers all works of the fine arts with protection, irrespective of the form or shape of their 
physical appearance. It does not distinguish between works used merely for aesthetic purposes 
and works serving as objects of personal use, i.e., applied art works. In terms of protection it 
makes no difference if the creation is in its final form or in any of the phases of creation.341 
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In accordance with Section 67342 designs, drawings, figures mentioned in it, which can be 
considered fine art works, are judged identically as applied art works. Protection is provided 
merely for artistic elements of these works, so protection does not extend to inartistic, 
conventional works, although the same applies to architectural works. The term architectural 
works is not restricted purely to built structures, it can include architectural works not 
connected with land surface. In accordance with the act, reproduction, making public and 
marketing of fine art works within term of protection is the author’s exclusive right. The act 
considers remaking, subsequent construction reproduction. The act mentions commercial 
presentation by mechanical or optical equipment as a new title, it makes it the author’s 
exclusive right, which serves that fine art works already made public should not become 
objects of shows for business purposes by projector and similar equipment without the 
author’s consent. The act reserves the right of commercial presentation only for the author.343 
Violation of author’s rights provided in Section 60 is infringement. Section 62 makes 
exceptions to the general rule for the sake of free development of art and the public.  This 
section specifically stresses that copies shall not be made for the purposes of distribution, 
which can be deduced from the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, it is forbidden to 
exhibit the made copy in public and to use the mark, name or initials of the name of the author 
of the original work on the copies; in case of breach of the latter prohibition making of the 
copy will become unlawful and will be considered infringement. Furthermore, subsequent 
construction of architectural works is forbidden, even if they are free of charge. The act 
allows reproduction of works erected permanently in streets, public domain outdoors, but only 
in picture representations. The act does not remove the works erected temporarily from 
protection. 
The act discusses when it is possible to include a copy, remaking of a fine art work in a 
writer’s work, and for the sake of general education it allows inclusion of faithful duplication 
of already published works in restricted volume justified by the purpose, but only in larger 
independent scientific or educational works solely for use in schools, in collections edited 
from several authors’ works. Faithfulness of duplication cannot be affected by proportionate 
modification of the dimensions of the work or simplification indispensable owing to the used 
technical procedure. This does not include non-independent scientific works, which contain 
mostly materials taken over from others except when they can be considered works for 
disseminating scientific knowledge. Inclusion can be carried out only for interpretation of the 
text, so it makes no difference whether the illustrations are within or at the end of the text, but 
they cannot be in a separate appendix; in inclusion the source and the author must be 
indicated. To advance dissemination of knowledge in general education, in this section the act 
made presentation of faithful duplication of already published works through mechanical or 
optical equipment free, but solely for the purposes of illustration within lectures, addresses 
held for scientific, general education or school purposes. In accordance with Section 63, the 
ownership right on the work as a thing in the sense of private law must be clearly 
differentiated from author’s right on the work as intellectual product.344   Obliging the owner 
to surrender the work to the author for the purposes of reproduction in several original copies 
might prejudice his lawful interests. Anyway, the author or his legal successor, when 
transferring a fine art work, will always have the opportunity to stipulate that on request the 
owner should make it possible for him to duplicate, remake the work. Nor is there any rule of 
law that would oblige the owner to assign the work of art temporarily for exhibition, even if it 
is for the purposes of national culture; whereas nothing will prevent the owner from agreeing 
with the author that he should not make any new original copies of the work purchased by 
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him, and he can ensure compliance with such agreement. In accordance with Section 64, with 
respect to ordered portraits and likenesses of statues, in addition to the author’s consent, the 
principal’s approval will be required. Anybody who violates this provision of the act shall pay 
compensation and shall be punished by the penalty defined for infringement. The principal 
can prevent, with respect to the ordered work, reproduction, making public, marketing or 
commercial presentation, communication by radio he is not pleased with for any reason by 
refusing to give his consent to all the above to the copyright holder. The principal can exercise 
this right also when the portrait or likeness of statue is not covered by copyright protection or 
he has not paid for the portrait of likeness of statue. If the author duplicates, makes public the 
work without the principal’s permit, then he will be liable to the principal. The principal will 
be entitled to duplicate the work even without the author’s consent, but only for non-business 
purposes, and he will not be entitled to make public, market the copies produced by 
reproduction. If the principal is not identical with the person portrayed, the person portrayed 
will have the right arising from his personal rights to resolve if his portrait or likeness of 
statue is to be made public or not. Violation of the said right of the principal (person 
portrayed) will involve the same legal consequences with respect to penalty and compensation 
as violation of copyright, infringement; otherwise, however, the principal’s right is not judged 
identically as the author’s right, therefore, protection cannot be extended to the period after 
his death. The right will not devolve to the legal successor either unless he has already 
commenced statutory proceedings in his life, in this case relatives can take action in their own 
right after his death, but can demand discontinuation, moral damages by virtue of prejudice to 
personal rights only on the grounds of general private law.345 
Section 65346 stipulates proper application of the provisions regarding writer’s works, referred 
to in it, to fine art works. It is not allowed to annihilate built structures on the grounds of the 
provisions set forth in Section 20—even if they have been produced through infringement—
or to give them in the ownership of the subject of copyright for the price of their production 
and to deprive them from their damaging shape without material injury to their corpus. In 
determining the amount of compensation the injured party is entitled to, attention must be 
paid to the possible injury that shows itself in survival of the infringed shape of the built 
structure.  
 Act III of 1969 acknowledges copyright of the designer of architectural and other technical 
facilities having carried out creative work and ensures that he could claim indication of his 
name on the building itself and on the facility.347 Furthermore, the act had to make sure that 
the author’s rights of the creator of architectural and technical facilities with regard to 
presentation of the work could not be prevented by the user of the facility without good cause. 
Rules are in line with present practice, however, express acknowledgement of creative 
designer work in rule of law is a new element. 
Also, the act acknowledges artistic photos as creations, it provides copyright protection for 
them in rules identical with those applicable to fine arts and applied art works; regarding 
photos not attaining artistic level provisions of Section 51 govern. 
Identically with statutory provisions, the act enforces the standpoint, among general rules of 
use contracts, that giving fine art and applied art works into the ownership of another person 
does not simultaneously mean alienation of the right. It follows from this proposition that 
within the limits of the owner’s equitable interests it is necessary to ensure exercise of the 
author’s rights, and it is necessary to stipulate that the author’s consent must be obtained for 
exhibiting the work. As a matter of fact, public collections should be exempted from consent 
necessary for exhibition, they can freely exercise right of exhibition in their operation for 
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intended use on works safeguarded by them, and such exception is justified with respect to 
works in social ownership.348 
A new provision of the act covers copyright protection of industrial designs, which form of 
use has been developed by aesthetic requirements industrial products are expected to meet. 
With respect to portraits made on order, to protect the rights of the portrayed person, author’s 
rights must be restricted so that their exercise should require the consent of the portrayed 
person; this means, for example, that the consent of the portrayed person must be obtained for 
duplication of the portrait.349 
In the currently effective act it continues to be the author’s exclusive right to permit exhibition 
of fine art and other similar works.350 Only with respect to exhibition of works safeguarded in 
public collections is it justified to allow exceptions to this rule.351 The currently effective act 
regulates the institution of the ”right to follow”, the so-called droit de suite (i.e., subsequent 
right; right to an interest in resales subsequent to the first transfer), without considerably 
changing the provisions set forth in Section 46/A of Act III of 1969.352 It is a typical form of 
use of fine art and applied art works to transfer ownership of the original work. Thereby the 
author’s right on the creation and the ownership in the thing on the original copy of the work 
gets in conflict, which is solved by copyright regulation as follows: although it does not 
require the author’s consent to transfer, it acknowledges his claim for author’s fee. It is part of 
the explanation for justification of this claim for fee that the value of certain works of art can 
rise in circulation to the multiple of the original purchase price, generating significant profit 
for the intermediary business, the art-dealer; obviously, the creative artist author and his legal 
successor can deservedly lay claim within the tem of protection to sharing such increase in 
value of the work.353 The act makes it clear that the first effective date of the subsequent right 
(right to follow) will be solely after the first transfer by the author; it sustains obligatory 
collective rights management in this scope; it subjects interior design works to the scope of 
regulation of industrial designs. 
 
VI. 2. 6. Protection of photographs, figures and visual aids 
 
The drawings and figures covered by protection under Act XVI of 1884 can be divided into 
various groups: 
− aesthetic representations, 
− instructive representations, 
− industrial representations, drawings serving satisfaction of man’s other physical needs, 
in addition to the above.354 
First, the act discusses protection of drawings and figures serving scientific purposes, helping 
education, which are not fine art works owing to their character. It does not follow from this 
definition that only drawings and figures with real scientific value will be covered by 
protection; however, in this case it is also indispensable that the figure or drawing should be 
suitable for publication as a result of intellectual activity. Secondly, this section provides for 
the protection of drawings that can be considered fine art works owing to their function. 
Paying regard to the provisions set out in Section 9 (1), the act allows inclusion of alien 
figures and drawings in scientific or other kind of works that have been created from several 
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authors’ drawings for school and education purposes. It does not qualify as infringement of 
rights when drawings and figures serve the interpretation of the text only and the author or the 
source have been indicated. In accordance with the act, photographs are not fine art works in 
the traditional sense since the photo itself is not the author’s intellectual activity; therefore, it 
cannot be ranked among copyrighted objects of the fine arts. The lawmaker, recognising and 
accepting that good regulation calls for sense, taste, application of scientific and technical 
information and that impunity of the remaker would make the activity of just the best 
photographers doubtful, included photographs in the scope of legal objects to be protected.355 
The object of protection is all works produced by photography in the event that the object 
presented in the picture is not the object of copyright. If the object to be presented in the 
picture constitutes the object of protection, the photograph will not be covered by special 
protection, since in this case the photographer will be protected by being the author’s legal 
successor. This protection, as a matter of fact, will hold only when the photographer has 
acquired the copyright from the author of the original work.  
Legal protection is due primarily to the maker of the original photograph; this right can be 
transferred by contract or measures taken in case of death; if there are no such measures, the 
author’s right will devolve to the inheritor of the maker of the original photograph. Protection 
of photographic works are conditional upon the name or company and address of the author or 
publisher of the original photograph, the date of making the photo being indicated on the 
authorised proof sheets of the photograph or each copy of its remaking. Photographs cannot 
be registered. Term of protection for photographs is five years; the deadline begins from the 
calendar year when the first authorised copy or remaking of the photograph has been 
published.  
If the photograph has been made public in a literary work, longer term of protection will not 
be due to the author of the photograph; specific proof sheets or remakings can be duplicated 
after five years. Regarding works published in several volumes, again the rule of Section 16 
applies that states that term of protection for works published in several volumes begins from 
the first publication of the given volume. The act protects photographic works against 
mechanical remaking irrespective of the character of the procedure, however, it does not 
protect them against non-mechanical remaking.  
For fine art works the act allows free adaptation, which is implemented with regard to photos 
too. Furthermore, the act permits use of photographs on industrial products or in other genres 
or kind of art.  
Act LIV of 1921 interprets photographic works as works made through photography where 
picture representation produced in a chemical process is mediated by light effect. For 
photographic works, the author’s intellectual work deserving protection lies in the selection of 
objects and persons represented and producing the result, for this does not amount to art yet. 
A photographic work is not a peculiar individual expression, elaboration of what the author 
observes or has experienced in the outside world; it is merely fixation of a detail or event of 
the outside world in picture representation through a technical operation. The photographic 
work under protection is the original photograph (snapshot) itself and not a photographic 
reproduction of other kinds of works. The author of the original photograph has exclusive 
right of reproduction, making public and marketing of the photographic work, their 
commercial presentation by mechanical or optical equipment,356 the latter have practical 
significance specifically for photographic works. As making a photographic work is not art, 
although needs some sense of art and scientific preparedness, for this reason, legislations 
usually set shorter term of protection for photographic works than for other works. For works 
of photography the term of protection extends to fifteen years from the calendar year when the 
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work was first published, and if it was not published during the author’s life, the fifteen years 
is to be calculated from the end of the year when the author died. 
Anybody who violates the exclusive right of the author of photographic works determined in 
Section 68 commits infringement.  
 The act separately regulates film copyrights.357 Motion picture works are products that 
represent actions, events, views before us in the form of motion picture shows. A film script, 
although it can be a writer’s work, cannot be considered a motion picture work as long as and 
until it takes shape in a film. The photographed copy of a motion picture work is the proof 
sheet of the film. In sound films, the sounds accompanying the pictures are made perceptible 
to us by the sound track on the reel or other technical equipment through running the roll of 
film. In accordance with the act, motion picture works are covered by protection identical 
with the protection provided for writer’s works, fine art works or photographic works if their 
author has given the work an individual character in devising the plot, in the form of 
rendering or direction or in grouping the events shown and other representations or otherwise. 
Motion picture works are often created by using, adapting some already existing writer’s 
work; in this case in accordance with Section 6 (10) adaptation requires the consent of the 
author of the original work used except when the motion picture work is so different from the 
work used that compared to it a new original work is created. Motion picture works should be 
distinguished from transmitting some existing musical work over to a roll of film, which is 
regarded identically as reproduction; consequently, recording the stage performance of a play 
(opera) on film is nothing else than public performance of a play.  
In a motion picture work reproduced music which can be separated from the motion picture 
work is regarded specially; in this relation music must be considered as music in musical 
works compared to the words. Sound films are created by uniting pictures and sounds relating 
to the actions and events that constitute the object of the work, to which special author’s rights 
regarding motion picture works must be applied. The legal consequence of the above is that 
while public performing rights of motion picture works are to be acquired from the film 
producer or film rental company, the public performing rights of the accompanying music 
requires the consent of the composer of the music or the person who has public performing 
rights of the musical work due to author’s right. 
To the question who should be considered the author of the motion picture work created 
through the work of various persons, Act LIV of 1921 gives no answer358, the only thing it 
contains is that motion picture works, provided that they have been given individual and 
original character by their author, will be as such covered by protection.  
The fact that the subjects of author’s rights are those who have created the motion picture 
work by their activity is significant to the extent that in spite of the devolution of their 
author’s rights they continue to be entitled to moral rights; so, only rights of sale will devolve 
unrestrictedly and exclusively to the entrepreneur. On the other hand, the authors of writer’s 
and musical works used for making the motion picture work do not belong to the scope of the 
above mentioned persons; accordingly, their author’s rights related to their works can devolve 
to the entrepreneur solely through transfer and within the frameworks of transfer. Usually, 
also for motion picture works, the rights due to the author of a work possibly used for them 
will remain untouched. 
In accordance with Section 6 of Act LIV of 1921, the author can always take action against 
anybody whose work has been made by using, adapting his work without his permit without a 
new original work having been created, furthermore, can take action when such unauthorised 
use, adaptation has been carried out indirectly, on the basis of another work directly remaking 
the original work. In accordance with the act, the exclusive public performing rights of the 
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motion picture work is due to the author of the work. Public performance of motion picture 
works lies in playing the roll of film in public, as a result of which the actions, events 
constituting the content of the work are expressed to the audience in the connected series of 
ceaselessly changing pictures on the projection screen—accompanied by sounds in sound 
films.  
In accordance with Section 75359 the term of protection of public performance of motion 
picture works, if the work is regarded identically as writer’s works or fine art works, lasts for 
fifty years, while for motion picture works that are covered only by protection due to 
photographic works the term of protection is fifteen years. As the law left the question who 
should be considered the author of the motion picture work unanswered, it must be declared 
by explanation to the act from when the protection of motion picture works should be 
calculated where the names of the persons who have brought contributions to the making of 
the work are more or less known. As several persons have brought contributions, it would 
lead to obvious difficulties if it were necessary to pay regard to each specific author who has 
brought contributions to the making of the work with respect to the protection of the 
completed motion picture work.360  
Act III of 1969 covers photographs, figures and visual aids with protection as activities related 
to author’s creative work, but, as a matter of fact, their protection is not identical with the 
protection of writer’s works; instead, it is confined to separately provided rights. Assessment 
of the rights is conditional upon the name of the maker and the year of making public being 
indicated on the demonstrative figure or visual aid, and the term of protection is restricted to 
fifteen years by the act. As a matter of fact, the cases of the so-called free use and use without 
the author’s consent prevail within the scope of activities related to author’s creative work 
too.361 
 
 
VI. 3. Rights related to copyright 
 
VI. 3. 1. Protection of copyright related rights 
 
Sections 73–75 of Act LXXVI of 1999 grants exclusive rights to performers to reproduce and 
distribute their performance, which is addition compared to formerly effective law. The scope 
of exclusive rights extend to the peculiar case of communication to the public when the 
performance is made accessible to the public in such form that members of the public can 
choose the place and time of access individually. These rights apply not only to exclusively 
audible performances but also to audio-visual performer’s performances. Regarding the latter, 
however, the permissive rule of the act sets out from the fact that, with certain exceptions, the 
producer of the film acquires economic rights if the performer consents to fixation of his 
performance in a motion picture work; however, the act is more flexible than the formerly 
effective law since it allows contrary stipulation.362 
Producers of phonograms have already been entitled to the right of reproduction and 
distribution, although the formerly effective regulation used different terminology. Here, just 
as regarding performer’s rights, regulation of on demand communication to the public, 
acknowledgement of exclusive right of producers of phonograms with regard to this form of 
use is a new element. The relevant international treaty (WIPO) has extended claim for fee, 
also regulated in Section 50/C of Act III of 1969, to indirect public performances. Directive 
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92/100/EEC regulates rights of producers of films as copyright related rights. Definition of 
the producer of a motion picture work is set out in Section 64 (3), this definition governs in 
application of related rights provisions too. The act acknowledges the economic rights due to 
film producers only to the extent necessary for complying with the Directive. 
 
6. 3. 1. 1. Protection of performers 
 
Act XVI of 1884 grants public performing rights of theatre plays, musical works and musical 
plays to the author. Theatre plays and musical plays are different from writer’s works that 
exclusive public performing rights are added to the rights due to the author (reproduction, 
making pubic and marketing). The right of mechanical reproduction and public performing 
rights are different from each other, are separable from each other and can be transferred 
separately; for this reason, when the author delivers the work to the publisher for mechanical 
reproduction, the publisher will not acquire exclusive public performing rights and vice versa.  
Section 50 regulates details of public performability of theatre plays and musical plays.  
Section 51, contrary to the former, allows public performance regarding musical works. The 
lawmaker saw the reason for this rule in the fact that usually the aim of printing musical 
works is to make it possible to play them, and in this case it is not authoritative whether the 
work is transmitted to a smaller or larger number of listeners. It is necessary that the author 
should declare expressly the performing right of the work on the title page or at the beginning 
of the work on each published copy, for reservation applies only to the edition on which it is 
indicated because in this case all editions must be considered original edition; there is no need 
to have this right entered in the register.363 
The authorised translator of the work is regarded, with respect to public performance of his 
translation, identically as the author. The translator of a play can prohibit performance only of 
the translation made by him, but he cannot forbid everybody else to translate and perform the 
play; however, the author of the play can prohibit performance of the translation if he has 
reserved the right of translation in accordance with Section 7, has fully completed translation 
in six months and has notified it for being registered. Translation of a work will be unlawful if 
it is made public under reservation of translation rights, within the five years of term of 
protection. Adaptation will be unlawful when an adaptation that cannot be considered a new, 
individual composition is published without the consent of the composer of the musical work. 
Public performance of both of them implements infringement of copyright; if, however, the 
musical work has already been published in duplicated form and has been offered for sale and 
the author has not reserved performing rights on the title page or at the beginning of the work, 
then the author cannot prohibit either the performance of the musical piece or performance of 
abridgements made of it. 
Term of protection that the act provides for public performances against infringement of 
copyright is as follows. During the author’s whole life and for fifty years from his death 
protection will be given to the theatre plays and musical plays that: 
− have not been published either in reproduced form or public performance yet, 
− have not been published in reproduced form yet, but have already been performed in 
public under the author’s real name or acknowledged literary name, 
− have been published in reproduced form under the author’s real name or 
acknowledged literary name, 
− have been published under pseudonym or without any name, but their author or his 
legal successor have during the fifty years deadline notified the author’s real name for being 
registered, 
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− have been published under pseudonym or without any name, but have been made 
public during the fifty years deadline.  
Protection of translation of theatre plays and musical plays that have been published 
simultaneously in several languages extends to five years from publication of the original 
work. Protection of translations of theatre plays and musical plays for which the author has 
reserved translation rights extends to five years from first publication of the authorised 
translation.364 
The calendar year of the first publication of the work or the translation or the year when the 
author died need not to be calculated as included in the above terms of protection. For theatre 
plays and musical plays that have not been made public at the time of their first public 
performance, term of protection must be calculated from the day of first performance.365 
Section 56 sets up a presumption regarding the author of works not published yet but already 
performed in public. The author is entitled to submit a claim in case of unauthorised 
performance of theatre plays, musical works and musical plays not published yet but already 
performed in public. Regarding theatre plays, musical works and musical plays published 
under pseudonym or without any name, copyright will belong to the publisher, or, if no 
publisher is named, to the consignee. Consequently, these measures imply the presumption 
that regarding theatre plays, musical works and musical plays that have not been published yet 
but have been performed in public already, the person who is named as author in the notice 
advertising the performance can be considered the author.  
Penalties of infringement to theatre plays, musical works and musical plays are set out in 
Section 57.  
To impose the prescribed penalty on the unauthorised performance, the act, on the one hand, 
demands that the performance is held wilfully or negligently. The penalties determined are the 
same as those for infringement of writer’s works, with the difference that confiscation cannot 
be considered as an option in this case. 
Fine and compensation will be imposed primarily on the person who performs the work in 
public, also the person who proposes or urges to hold public performance, i.e., who assists as 
instigator. Other parties privy to the act can be involved in infringement, who are to be 
punished in unauthorised performances just as in infringement of copyright.366 Attempt at 
public performance cannot be punished.  
Section 58 sets the rule of compensation for damage. Unauthorised performance of theatre 
plays or musical plays can contain only lost profit (lucrum cessans) as loss, which is based on 
the presumption that the author or his legal successor would have held the same performance 
at the same place and same time as the unauthorised performer. If, however, it is proved 
during the lawsuit that the author did not want to hold the same performance, and he could not 
have intended to do so either, or, even if he had held one, he would not have drawn any profit 
or loss from it, then, based on general rules, he could not claim lost profit. To ensure that by 
referring to the above the author’s loss and indemnification should nevertheless not become 
impossible in each occasion, the act declares that the person who holds unauthorised 
performance must every time pay compensation for damage, specifically the sum total of the 
income received, without deducting any costs incurred. However, during the lawsuit it might 
be revealed that no income has arisen from the performance, or the injured party cannot prove 
this, then the amount of compensation will be determined by the court. The same is true when 
the perpetrator is not responsible either for malice or negligence; he must pay compensation 
up to the extent of enrichment.367  
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Applications involved in artistic activity serving mechanical performances are covered by 
protection equally to the original work, and in accordance with the act this must be properly 
applied to musical works too.368 This provision of Act LIV of 1921 applies to the cases where 
a writer’s or musical work is performed by an actor, singer or musician, and their artistic 
activity is transmitted by gramophone, film or other equipment serving the purposes of 
mechanical performance, or when the artistic performance is entitled to protection owing to 
its individual, special artistic character. What performers provide for the public on records, 
films, by radio is, yet, the result of their original activity; their such performance must be 
given a share of the gains arising from use of distribution equipment all the more because as a 
result of using such equipment they lose a part of their audience. Section 8 provides 
protection for artistic performance serving the purposes of mechanical performance, and 
refers to the sections that make transmission of the work to equipment serving the purposes of 
mechanical performance subject to obtaining the author’s consent. Performer’s artistic 
performance serving the purposes of mechanical performance is covered by protection equal 
to that of the original work.369 
In accordance with the act, gramophone records, films, communication by radio made 
lawfully of the performer’s performance and marketed can be used without the performer’s 
consent. The permit of the composer of musical works is required for public performance or 
communication to the public by radio of gramophone records made of their protected work. 
If, in addition to the author’s permit, obtaining the performer’s consent were demanded to this 
end, this would restrict authors in sale of their works.370 Furthermore, it should be taken into 
account that performers, in recording their performance on gramophone record, are paid 
remuneration in return for their consent to recording, and there are no causes deserving 
appreciation that would make it justified that they should be given share of any further use of 
the records made with their permit.  
Performer’s performance is protected equally as original works, but this is far from implying 
that the scope of performer’s protection is equal to the author’s protection in every respect, 
regarding its extent, this is to express only that within the restrictions that his artistic 
performance is protected in accordance with proper interpretation of the act the performer is 
also entitled to more increased protection than private law protection. 
Anybody who unlawfully reproduces, makes public, markets or communicates by radio 
records, films made of performer’s performance commits infringement. In case of sale, 
distribution of records in unauthorised circulation, the performer can take action.371 
Unauthorised omission or unauthorised indication of the performer’s name in records, films, 
communication by radio covered by protection will also involve legal consequences, and 
publication of unauthorised alterations of performer’s performance on records or films is to be 
considered infringement. Protection provided for the benefit of artistic performance is due to 
the performer, and, in case of choirs and music ensembles, to the leader of the choir.372 
Recording a theatre performance of a play or opera on gramophone or film requires consent of 
the theatre company, however, duplication, marketing of gramophone or film recordings does 
not because it is the performer’s legal right to give permission for it. Performers can transfer 
their right to reproduction, making public, marketing of their artistic performance, its 
transmission to gramophone or film to anybody. In accordance with the act, with respect to 
their artistic performance performers are entitled to protection solely without prejudice to the 
rights due to the author of the original work, which means that performers can give 
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permission, solely with the consent of the author of the work under protection, for 
reproduction, making public, marketing, communication to the public by radio of the 
gramophone or film recording made of their artistic performance.373 Failing which, 
performers will be liable to the author for infringement, but they will be protected against 
unauthorised user third parties. As in accordance with the act it is the artistic activity itself 
that is the object of individual protection, for this reason, protection will be due to the 
performer even if the work performed is not covered by copyright protection.  
The consent of the theatre is considered to include the consent of the artists used in the 
performance as theatres usually settle this issue with their members. 
It is an essential provision of Act III of 1969 to include performer’s performance in the scope 
of legal protection. Protection demands performers’ consent for recording or transmitting 
artistic performance, extends the rule of remuneration to them and grants them the right to 
indicate name and protection against distortion.  
 
 
6. 3. 1. 2. The radio 
 
Act LIV of 1921 regulates transmission of works to equipment that reproduces the same 
transmission mechanically or electronically only once,374 which, however, makes it possible 
to perceive the work simultaneously at several places in sound or picture for everybody who 
has a proper receiver, and thereby through the operation of the receiver now apparently 
mechanical performance is carried out.375 In accordance with the act, the right of 
communication by radio, which is enjoyed by authors of foreign works in our country, is due 
to authors of inland works too. The interpretation of the act contains, on the one hand, the 
protection that the Rome Convention provides for the author, and, on the other hand, what the 
Rome Convention deems necessary to specifically underline.  
Although works outside the scope of these works can be performed in public without special 
author’s licence, even these works shall not be communicated to the public by radio without 
the author’s permit. 
It is allowed to transmit the work from radio receiving station by wire through secondary 
stations placed near the receiving station, on which subscription fee is paid just as by direct 
users of radio receivers. Owing to payment of the subscription fee, connecting/turning on such 
stations does not injure the author’s interests; it is not regarded identically as public 
communication by loudspeaker. Only by radio broadcasting to unlimited number of audience 
is it forbidden to transmit public performance of works whose public performance is not 
reserved for the author.376 
Changes can be subjected to the scope of this statutory provision only in the event that at the 
same time it is a case of direct appropriation, alteration, reworking of the work referred to in 
the act because otherwise minor changes made to the work subsequently fall within the scope 
of other aspects. And if a new original work is created through using a work, or use of certain 
elements of the work has been carried out that is basically different from the work used, then 
reproduction and sale of the new work will no longer require the consent of the author of the 
original work, and in this case sale of the new work cannot be considered infringement. The 
question whether a new original work basically different from the work used has been created, 
which may lay claim to copyright independent of the author of the work used, will be decided 
by the judge paying regard to the circumstances of the case by hearing an expert. The author 
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can always take action against anybody whose work has been created by using, adapting the 
author’s work without his permit without a new original work having been created, and can 
take action when the unauthorised use, adaptation has been carried out indirectly on the basis 
of another work directly unlawfully remaking the original work.377 In this case, if the user, 
adapter did not know about the fact that the used, adapted work was an unauthorised 
remaking (plagiarism) of another work (lack of malice), but with due care they could have 
known about it, then the author of the original work can hold them responsible for 
infringement caused by negligence. If the user, adapter has been innocent, they will have 
liability determined for infringement.378 
 
6. 3. 1. 3. Protection of authors of databases 
 
The act complies with provisions of international treaties as a joint result of general and 
special rules; it does not qualify software as literary work, however, regarding them, together 
with the special provisions set out in Chapter VI, the general rules applicable also to collected 
works govern.379 
Chapter III and Chapter VI of the act regulates software related economic rights and 
restrictions of such rights; making the so-called decompilation possible (Sections 59–60) is 
especially important. 
Concerning databases, the act uses the codification technique applied for software: it 
determines solely deviations from and peculiarities compared to the general rules. In this field 
again, provisions of several international treaties set the direction of codification.  
Sections 60/A–62 of the act provides only for copyright protection of databases, although the 
directive has introduced special—not copyright—protection of non-original databases. 
 
 
VI. 4. Consequences of violation of copyright 
 
Hungarian Criminal Code provides sanctions for the most serious cases of violation of 
copyright by determining the state of facts of infringement (usurpation). In practice it is rarely 
applied; usually civil law means must be used against occurring violations of rights; therefore, 
it is an important task of the act to develop methods in the field of civil law consequences that 
are suitable for repressing unlawful conduct and efficient redress of injuries. The principle of 
separating moral rights from economic rights followed by the act prevails also in 
determination of legal consequences; for this reason, it contains special legal consequences in 
case of infringement of moral rights. The act sanctions infringement of economic rights 
usually by compensation for damage. 
Compensation for damage is mostly equal to the fee due to the author in the case of lawful 
use. This consequence itself does not represent a repressive factor: the unauthorised user’s 
risk is no more than he pays back the amount that he would have been obliged to pay anyway 
in case of conclusion of contract according to rules. For this reason, in each case when 
unauthorised use can be imputed to the user the act prescribes that the court proceedings in 
the case must impose the amount also as a fine to the debit of the user; which fine can be 
mitigated by the court solely under circumstances that deserve appreciation. This fine that can 
be imposed in civil proceedings is a peculiar institution, its introduction rests basically on the 
deliberation that in terms of legal policy it would be improper if the court awarded fine-type 
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extra service to be discharged by one of the parties for the benefit of the other party. 
Accordingly, the implementing decree of the act will specify the public benefit goal on which 
the fine so received must be spent. Consequences of infringement of copyright must be as 
appropriate applied to cases of infringement of the so-called neighbouring rights too. 
The system of legal consequences corresponds with rules in force in the rest of the fields of 
intellectual property. 
The legal institution of fine that can be imposed in case of infringement of rights imputable to 
the user, however, must be terminated. The institution of copyright fine comes from the 
period of planned economy; originally it was due to the legal predecessor of the Ministry 
National Cultural Heritage and the Central Statistical Office. In the present system of civil law 
consequences, when in case of infringement of copyright, deprivation of the offender’s 
enrichment can be requested from the court in addition to compensation for damage, and it is 
possible to enforce criminal law consequences, in terms of retaliation of infringement of 
rights it does not seem to be reasonable to maintain the institution of the fine. It is an outdated 
institution; it can be disputed in principle too, since it punishes infringement of private titles 
by obligation to make payments for the benefit of the State. 
The contracts concluded in December 1996 under WIPO stipulate that proper legal protection 
and efficient legal means must be provided against circumvention of technological measures 
that copyright owners apply in exercising their rights in order to prevent activities not 
permitted by them or rules of law. 
  
 
VI. 4. 1. Infringement of copyright 
 
In accordance with Act XVI of 1884, infringement of copyright is implemented through 
exercise of the author’s exclusive rights by an unauthorised person; acts implementing 
infringement can be various. 
Infringer is the person who makes an alien intellectual work public as his own; thereby he 
deceives the buyer of the reprinted work, who for that matter does not incur any loss, and not 
the author. The sate of facts of the offence of infringement of copyright requires that the 
original work (which is to be reprinted) should belong to the scope of writer’s works, the 
author’s work should be reproduced, reproduction should be carried out mechanically, and 
mechanical reproduction should be performed without the copyright owner’s consent. Having 
studied the act profoundly, it can be declared that mechanical reproduction is reproduction 
where several copies of the writer’s work are produced by external appliances or aids 
simultaneously, at the same time, or where procedures apply technological means that enable 
production of a large number of copies in such form that the entire work or a part of it is 
produced at the same time. 
It is indifferent whether the author intends to make his work public or not since works not 
meant to be made public ever by their authors are also covered by protection. Also, it is 
irrelevant whether the reproducer benefits from the activity or not because anybody who 
markets an alien author’s work for charitable purposes or free of charge, without the author’s 
consent, also commits infringement of copyright.380 
Infringement of copyright means unauthorised reproduction of alien author’s works. 
Unauthorised reproduction can be carried out in whole or part or connected with the 
reproducer’s intellectual activity. The implementation of the state of facts of infringement of 
copyright does not necessarily require that the work should be reproduced word for word; an 
expert should decide if the partly supplemented work is considered reprint. Partial 
reproduction is equal to full reproduction. This case, however, calls for circumspection since 
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the act allows to quote smaller parts of a work already made public word for word, or to adopt 
already published papers in reasonable volume and form into works deemed larger 
independent scientific works, for ecclesiastical, school and educational purposes, with the 
source specified. It will qualify infringement of copyright solely when a fragment of an alien 
author’s work is published without the reprinter’s own contribution as an independent writer’s 
work. The same applies to publication of the abridgement of a work in a foreign language. 
Quoting in critical activity does not qualify as infringement of copyright either, except when 
intention to publish the work is behind the critical study, review.381 
It is a necessary condition of the occurrence of infringement of copyright that reproduction 
should be carried out without the copyright owner’s permit. The person charged with 
unauthorised reproduction is obliged to prove, if he alleges it, that the reprint has been made 
with the copyright owner’s consent. Consent can be manifested without any required 
formalities; therefore, it can be given either orally or in writing. Foreign writers’ works will 
be protected solely to the extent that protection is provided for foreigners by the cited act or 
international agreements. Publication of a work in Hungarian within the territory of the 
country in another language is a different issue. The answer is again negative; yet, this is no 
longer the case of unauthorised mechanical publication of the work but translation of the 
original work without the author’s consent.382 
Mechanical reproduction is to be interpreted as a procedure that makes it possible to 
reproduce whole works or their specific sheets by using external means. Writing down is the 
opposite of mechanical reproduction; in this case the original process of producing the work is 
repeated. Letters and punctuation marks are shaped one by one, individually; yet, the act 
considers writing down mechanical reproduction when its function is to substitute mechanical 
reproduction. 
Section 6 of the act enumerates the cases that implement the offence of infringement of 
copyright in accordance with the general concept of infringement of copyright. The act 
specifies the manuscript not published in printing as the object of protection. Protection is 
provided solely for the author of the manuscript, irrespective whether the manuscript or a 
copy of it made in any form is lawfully in possession of another person.383 
Oral presentations are usually held either freely or on the basis of a manuscript by reading—in 
the latter case there is a (written) writer’s work and reading it corresponds to copying or 
duplicating it; so, it is clearly covered by protection. Free presentations, however, are not 
writer’s works because they are held not for the purposes of putting them into literary 
circulation; in spite of that, the act provides protection for them in certain cases. As a matter 
of fact, these presentations must also meet the requirement that they should be suitable for 
being the object of literary circulation. Protection is not influenced by the fact whether the 
person holding the presentation has intended to reproduce it or sell it as literature.  
In accordance with the provision regulating publisher’s transactions384 the author commits 
infringement of copyright against the publisher when he publishes the work assigned by him 
to the publisher again at another publisher or in his own edition. It is regarded identically as 
the above when the author has his work published in the edition of his complete works, 
without having applied for the publisher’s consent or otherwise being entitled to do so. The 
publisher commits infringement of copyright when it issues the work in more copies than it is 
entitled to, or when it carries out a new edition in spite of the contract or the law, or when it 
separately publishes papers assigned to literary or scientific periodicals or includes them in a 
collected work.  
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Section 7 expounds cases of infringement of copyright that arise from translation of the 
original work without the author’s consent. Translation of a writer’s work into another 
language should be considered infringement of copyright in accordance with general 
principles, since the translator communicates the thought and original form of the work, and 
changes the language only. However, practice has narrowed the scope of protection: it covers 
only the language in which the author has made his work public. As legislation allowed 
reprinting foreign works, it had to permit their translation into Hungarian too, to enable 
transplantation of significant alien literary works into Hungarian literature through translation. 
When a work published in several languages at the same time is published in translation into 
one of these languages, this is considered infringement. The reason for this prohibition can be 
that if, for example, a work is published both in Hungarian and German, and then somebody 
translates the German copy into Hungarian, then in content it is equal to reproduction of the 
original work issued in Hungarian. In this case it is irrelevant whether editions in different 
languages are from a single author or not. The term of protection in this case is five years; the 
reason for this short period is that translators would be injured if a foreign author, expecting 
his work to sell well in Hungary, had it published in Hungarian, in addition to the edition 
written in the original language, thereby providing himself with longer term of protection. It 
should be noted that this five years’ protection applies to right of translation only because it is 
protected against reproduction just as any other original work.  
Except for the cases expounded in the above paragraph, the act does not qualify translation of 
a work as infringement of copyright; yet, it gives the option to authors to ensure that others 
should not translate their works instead of them. They can do that by clearly reserving 
translation rights on the title page or at the beginning of the original work, and by ensuring 
that the translation comes out indeed within the time frame set out in the act, or by notifying 
the translation for registration. The act stipulates that the author who reserves translations 
rights shall make a part of the translation public within one year, or else the right will be lost, 
and the complete translation shall be made within three years. Registration, that is, 
notification to a public authority is required to enable the person who intends to translate the 
work to make sure that the author has indeed asserted right of reservation. Also, the act deems 
translation of manuscripts not published yet or presentations, recitations, readings held for 
education, entertainment purposes infringement of copyright.385 
Section 8 states that translated writer’s works—irrespective whether the translator has had 
translation right, or if translation rights reserved for the author of the original work have been 
injured by such translation—are provided with protection equally as original works. Section 9 
of the act regulates the exceptional cases when author’s rights are restricted. 
General literary circulation demands that articles of newspapers and periodicals should be 
used freely since very rarely does the original newspaper or periodical suffer any pecuniary 
loss thereby.  
Section 10 declares that statutes and decrees must be taken out of the scope of public files; 
their publication is regulated in a separate act, which stipulates that it is the State’s exclusive 
right to publish and sell translations of statutes and decrees, which can be arranged for solely 
by the Government. The Minister of the Interior defines the forms of publishing and sale, 
makes arrangements to ensure that such editions should be easily obtainable throughout the 
territory of the country, determines the price of specific copies, and can apply administrative 
measures to seize editions published or sold unlawfully.  
Officials of lawmaking must transfer the works written by them to the State, who, in 
accordance with this act too, is exclusively entitled to reproduce them, which right 
unambiguously belongs to author’s rights and as such is provided with protection. 
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Finally, the act on copyright provides protection for works published by legal persons. It 
follows from the above that the State has copyright over statutes and decrees published in its 
own name as writer’s works, however, this right is not original but derivative, more 
specifically copyright derived from civil servants as natural persons.  
Section 58 properly extends the provisions pertaining to legal consequences of infringement 
to public performing rights; this section does not refer to Section 22, which in its entirety is 
not suitable for being extended to public performance. It is certain, however, that commercial 
use mentioned there can be carried out through public performance.386 Section 59 properly 
extends rules set out under writer’s works with regard to judicial proceedings, copyright 
expert committee, limitation and registration, on condition that they are suitable for it, to 
public performing rights. 
Section 61 uses the term ”remaking” in summary for any act that infringes copyright of fine 
art works to be able to contain various conducts of the widest scope. Remaking is different 
from reprint to the extent that committing this act does not require solely mechanical 
reproduction but any imitation by which, actually, the original work is produced. Regarding 
fine art works, it is unauthorised remaking and not making public that the act prohibits, for the 
right of making public and marketing belongs to the author, which is not lost and not 
restricted by the work being made public by somebody else instead of him. Remaking can be 
committed by several persons jointly, who are to be punished as perpetrators or parties privy 
to the act. A perpetrator is the person who prepares remaking or under whose assignment 
preparations are made. Persons who act under assignment given by others must be considered 
abettors, in this case again the general rules applicable to parties privy to the offence must be 
applied to them. 
In accordance with Section 62 of the act, imitation is different from remaking: the latter 
conveys the artistic content of the work remade, while the former constitutes borrowing of the 
technique, form of representation of the artist’s specific works only, as such imitation does 
not convey the material content of a work; for this reason, the act does not qualify it as 
infringement of copyright. 
 Although the act refers photographs to the scope of copyright protection, and in Section 71 it 
describes the possibility of their infringement, with respect to portraits Section 72 contains 
special regulations.  
Act XVI of 1884 on copyright does not stipulate against what attacks, what persons it desires 
to protect authors. The act takes the identity of the person infringing copyright into 
consideration only in the event that the attack has been committed abroad, and even then 
solely to the extent whether the perpetrator is a Hungarian citizen or not. Act LIV of 1921 
calls the concept of violation of copyright infringement. Without the consent of the author 
(including his legal successor) either reproduction or making public or marketing of the work 
itself is sufficient for infringement of copyright. One of the forms of unauthorised 
reproduction is plagiarism. We can speak about plagiarism when somebody communicates 
somebody else’s intellectual product as his own. Also, plagiarism is realised when the 
infringer does not reproduce, make the whole work public word for word but carries out the 
above with changes, inclusions, deletions, in other words, by reworking that conceals 
infringement or under a new title, other author’s name.  Use, reworking of somebody else’s 
work which results in a new original work is not plagiarism.  
If somebody makes his own work public unlawfully under somebody else’s name, he will be 
responsible for prejudicing another person’s personal rights in accordance with general 
private law only. The author is restricted in new use, adaptation of his own work already 
published to the extent that thereby he shall not prejudice the rights of the person who has 
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acquired copyright from him on his already published work. The act forbids unauthorised 
reproduction by any procedure. Infringement will have been implemented already when the 
first copy of a work reproduced in spite of the law or the first copy of unauthorised remaking 
has been made; the act, however, allows production of a single copy free of charge without 
the author’s consent, when it is intended for non-commercial use. Producing more copies than 
the permitted single copy is also production of a single copy against a fee; furthermore, 
production of a single copy free of charge but for commercial use, when the author’s consent 
is missing, will establish infringement of copyright one by one. Commercial use is to mean 
use beyond the scope of private life for profitable or business purposes. The produced single 
copy can be used even for presenting the work by optical equipment only in the event that 
presentation is free of charge, non-commercial; otherwise, commercial presentation as 
reproduction will become infringement. Presentation of already published writer’s and 
musical works by optical equipment does not require the author’s consent, and only 
presentation through phototelegraph, photoradio to an unlimited number of audience is bound 
to the author’s special permit. 
Section 6 of Act LIV of 1921 deals with infringement of copyright in details. The author has 
moral and economic interests in ensuring that his work should not be made public in spite of 
his will; therefore, only he can be vested with the right to communicate his work and its 
content for the first time.  
Even if the manuscript or reproduced copy of the work has been taken possession of by 
somebody else lawfully, thereby copyright with regard to the work will not devolve without 
any special transfer; it follows from this that copyright will be even less due to anybody 
purely on the grounds that he has acquired ownership right of the publication that embodies 
the work. The act forbids reproduction, marketing, making public and communication by 
radio of presentations, recitations, readings without the author’s consent only in case it serves 
educational or entertainment purposes. Presentations, recitations and readings to this effect 
without the author’s consent cannot be published in newspapers either.387 
The publisher commits infringement to the author’s injury if it publishes translation of the 
work, or makes unauthorised changes to the work; if it issues a publication where it breaches 
the author’s orders regarding the shape and price of copies; if it issues a new edition 
unlawfully; if it publishes a collected edition instead of single works or single works instead 
of a collected edition. Also, the publisher commits infringement when it produces the work in 
more copies than it is entitled to in accordance with the contract.388 
In the event that the author makes changes subsequently to the work not prejudicing the 
publisher’s lawful interests and the publisher publishes the work omitting such changes, this 
edition is to be considered an edition carried out in defiance of the law or contract and so will 
be qualified infringement by the publisher. And if the publisher refuses to publish a work with 
changes made subsequently by the author that prejudice the publisher’s lawful interests, and 
thereupon the author himself publishes or causes to publish the work with such changes, then 
the author will commit infringement in defiance of the law or contract.389 
If, however, the author or the publisher is in breach of the contract in any other form, then the 
legal consequences determined in private law will be incurred. The author will be responsible 
for the offence of infringement if the author, having transferred copyright of all his works to 
be created during a determined period to somebody under contract, transfers copyright on his 
work created during the contractual period to a third party, contrary to the contract, although 
such copyright has devolved to the other party from the first, and this third party publishes the 
work. The same applies to an individually determined work to be created in the future. If, 
                                                 
387
  Alföldy 1936. 47.  
388
  Alföldy 1936. 49. 
389
  Alföldy 1936. 49. 
however, the author has committed himself to somebody merely to write a certain number of 
works for him for publication, then this person will acquire copyright on the work completed 
later only in the event that he makes a special agreement with the author on publishing that 
work, without that the author can freely dispose over the completed work against third parties, 
and will be responsible for failure to fulfil obligations in accordance with general private law. 
The above, in a wider sense, is applicable to publisher’s transactions whenever publication is 
in conflict with the contract concluded with the person whom the author has transferred his 
copyright to.390 
The provisions of the act shall be properly applied to public performances; therefore, anybody 
who performs or causes to perform a theatre play, musical work, musical play or motion 
picture work in public in defiance of the law or contract concluded with the author will 
commit infringement.391 Anybody who stages a play under right acquired for performance at a 
determined theatre without the author’s consent at another theatre commits infringement in 
accordance with the provisions of the act. The relevant clauses of the act shall be applied 
properly to fine art, applied art and photographic works.  
If publication, public performance, presentation by mechanical or optical equipment, 
communication by radio has been unauthorised due to prohibition under the law, then 
infringement will be implemented. Co-authors’ acts regarding publication of the joint work 
without consent of the rest of the authors will be considered unauthorised if they use the work 
made jointly without the other co-author’s consent, unlawfully. If a co-author disposes over 
only his own separable part, then the other party will be responsible merely in accordance 
with general private law.392 
The provisions of the act protect the author against unauthorised adopting of news of 
newspaper correspondence offices. Such companies deal with gathering reports and telegrams 
on daily events, and, having collected and reproduced them in a special edition, make them 
available to subscribers, and thereby subscribers acquire right to directly adopt news. 
However, newspapers that are not subscribers of such companies can adopt their reports and 
telegrams only in the event that the reports and telegrams have already appeared in the 
newspaper entitled to adopt them. The act considers breach of this prohibition infringement; 
here it protects activity of gathering news rather than author’s intellectual work. If copyright 
on the so appeared announcement holds, then the author will be entitled to take action in case 
of further unauthorised adopting. Obviously, reports of newspaper correspondence offices can 
be communicated to the public by radio without their consent only in the event that they have 
already appeared in any newspaper entitled to adopt them.393 It is the newspaper 
correspondence company that will have the right to take action due to infringement committed 
to their injury against anybody who adopts news of such company in defiance of the 
prohibition set out in law.  
In accordance with Article 13 of the Rome Convention, it is he author’s exclusive right to 
transmit his work to means, equipment that serves mechanical performance of the work. 
Mechanical performance is to mean that the equipment to which it has been transmitted is 
capable of reproducing it mechanically. In legal terms, appliances must be distinguished 
whether they are able to reproduce the work several times owing to the same adoption, or they 
are able to reproduce the transmitted work only once but at several places simultaneously. 
Transmission of the work to equipment that can reproduce the work mechanically repeatedly 
is to be considered reproduction. Anybody who makes or duplicates a gramophone record or 
roll of film of the work without the author’s permit will commit infringement according to the 
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law; however, a person who acquires right to transmit a musical work, musical play, play to 
such equipment and to duplicate the work by such equipment will not be entitled, purely for 
this reason, simultaneously to right of public performance through such equipment. 
The question arises what should be considered infringement of copyright. By the provisions 
set out in section 9 the act sets exceptions for the sake of general education, criticism, news 
service of newspapers, publicity of political, administrative and court proceedings. 
The given provision inures to the benefit of only independent scientific works, i.e., the benefit 
of works that, in terms of their content, constitute mostly their author’s own intellectual 
product, and does not contain merely materials borrowed from others. Borrowing is allowed 
into collections that serve solely ecclesiastical or school use. To protect the authors’ interests, 
the act deliberately does not mention educational use, in addition to school use; so, it forbids 
borrowing for the purposes of any education beyond education carried out strictly at school. 
According to proper interpretation of the act, wilful or negligent failure to specify the source 
or the author is offence, and will involve legal consequences. Text images, figures, drawings 
set in published works, on condition that they are protected as original works, are regarded 
identically as specific minor parts of larger writer’s works in terms of the rules properly 
applicable to them; consequently, they can be included again only in independent scientific 
works or solely in collected works serving ecclesiastical and school use subject to specifying 
the source or the author.394 
In accordance with paragraph 2, except for literary and scientific papers, other newspaper 
articles can be used in other newspapers, except when reprint is expressly forbidden, but the 
source and the author possibly indicated in it must be clearly named. So, borrowing literary 
articles requires the author’s consent also in the event that prohibition of reprint is not 
indicated on them.  
In case of using newspaper articles in newspapers these provisions cannot be applied in the 
event that the article has appeared or is used in a periodical and not in a newspaper. In 
accordance with Section 10 of Act LIV of 1921, separate rules of law govern reproduction, 
making public, marketing of statutes and decrees. 
In accordance with Section 18 of the act, prejudicing copyright is infringement; copyright is 
covered by both criminal and private law protection.  
 
VI. 4. 2. Penalties 
 
It is in the chapter Penalties that Act XVI of 1884 sets forth regulation, sanctions of 
infringement of copyright and other unlawful conduct related to it. 
The state of facts distinguishes three forms by the content of consciousness related to the act: 
malice, negligence and accidental infringement. The perpetrator commits malicious 
infringement if with the aim of making a writer’s work public he carries out or causes to carry 
out mechanical reproduction, being aware of the fact that thereby he prejudices another 
person’s copyright. The perpetrator commits negligent infringement when, without being 
aware of the unlawfulness of his act, he carries out or causes to carry out mechanical 
reproduction of a writer’s work, and by making it public he prejudices another person’s 
copyright, although with due care he could have avoided this injury.395 
To declare offence, it is not necessary that the writer’s work should be reproduced for 
distribution since Section 5 of the act unambiguously sets forth that mechanical reproduction, 
making public and marketing of the work, when it is carried out without the copyright 
owner’s consent, must be considered infringement. Section 22 declares that the act becomes 
completed by the fact that the first copy of the duplication of the work in defiance of the law 
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has been made, and to declare penalty does not require that the perpetrator should intend to 
make public and market too.  
The subject, i.e., perpetrator of infringement is a person who carries out or causes to carry out 
reproduction for himself or on his own account so that he could market them as the owner of 
the so reproduced copies.396 This is usually the publisher since it is the publisher that makes 
reproduced copies so that it could market them as its property.  
Obligation to compensate for the damage will bind the person who has committed 
infringement of copyright, or who has induced another person to commit infringement of 
copyright, or who has been party privy to infringement of copyright, finally, who has wilfully 
distributed, marketed the unlawfully reproduced copies. In case of attempt compensation does 
not lie. On the other hand, compensation claim must be distinguished from action for 
enrichment. For, if the person who has suffered injury has submitted compensation claim 
only, but later the injury has not been declared (accidental infringement of copyright), the 
perpetrator cannot be obliged to pay damage up to the extent of his enrichment because it has 
not been resolutely requested in the claim. 397 
Obligation to compensate applies both to real damage and lost profit. The act contains no 
measures to determine the amount of compensation. In a strict sense, the basis of damage 
shall be the value of the items not sold due to unauthorised reproduction from among the 
lawfully published copies; however, since it is not easy to determine the above in practice, it 
is more expedient to set out from that fact that saleability of a work is shaped by need and the 
audience’s interest, in other words, just as many of the lawfully published copies would have 
been sold as many of the unlawfully reproduced ones have been sold—yet, this can be applied 
only if the original work is completely reprinted. Or else it is the duty of the court to declare 
the extent of the loss paying regard to circumstances. In setting the amount of damage, it is 
always mandatory to set out of the price of the original work, since the author has hoped to 
gain profit from that; so, his loss will be the deficit arising from the price of such copies. 
Domestic approach represents the view that the gross price should be taken as basis, which 
means the actual shop price since the public can buy the work only at this price.398  
If the number of copies made through unauthorised reproduction and sold exceeds the number 
of sold copies of the original work, then it will be a question whether indemnification from 
the difference is due to whom. The answer to this can be found in the publication contract, for 
if the author has transferred copyright without any reservations to the publisher, then his right 
has completely terminated, and the compensation can be due solely to the person empowered 
to publish the original work, i.e., the publisher. If, however, the author has assigned his right 
to the publisher only for publication of a determined number of copies, then compensation 
payable from the difference will be due to the author because the publisher has already 
received compensation on copies in stock for sale and its right resting on the publication 
contract has been fully enforced.399 
Furthermore, the state of facts provides for the case when the perpetrator is not responsible for 
either malice or negligence in his act, i.e., he was in error in fact or error in law when 
committing the act, and acted in good faith (accidental infringement of copyright). Penalty 
will be imposed on an accidental infringer too, specifically by compensation up to the extent 
of his enrichment because the lawmaker cannot permit that anybody should gain benefit at 
somebody’s expense from any unlawful act, albeit, innocently. However, he can prove that he 
has produced enrichment beyond the loss caused to the author, which he can keep, since he 
must repay it solely to the extent of the damage of the injured party.  
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Section 20 provides for parties privy to the act—instigators, abettors and accessories after the 
fact—and states that the penalties and obligations to compensate applicable to them are 
determined according to general legal principles. Section 21 sets the rules of confiscation. 
Equipment necessary for unauthorised reproduction will be confiscated in order to prevent 
continuation and repetition of infringement. Such equipment will be also confiscated if the 
perpetrator is not responsible either for malice or negligence because confiscation is not the 
consequence of offence but a title arising from the author’s exclusive right that can be 
enforced against the possessor of all unlawfully reproduced copies, however, it is allowed to 
confiscate only the copies that are possessed for the purposes of distribution, but it is not 
allowed to confiscate copies that have been acquired for own use. Confiscation can be 
effected only with regard to objects that can be used solely for unauthorised reproduction. 
Unlawfully reproduced copies still on hand, which are found in possession of the printer, 
bookseller, industrial distributor, the perpetrator or the instigator and are confiscated, must be 
annihilated. Annihilation of special tools intended to be used for unauthorised reproduction 
means that their shape will be changed so that they could not be used for their original 
purpose; yet, the material of the tools will be returned to the owner. Annihilation and 
confiscation can be performed on request, because the author has the right to purchase copies 
and equipment on hand. The author can exercise this right freely both in case he has suffered 
any loss indeed and in case he has not because this right of the author can be restricted solely 
by the right of a third party interested. For, if the author has assigned his work to the publisher 
for a single edition of one thousand copies, then neither the author nor the publisher can 
demand to hold unlawfully reproduced copies because thereby the other party’s right would 
be injured. Partly unauthorised reproduction occurs when it affects certain parts of the work 
only; so, for example, the title page, the foreword, certain pages, full or half sheets. In this 
case, confiscation can extend only to these specific parts or the equipment necessary for 
producing them, on condition that these parts can be separated mechanically from the whole 
work. 
Section 22 sets forth the stages of the state of facts of offence. Offence of infringement of 
copyright becomes completed when the first copy reproduced in defiance of the law has been 
made; it is not necessary for it to be made public or marketed. If somebody has made only a 
single copy of an alien work without having planned to make more copies of it, thereby he has 
commenced but has not finished offence, i.e., his act can be considered an attempt only. 
Regarding infringement of copyright, attempt can be declared only in the event that 
mechanical reproduction has already been started. This requires certain preparatory works, 
without which reproduction could not be carried out, and if preparatory works have been 
commenced, mechanical reproduction will become possible, i.e., infringement reaches the 
stage of attempt. The parts and equipment so produced can be also confiscated. If, however, 
no more than purchasing has been carried out, but other work activities have not been started, 
we cannot speak about attempt either. To commit offence, the act demands that at least the 
first copy should have been made in a publishable form. For this reason, if certain parts of the 
work have been completed only, we can again speak about attempt at infringement.  
Section 23 formulates the state of facts of the offence of commercial distribution, and orders 
to punish it equally as infringement of copyright. As Section 22 considers the offence of 
infringement of copyright completed by the first copy having been made, therefore, 
distribution following it cannot be punished as being privy to the act either. This is 
supplemented by the provision that regards businesslike offering for sale, sale or distribution 
in other form, if they are committed by the perpetrator deliberately, as an act of committing 
offence too. If the distributor is responsible for negligence only, he will not be subject to any 
penalty or obliged to pay compensation because a bookseller cannot be expected to be 
familiar with all works involved in bookselling and to know which is considered unauthorised 
reproduction and which is not.400  
Thus, conducts of committing offence are offering for sale, sale and distribution in other 
forms. Distribution in other forms can be any act that makes it possible to acquire, get familiar 
with the unlawfully reproduced work.401  
In accordance with Act LIV of 1921, the act implementing infringement will be subject to 
penalty and can be both deed and omission. Penalty will lie only in the event that the injured 
party submits his application seeking penalty in action at law. Penalty by fine is the criminal 
law consequence of infringement; private law consequences of infringement include 
compensation and confiscation, but the act does not mention claim seeking discontinuance of 
infringement in the enumeration of the legal consequences of infringement, although it is 
beyond doubt that the injured party can institute an action seeking measures to oblige the 
infringer to discontinue the act of infringement and to bar him from repetition or continuance 
of infringement. The act regulates the issue of compensation to the extent that in case of 
malice, negligence the infringer will be obliged to give proper pecuniary compensation to the 
injured party for both pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss. Pecuniary compensation extends 
to damage actually suffered as well as lost profit expected under normal circumstances. The 
infringer is obliged to recompense non-pecuniary loss, in addition to pecuniary loss caused by 
infringement. 
Judicial practice acknowledged the right of compensation of non-pecuniary loss of the person 
whom the author has transferred his copyright to. In accordance with the act, the amount of 
compensation cannot be less than the infringer’s enrichment. The infringer is obliged to 
surrender his enrichment even if it exceeds the pecuniary loss caused to the injured party. In 
accordance with the act, in case the infringer is not responsible for either malice or 
negligence, penalty does not lie, and the infringer will be liable up to the extent of his own 
enrichment only.402  
In general, enrichment is the amount that is usually paid to the author for the relevant use. 
Paying regard to general private law principles, an accidental infringer is responsible for 
enrichment only in the event that he still has the enrichment at the time when he learns of the 
infringement.403  
It might happen that the injured party seeks declaration that a legal person has committed 
infringement to his injury and requests to punish the legal person in its medium specified by 
name. A natural person named by name can be punished only in the event that he has been 
sued personally as a party. His penalty and condemnation cannot be decided on the basis of 
the defence of the legal person involved in the lawsuit; however, if the individual empowered 
to act on behalf of the legal person has committed offence contrary to the act within the scope 
of his duties of his employment, then the legal person will be also responsible for the 
demandable pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss or enrichment. Furthermore, it follows from 
the provisions of Act LIV of 1921 that if the legal person’s enrichment due to infringement 
exceeds the amount of the loss caused by the natural person, then the legal person will be 
liable up to the extent of its enrichment. If the acting natural person is not responsible for 
either malice or negligence with respect to infringement, then the legal person will be again 
liable to the extent of its enrichment. 
It might occur that an article appears in a newspaper, periodical that implements infringement. 
Responsibility for infringement will undoubtedly bind the person who has sent the article as 
his own to the newspaper, periodical for publication. However, commission of infringement 
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will be assisted by the person who arranges the compilation of the journal and who has right 
of disposal over the content and articles that appear in the journal—this person is the 
responsible editor of the paper,404 whose criminal liability with respect to infringement 
committed in the journal must be judged in accordance with general criminal law rules. 
Only by deliberation of all the circumstances of the case being judged can it be decided 
whether the responsible editor has breached the obligation to review binding him. Against the 
injured party the responsible editor cannot refer to the fact that he has entrusted another 
person with editing the paper because regarding third parties it must be always presumed that 
publication has been carried out with the responsible editor’s knowledge and approval; so, he 
can be held responsible by virtue of negligence even in this case. At the request of a person 
who finds an article published in the paper injurious on the grounds of Act LIV of 1921, the 
responsible editor is obliged to name the person who has sent in the article as his own for 
publication. If the responsible editor fails to fulfil his obligation to supply information, he will 
expose himself to the injured party bringing an action against him, and if the identity of the 
perpetrator is revealed in the lawsuit, the responsible editor, even if he wins the lawsuit, can 
be obliged to bear costs in accordance with the provisions of the civil procedure on the 
grounds that he has given cause for the lawsuit. In case publication of the article can be 
attributed to the responsible publisher’s act, the responsible publisher’s copyright 
responsibility cannot be higher than the responsible editor’s responsibility.405 
 In accordance with Section 20, the injured party can request confiscation of the stock of 
copies produced through infringement and special tools and equipment used for infringement. 
Confiscation lies only in the event that the injured party has submitted special application to 
this effect, which specifies the objects in details that are requested to be confiscated. 
Confiscation can be the object of the relief sought. The stock subject to confiscation is to 
mean copies that are meant to be marketed, which can be established from the circumstances 
of the case; it can be a single copy if it has been meant to be sold. Copies transferred from the 
infringer to the ownership, possession of persons where they are waiting for being sold will be 
also subject to confiscation. If the judgment has ordered to confiscate the copies in the stock 
in whole, they must be annihilated. 406 
Application for confiscation can be submitted against those who possess the copies as 
infringer, seller, or other commercial distributor, public exhibitor; confiscation of copies at 
members of the public, closed readers’ circles, casinos, libraries and collections is not 
permitted. In accordance with the act, confiscation lies also against the person who is not 
responsible for either malice or negligence with respect to infringement as well as against 
inheritors and legatees. In accordance with the act, attempt at infringement will bring about 
confiscation, what is more, tools and equipment used for preparing infringement can be 
confiscated too. The injured party can request to use the copies, tools and equipment, but only 
in the event that third parties do not suffer any legal injury thereby. The above provisions 
must be properly applied to public performances, fine art exhibitions. 407 
Reasons for confiscation hold in case of advertising that prejudices another person’s copyright 
as preparation, according to the nature of the thing, just as in case of attempt. If the planned 
reproduction, marketing of a work is advertised by a person who does not have copyright on 
the work, then such advertisement is suitable for thwarting publication of the work by the 
person who is actually entitled to copyright. If the unauthorised advertisement advertises a 
cheaper edition or an edition under otherwise more favourable terms, then everybody will 
refrain from buying the copies published by the person empowered to do so. By keeping in 
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circulation the act means offering for sale, sale, distribution in other forms or use of copies. 
Offering for sale is implemented when the bookseller keeps the copies in stock in his shop 
ready for sale. Distribution is making the work available to the public or making the work 
public in other form, but only in case of malice and businesslike manner shall offering for 
sale, sale, distribution in other forms or use be considered offence that brings about penalty 
and compensation. The state of facts of this offence can be implemented only wilfully; 
negligence is not enough.408 
In accordance with the act, copies kept unlawfully in circulation will be subject to 
confiscation at the distributor (user) even if he is not responsible for malice or negligence. In 
accordance with Section 23, offence will be committed by a person who breaches his 
obligation to name the source and possibly the author as well as who indicates or omits the 
author’s name on the work in spite of his will; consequently, indication of the name of an 
author with pseudonym or an anonymous author is offence subject to this provision.409 
This provision must be properly applied to public performances. 
 
VI. 4. 3. Procedural rules 
 
Chapter four of Act XVI of 1884 sums up procedural rules of infringement of copyright. 
Section 25 determines the jurisdiction rule, which states that infringement of copyright will be 
judged, based on the lawmaker’s will—in spite of its criminal law character—in civil law 
proceedings.  In accordance with Section 26, conducting proceedings on infringement of 
copyright will always fall within the jurisdiction of royal courts of justice irrespective if the 
claim seeks compensation, confiscation or penalty. The injured party can freely decide 
competence of courts of justice; so, he can choose the court of justice of the place of 
committing the act, or the domicile, residence of the perpetrator, or any of them if the two are 
not located at the same place; in case of several perpetrators he can choose the competent 
court of the domicile or residence of any of them.410  
Section 27 regulates commencement of the proceedings. Infringement of copyright is an act 
subject to private complaint with request for prosecution, i.e., proceedings can be commenced 
solely upon the application of the injured party, for infringement contains violation of private 
law and it is usually not in the interest of the State to punish infringement if the injured party 
does not require it. It is different in criminal cases and civil cases against whom the injured 
party is obliged to submit his claim. In criminal actions, in case of several perpetrators, when 
proceedings can be commenced solely upon the motion of the injured party, then the motion 
submitted by the injured party against any of them will involve the rest of the perpetrators 
being subjected to proceedings, i.e., the injured cannot choose from them. In civil actions, 
however, the injured party can choose from joint obligors; consequently, he can sue one, 
several or all of them with regard to the same loss. Infringement of copyright, although it is a 
lawsuit conducted before civil courts, is determined by the lawmaker’s intention due to its 
criminal law nature in such fashion that the injured party should not be able to choose from 
among those whom the law orders to be punished; so, the injured party is obliged to submit 
his claim against all the perpetrators known to him. A perpetrator subjected to lawsuit will 
have the right to name his accomplices having taken part in committing the act, and so the 
injured party can submit an accessory claim, until judgment is passed, against the perpetrators 
he has subsequently learned of. It is also in the interest of the injured party to sue all the 
perpetrators since they are jointly and severally responsible for compensation, i.e., in case of 
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several perpetrators he will have greater security to ensure that one of them will compensate 
for his loss.411  
The act provides the injured party with the right to withdraw his motion any time before 
pronouncement of judgment; in this case, penalty does not lie. The perpetrator’s obligation to 
compensate will always continue to hold, except when the injured party expressly waives his 
right to this effect. Also, the question might arise whether the injured party can choose from 
among several perpetrators against whom he withdraws his claim. Setting out from the fact 
that he does not have the right to choose from among those against whom he submits his 
motion, so he does not have right to choose against whom he withdraws his claim; so, if he 
manifests his intention to withdraw his claim against any of the perpetrators, thereby the rest 
of the perpetrators will be released from penalty. Claims due to infringement of copyright can 
be submitted by those whose copyright has been prejudiced or endangered; accordingly, it is 
primarily the author who is entitled to right of action; however, if he has transferred the right 
of reproduction, making public or marketing of his work to another person, then such other 
person can become copyright owner in determining right of action.  
This section sets up the reversible presumption that it is the person whose name is indicated 
on the work as the author that must be considered the author of a work already made public. 
This presumption is true with regard to the translator and the editor of collected works too 
because Sections 2–7 of this act states that in the cases regulated therein they are regarded 
identically as the author.412 On the other hand, it sets up no presumption that the publisher 
indicated on the title page of the work as publisher of the work is indeed the authorised 
publisher of the work, for the publisher’s right is set out in contract, for this reason, its right 
can be proved only by this contract or other tools of demonstration. In case of works 
published under pseudonyms or without any name, the act allows that the author’s name 
should be subsequently notified for being registered and that it should be entered in the 
register; this, however, does not provide grounds for the presumption that it is him who must 
be considered the real author of the work because registration takes place at the unilateral 
request of the party concerned, and revision by court whether this fact is true is missing; 
furthermore, registration extends the term of protection only, and does not prove that the 
registered person has written the work. If the author’s real name is indicated on the new 
edition of a work published under pseudonym or without any name, then the presumption will 
be valid with regard to the new edition; yet, this will have no effect on the first edition.413  
If a work has been published in several editions by several publishers, then each publisher 
will be entitled to assert author’s rights but only with regard to its own edition. 414 
If the author has transferred his copyright to the publisher not unconditionally, then he can at 
his discretion disclose his real name and can prove that he has written the work, and then he 
himself can take action against any person committing infringement of copyright, for the 
author has not lost his copyright by hiding behind a pseudonym because the act does not 
demand that he should have his real name registered in order to maintain right of action. 
Consequently, the aim of this section is to protect the rights of the author who intends to stay 
without any name. The other case is when the publisher or the commission agent asserts its 
right of action as the author’s legal successor. For, in accordance with general rules, they 
could do that by proving that they are the copyright owners through attaching their contract 
concluded with the author, by which, however, they would disclose the author’s name. As this 
is contrary to the lawmaker’s will, it states that the publisher or commission agent indicated 
on the work will be without any further demonstration considered the author’s legal 
                                                 
411
  Kenedi 1908. 196. ff.; Knorr 1908. 112. ff. 
412
  Knorr 1890. 116. ff. 
413
  Kenedi 1908. 196. ff. 
414
  Knorr 1890. 117. f. 
successor; which, as a matter of fact, does not exclude that the perpetrator could prove that the 
publisher or commission agent indicated on the work is not the real publisher or commission 
agent.415 Section 29 provides courts with the opportunity to proceed with respect to 
deliberation of evidence in accordance with the theory of free demonstration, which accepts a 
fact as having been proved not in the case set out in the rule of law but when it is made certain 
by the court, i.e., it demands the judge’s personal conviction resting on reasonable causes 
complying with general laws.416 
If the court deems that the evidence submitted by the parties is not sufficient for fully 
clarifying the circumstances of the case, but it hopes to reach success by continuing the 
proceedings, the court of first instance will have the right to order to extend the proceedings 
and conduct new demonstration.  
The court can order hearing of experts if it deems it necessary for judging the case 
profoundly; the court is not bound by the parties’ motion in deciding appointment of experts. 
In general, expert opinion is requested when a technical question arises that needs to be 
answered by all means in order to determine the fact of infringement, the volume of loss, or 
the extent of enrichment.  
Section 31 of the act, by setting up permanent expert committees, ensures that courts should 
receive reliable opinion they can base their judgment on. As a matter of fact, courts are not 
obliged to invite these committees and are not bound by their opinion. Contacted experts must 
have sufficient technical information, literary and bookseller’s experience, knowledge of 
relevant laws on protection of copyright to be able to give full scope and well-founded 
opinion; for this reason, the committee consists of persons pursuing various occupations. 
Rules of procedure of expert committees were governed, temporarily, by the 1876 directive of 
the German imperial chancellery, which sets out the following: special committees consisting 
of seven members operate separately for writer’s works, musical works, fine art works and 
photography; adoption of resolution requires presence of five members; resolutions are 
adopted based on the submission of two appointed experts by majority of the votes cast; in 
case of equality of votes the chairman will decide the case.  
Section 25 of Act LIV of 1921 refers assertion of claims arising from infringement to civil 
action, which is supported by compelling reasons examined with knowledge of earlier 
regulation. Section 26 contains merely fundamental causes of competence: proceedings must 
be commenced before the court of the defendant’s domicile. Section 27 stipulates that the 
proceedings seeking enforcement of both criminal and private law consequences of 
infringement can be commenced only upon the application of the injured party, and are 
governed by the rules of civil procedure. Section 28 intends to make it possible—in the lawful 
interest of the injured party, specifically in case of danger, and in order to prevent occurrence 
of any further legal injuries and losses—for the court to bar the infringer from continuance 
and repetition of infringement or to sequester tools, to prevent marketing, further unauthorised 
production, by temporary injunction, upon the application of the injured party. Before 
commencement of proceedings, ordering sequestration will fall within the competence of the 
court of justice on the territory of which sequestration must be effected. In case of several 
courts of justice having competence, ordering of sequestration can be applied for from any 
competent court of justice. Sequestration can be ordered in accordance with Section 22 of Act 
LIV of 1921 against the distributor or user also in the event that they are not responsible for 
malice or negligence, i.e., if they keep the infringed copy in circulation in good faith or 
perform the work in public in good faith. Based on condemning judgment, if the defendant 
has exercised contestation or appeal delaying enforcement, sequestration can be ordered. 
Ordering sequestration does not lie if the opponent of the party applying for sequestration 
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makes it probable that the complainee has properly acquired right of reproduction, translation, 
remaking, putting into circulation, keeping in circulation, public performance or presentation. 
In this case the court will withdraw the sequestration ordered without hearing the parties. 
Endangering of the plaintiff’s claims can be made probable from the mere fact that the 
defendant can market the work published by it.417 Even surrendering all of the purportedly 
existing copies will not lead to exemption from ordering sequestration because the authorised 
party will be entitled to search for and find copies anywhere in stocks. Sequestration should 
be preferably restricted to the part of the work, tool or equipment or performance or 
presentation that contains infringement. During or after effecting sequestration, the parties can 
make an agreement set out in minutes by the delegate to ensure that the sequestrator could 
carry out reproduction and remaking, sell the copies in stock, hold public performance, place 
the amount remaining after deduction of costs fruitfully until the lawsuit is finally decided or 
sequestration is withdrawn.418 Section 30 regulates declaration of the fact and volume of loss 
and enrichment. This provision, however, does not prevent the judge from effecting inquiry 
and demonstration regarding the issue of pecuniary loss and enrichment, in accordance with 
other rules of civil procedure. The judge will have free hand especially in declaring the 
volume of non-pecuniary loss because the volume of such loss can be usually determined only 
by general deliberation of the circumstances of the case; consequently, declaration of such 
loss does not depend on particular data so much as declaration of pecuniary loss. Paragraph 2 
of the section provides for making the judgment public. Making the judgment adopted on the 
issue of infringement public in some inland periodical paper can be applied for by the winning 
plaintiff or winning defendant in case infringement is declared if the court has dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim based on infringement. The judge will deliberate according to the 
circumstances of the case whether the party applying for it has any interest in making the 
judgment public in need of such protection. In this respect it should be taken into account that 
making the judgment public in a periodical paper incurs significant cost; therefore, obliging 
imposes pecuniary loss on the condemned party. At the party’s request, the court may as well 
resolve that obligation of publication should be restricted to the enacting part of the judgment. 
 
VI. 4. 4. Regulation of limitation 
 
It arises from the nature of infringement of copyright that legal injury can be redressed 
properly only within a short time. Among others, it is conditional upon the injured party 
submitting its claim within a short time because if he fails to do so, it can be presumed that he 
has not suffered any material loss. For this reason, Section 36 of Act XVI of 1884 shortens the 
ordinary deadline open for right of action (thirty-two years) to three years in case of 
infringement of copyright. 
Limitation starts from the day when distribution of unlawfully reproduced copies has started; 
the reason for this is that Section 22 of this act states that offence must be considered 
completed when the unlawfully reproduced first copy has been made. If limitation started on 
this day—i.e., criminal law limitation were applicable to it—then the unauthorised reproducer 
could avoid penalty by making reproduction of as well a thousand copies and keeping it secret 
until three years have elapsed from making the first copy, then he could distribute them 
without being punished; that is why the day of distribution in this case is declared as the date 
of commencement. In case of infringement, limitation starts on the date of distribution, in 
other words, the day when distribution has started must be calculated as part of the deadline. 
The court does not need to take limitation into account ex officio.419 
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The deadline open for submitting the claim in case of committing this offence (identically 
with the offence of infringement of copyright) is again three years, however, there is a 
difference as to when this term of limitation begins. 
The perpetrator cannot be punished if the injured party has not submitted its claim within 
three months; however, the perpetrator will not be exempted from obligation to compensate 
even in this case, because payment of the damage is the consequence of the act and not 
penalty of the offence. Action for damages must be submitted within three years’ term of 
limitation. In calculation the three months must include the day when the injured learns of 
commission of the offence or the identity of the perpetrator, and the last day of the deadline 
will be the day which owing to its number corresponds to the date of commencement.  
Section 39 determines the deadline of confiscation and annihilation. Confiscation can be 
enforced independently as injunction, it is not bound to penalty, i.e., as long as unauthorised 
copies and their appliances exist they can be confiscated. No deadline applies to it, and it can 
be applied in spite of the injured party having failed to submit its claim during the term of 
limitation. 
The injured party can submit its right of action within three months from commencement of 
distribution of the printed publication in the following cases: 
− if the author or the source has not been clearly indicated when quoting specific points 
or minor parts of the already published work word for word, 
− in case of adopting already reproduced or published minor papers in limited volume in 
a larger work that can be considered independent scientific work in terms of its content, or in 
collections that have been edited from several authors’ works for ecclesiastical, school, 
educational purposes, 
− against the person who makes the author’s name public in spite of the author’s will. 
Section 41 states that interruption and rest of the term of limitation are governed by general 
rules; however, it does not specify if it refers to the rules of criminal law or civil law. As 
infringement of copyright is ”public offence” but proceedings can commence solely upon 
private complaint with request for prosecution, which is referred by the act to the jurisdiction 
of civil courts, and the criminal code usually contains measures regarding offences and 
infractions, it can be said that in this case again a peculiar mixture of the rules of the two 
fields of law prevails. According to criminal law, limitation is interrupted by the resolution or 
measure of the court due to the offence against the perpetrator or the party privy to the act, 
while according to civil law, by commencement of the action, and, in case of offences and 
infractions committed in the scope of infringement of copyright, by the resolution or measure 
of the court adopted with regard to the submitted motion. 420 
Limitation will be interrupted only with regard to the scope of object which the claim applies 
to. Limitation will be interrupted only with regard to the person who the measure of the court 
applies to. If commencement of the action depends on decision adopted on some preliminary 
issue (and it becoming final and unappealable), then limitation will rest until such decision.421 
In accordance with Act LIV of 1921, the proceedings that can be commenced due to penalty 
and compensation in case of infringement will lapse in three years. The claim seeking 
compensation for the damage, including the claim that can be laid with regard to enrichment, 
will lapse in three years too. The act sets compensation claim jointly with limitation of 
penalty for expediency purposes lest calculation should become more difficult and 
prosecution of infringement should become more complicated due to different limitation in 
public circulation. Paragraph 2, by setting up material preconditions, regulates 
commencement of limitation; accordingly, commencement of limitation is independent of 
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when the injured party has learned of infringement and the identity of the infringer. In case of 
unauthorised reproduction, limitation will commence on the date it is completed; 
consequently, the injured party cannot take action seeking penalty and compensation due to 
unauthorised reproduction if three years have passed from completion of reproduction. If the 
injured party intends to assert his claims arising from unauthorised putting into circulation, he 
can do that within three years from commencement of unauthorised putting into circulation, 
irrespective when unauthorised reproduction has been completed. Accordingly, if the 
infringer has concealed the stock of unlawfully produced copies from the injured party for 
three years, and as such he cannot be held responsible for unauthorised reproduction, the 
author can take action due to subsequently occurred unauthorised marketing (putting into 
circulation), within three years from its commencement. This also applies to the case when 
reproduction of the copies has been carried out lawfully, but putting the copies into circulation 
is infringement due to unauthorised changes or lack of indication of the source or for other 
reasons.422 
In case of unauthorised putting into circulation, the act calculates commencement of term of 
limitation from commencement of putting into circulation because putting into circulation is 
to mean commencement of the marketing of copies, and in several cases the date of 
completion of putting into circulation could not be determined. The injured party can take 
action due to unauthorised publication of unlawfully produced copies within three years from 
it. If only an attempt has been made at reproduction, making public or marketing, then 
limitation of enforceable compensation claim will begin upon discontinuance of the 
attempt.423 
Paragraph 3 sets the term of limitation of the imposed penalty as being equal to the term of 
limitation of commencing proceedings. The provisions must be properly applied to 
unauthorised public performance and unauthorised presentation by mechanical or optical 
equipment. 
The proceedings commenced in case of unauthorised keeping in circulation referred to in 
Section 22 and proceedings seeking compensation for the damage caused will also lapse in 
three years. In this case, limitation will start on the day when distribution or use was carried 
out for the last time. In case of offence of infringement, claim seeking penalty can be asserted, 
even within the three years’ term of limitation, only during three months from the date of 
learning of the fact. 
The act removes the claim seeking annihilation, confiscation of copies produced through 
infringement or the tools, equipment used for producing them—as a claim seeking 
termination of a permanently unlawful status—from the scope of short limitation and that for 
the full period of protection. It follows from the nature of the thing that this applies also in 
case of confiscation that can be enforced due to attempt at infringement or preliminary 
advertising, although the act does not specifically refer to it. The rules of general private law 
must be applied to interruption and rest of limitation of claim that can be laid due to 
infringement or an act regarded identically as that by virtue of damage. 
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 Summary 
 
The first form of independent copyright evolved on the analogy of right of ownership at the 
end of the 18th c.; this state in Europe lasted for almost one hundred years. Analogies drawn 
from right of ownership were certainly suitable for providing protection for authors’ works in 
corporeal form for the author’s benefit. Within the frameworks of the right of ownership 
approach, however, copyright could not be protected against distortions at all or only 
insufficiently by violently bending application of law. During the 19th c. in Europe, copyright 
and patent law codification in the modern sense evolved, consistently enforcing the civil law 
approach and development of exclusive rights related to intellectual works. 
Hungarian regulation of the field of law of intellectual works, basic codices go back to the 
19th century. Given the peculiarities of historical development, modern codification efforts 
evolved with a delay in the Age of Reforms; with respect to copyright the Bills related to 
Bertalan Szemere are worth mentioning. After suppression of the 1848-49 War of 
Independence and the 1867 Compromise, basically Austrian laws were applied. 
Around the middle of the 19th c., however, literary, scientific and political life in our country 
flourished, strongly helped by reproduction, by which Hungarian thoughts could be delivered 
to more and more people desiring changes. Simultaneously with progress, complaints were 
received on abuses of author’s rights. Increasing needs of life and enhancing circulation of 
intellectual goods as well as politics aimed at liberating the press brought along more 
independent development of author’s rights.  
In Hungary, in the beginning, as a result of state law relation, the development of author’s 
rights was similar to the process in Austria, and then, upon termination of this connection, it 
went through independent progress. The consequences of the Second World War, the 
evolution of the centrally controlled socialist economic/social system emphasised this 
requirement all the more. Even at that time, this branch of law preserved its main traditional 
features, owing to, at last but not least, several decades’ long memberships in international 
agreements. The field of law of intellectual works shows permanent progress—without injury 
to essential principles. Just as in the phase of its evolution, in the appearance of tendencies of 
modern development, changes in economic circumstances and technical conditions represent 
the key driving force. General features of historical development are reflected by the progress 
made in this field of law in Hungary too.  
The present volume has set the task to present currently effective regulation through the 
history of the development of copyright law in our country. This approach enables deeper 
understanding of specific legal institutions of copyright and their regulation as well as the 
underlying lawmaker’s intention and economic reason. Comparison of the solutions of Act 
XVI of 1884 and Act LIV of 1921 as well as Act III of 1969 and the currently effective Act 
LXXVI of 1999 clearly shows the arc of development these legal institutions have gone 
through, and how regulation of copyright—wanting to meet challenges posed by 
technological development—has been renewed and has been reinterpreting regulatory 
concepts again and again. 
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